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Abstract  
Over the last two decades, the increasing multiculturalism and religious pluralism in 
the progressively secular Europe has generated concerns and debates, among not only 
politicians but also academics and the general public, about the appropriate role of religion, 
especially Islam. This research is accordingly based on interdisciplinary perspectives that 
exchange concepts and methodologies for the purpose of exploring the relationship(s) Muslim 
women have to religion in a secular setting like Norway.  More specifically, this research 
presents a dialogue between “the personal”, “the feminist” and “the political” with the aim 
first to understand the role religion plays in the daily lives of Muslim female students at UIO 
in addition to reconsidering the theoretical constructs about appropriate accommodation of 
religious diversity and particularly the concerns and interest of Muslim women in Norway 
and Europe in general. Significantly, this research introduces a guide to any future attempt to 
redefine issues as diverse as secularism, religious freedom, religious diversity and women’s 
rights in contexts of renewed or persistent presence of religion in the public sphere. 
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1 Introduction  
This research is mainly directed towards rethinking the intersection of religion, 
feminism and politics; in particular the issue of “Muslim women” within the European debate 
and namely Norway. As a general overview, the increasing visibility of Muslims in the 
European public, either through performing their difference or through claiming religious 
rights, has generated concerns about how to deal with Islam and its adherents in the 
progressively secular Europe. “Obviously, the intersections between Europe and Islam are not 
a new phenomenon; a long and deep history of exchanges, wars, colonization, and waves of 
immigration has profoundly shaped the relations between Muslims and Europeans” (Göle, 
2006a, p. 260). However, as Muslims start forcing “their entry into spaces that were reserved 
to Europe’s “white” citizens, (…) they become “visible” and disturbing to the public eye” 
(ibid., p. 261). Notably, in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and similar incidents that were carried 
out in the name of religion, a series of questions have been raised interrogating the presence 
of the Muslim community and its influence on secularism, the traditions of European 
societies, Christian heritage and the security and stability of Europe1. More specifically, Islam 
has become a national security issue and a source of public and political controversy resulting 
in conflicting attitudes towards religious tolerance and freedom in parts of Europe. The most 
frequently cited example in this regard is France:  
The French model of Republicanism promises equality of universal rights for 
individual citizens; but the voluntary secular “blindness” to religious difference and 
the fear of communitarian twists (seen as an Anglo-Saxon and American model to be 
avoided) risk leading to a politics of denial, where ethnic, cultural, and religious 
differences disappear, or where authoritarian attitudes towards Muslims manifest 
themselves (Göle, 2012, p.142).  
                                                 
1Among the factors that have contributed to the growing visibility of Islam are summarised as follows:  
(…) increases in the European Muslim population in contrast to decrease in the population of “Western” 
Europeans; terrorism—surely mistakenly and wrongly—but defiantly committed in the name of Islam; 
calls for the application of elements of Islamic law in traditionally majority Christian nations; Europe’s 
economic dependence on Middle Eastern oil; traditional differences in dress (…) political upheavals in 
the Middle East (…); nuclear tensions with Iran; and war in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Durham & Kirkham, 
2013, p. 3)  
 
2 
 
As a matter of fact, the focus has shifted towards reconsidering models of integration as well 
as the ways in which religious diversity is accommodated. To clarify, the growing entry of 
Islam into the public sphere has urged European societies to consider new political strategies 
that would result in the successful integration of Muslim citizens; especially women. 
Regarding the European debate in general, one may argue that while some discourses 
draw on the Orientalist conceptions of the “Other” (Said, 1978), viewing Muslim women as 
victims of Islam and its patriarchal oppressive norms (Ahmed, 1992; El Saadawi 1999), 
Others stress the contemporary conceptions of the terrorist and the extremist “outsider within” 
(Collins, 1986), presenting Muslim women as “active” threats to the so called democratic 
“secular” societies (Salih, 2009). Based on such a discourse, some feminists as well as 
politicians either call for the protection of Muslim women from their oppressive Islamic 
cultures or from the implementation of various restrictions on their religiosity (Okin, 1999). A 
second position is adopted by those researchers and politicians who choose to emphasise the 
importance of an inclusive, plural and multi-religious public sphere (Modood and Kastoryano, 
2006). Nevertheless, one may also argue that the debate on “Muslim women” is recurrently 
expressed in a certain prejudice against Islam as either a threat or as an antifeminist religion. 
The logic of this argument, according to Lazreg (1988), lies on the belief that “religion must 
be abandoned if Middle Eastern women are to be like Western women” and that “there can be 
no change without reference to an external standard deemed to be perfect” (p. 85). Then again 
such an Othering discourse on Muslim women undermines the interconnected components of 
this debate; namely religion, feminism and politics. That is to say, it pays little attention to the 
individual freedom of religion and it ignores what perceptions these women appropriate to 
liberation. As a result, the same dichotomy of the civilized “West” versus the lagging behind 
“Rest” is reproduced projecting the fact that the justified and normalised rights are still 
defined by those in power; which means the persistence of hierarchy and inequality.     
As far as the Norwegian context is concerned, Jacobsen (2009) argues that research 
about Muslims and Islam in Norway has mainly focused on issues related to inter-religious-
dialogue, patterns of social and economic inequalities, and ethnic and cultural difference (p. 
19). On the other hand, she maintains that in the last decade the increasing interest in 
investigating the religious aspects of Muslim immigrants has become more difficult given the 
growing politicization of the research field. In other words, she clarifies that “the analytical 
categories used by researchers to distinguish between different Islamic tendencies have thus 
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become increasingly politicized as they are mapped onto the dichotomization of “good” 
versus “bad” Islam” (ibid. p. 20). With regard to Muslim women in particular, Langvasbråten 
(2008) indicates that addressing specific problems facing minority women is often a source of 
generalization or stigmatization to certain groups (p. 47). To illustrate, issues such as 
violence, force marriages and female genital mutilation are presented as the only “gendered 
multicultural problems” (ibid. p. 44), and they are most of the time equated to Islam and its 
patriarchal norms. In this respect, Halsaa et al (2010) acknowledge that “if gender equality is 
constructed as a particularly ‘Norwegian’ value, as something constitutive of ‘Norwegian-
ness’, it contributes to a problematic ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide” (p. 9).  As a result, though 
feminist as well as politicians continue their attempts to expand gender balance policies, this 
“has not been combined with similarly eager efforts to include minority based location, voices 
and points of views in core decision making bodies” (Siim and Skjeie, 2008, p. 339). More 
important, in the case of Muslim women, religion or spirituality remains among the frequently 
neglected aspects of diversity. In fact, both within feminism as well as in politics the focus 
has been exclusively on ethnicity, race and social class. Another salient point in this respect is 
related to questions such as: Who should have the right to represent whom, and in which way; 
taking into consideration the growing global and diverse Norwegian environment where 
women’s interests and needs are changing constantly? in fact, which tendency will have the 
upper hand in the future, according to Leirvik (2014) “depends both on structural questions of 
social cohesion (which include the integrating function of welfare society values) and of the 
agency of dialogue activists who are committed to making a difference by doing what does 
not come by itself” (p.158-9). In this case, a central feature underlying Leirvik’s argument is 
his support for a joint effort between the state’s integration policies and the dialogue activists 
representing the Muslim communities in Norway. Nevertheless, I would argue that such a 
proposal would still pay little attention to the inclusion of Muslim women’s voices. For this 
reason, my research aims at reversing the debate through allowing Muslim women (female 
students at UIO) first voice their relationship(s) to religion, express their standpoints vis-à-vis 
feminist as well as political representation(s) of their concerns and interests, and finally 
engage them in suggesting appropriate strategies to accommodate religious diversity within 
contemporary Norway. Indeed, developing appropriate feminist representations and policy 
strategies that would be in women(s) best interests become an area that needs more focus if 
we are to recognize diversity “within”. 
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Objectives and motivations 
Bearing in mind the previous discussion, my research is mainly concerned with 
introducing a multidimensional dialogue between the personal (Muslim women and their 
relationship(s) to religion), the feminist (discourses on Islam and Muslim women) and the 
political (discourses on Islam, Muslim women, religious diversity and secularism) with the 
purpose of developing a narrative that will reveal more accurate perceptions on Muslim 
women’s concerns and particularities. Significantly, it will help as a guide to any future 
attempt to redefine issues as diverse as secularism, religious freedom, religious diversity and 
women’s rights in contexts of renewed or persistent presence of religion in the public sphere.  
Main question 
• Is there a growing identification with Islam among young Muslim women in (secular) 
Europe? If so, what are the appropriate strategies and approaches to represent/ 
accommodate such religiosity within feminist and political debates, especially in relation 
to Muslim women’s concerns and particularities?  
Supporting Questions  
• Which relationship(s) do Muslim female students at UIO have to religion? And how does 
religion (Islam) shape their perceptions on life, freedom and women’s liberation? (5.2) 
•  What are the standpoints of these young women vis-à-vis feminist (5.3) as well as 
political (5.4) representation(s) of their concerns and particularities? Do they reinforce, 
reject, or challenge the ways they have been talked about? 
Methodology  
On the one hand, I reviewed theoretical perspectives drawing upon relevant literature 
within the feminist and political discourses on Islam and “Muslim women” in Europe and 
Norway in particular. On the other hand, empirical data was derived from my data collected 
through semi-structured qualitative interviews. Notably, a total of ten Muslim female students 
at the University of Oslo were given the opportunity to articulate their relationship to religion, 
their perceptions of life, freedom, women’s liberation, the secular state, and how they 
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conceive the prevailing political as well as feminist views on issues related to Muslim 
women.  
Theoretical background and delimitations 
This research accounted for the standpoints of Muslim female students at 
UIO regarding both “secular” political views that advocate, most of the time, for the 
privatization of religion as well as feminist discourses that either reject religion or call for its 
reinterpretation. For this purpose, I drew on a variety of interpretations from various 
disciplinary and theoretical perspectives. This includes the different definitions associated 
with the principle of secularism and multiculturalism drawing on examples from debates and 
policies developed in a range of European countries. Moreover, the “multiculturalism versus 
feminism” debate, initiated by the liberal feminist Susan Moller Okin, was reviewed as a 
background to the discussions linked with Muslim women in Europe. Besides, feminists’ 
approaches to Islam and Muslim women were evoked; including specifically secular 
feminism2 and Islamic feminist. With the purpose of producing a feminist account that takes 
into consideration issues of difference, the questioning of social power, resistance to all forms 
of oppression and a commitment to social justice, I conducted my research based on the 
standpoint feminist theory and the post-colonial feminist theory.  
Structure  
In this chapter (1), I intended to provide the broad as well as the specific contextual 
background of my research indicating the relevance of my contribution to the debate. More 
details about the context and background will be presented in chapter (2). In chapter (3), 
relevant literature will be reviewed to present a theoretical framework for interpreting my data 
gathered and answering my research questions. In chapter (4), the research design and 
methodology applied will be traced and reflected upon. Subsequently in chapter (5), my 
findings will be presented and discussed thematically; including the personal, the feminist and 
the political. Finally in chapter (6), I will attempt to answer my main research question and 
reflect on the limitations encountered while conducting the research. Besides, suggestions for 
possible further research will be suggested.   
 
                                                 
2
 Secular feminism is discussed in the theoretical chapter, see p. 37.  
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2 Context and Background 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the background related to debates about Islam and Muslim 
community first within the general context of contemporary Europe. In the second part, a 
more detailed overview about the Norwegian debate will be introduced; including the 
implications appropriated to secular Norway and its integration policies. Finally, the focus 
will be on presenting the way(s) Islam and Muslim women are perceived within discourses on 
Women’s oppression and radicalism.   
2.2 Islam in Contemporary Europe 
According to estimates from 20103, Muslims makes up approximately 6 percent of 
Europe’s total population, and Islam is becoming its second largest religion. As a result, the 
growth of Islamic culture in public space poses new issues that, for some European countries, 
conflict with the liberal values of secular Europe. Under those circumstances, Muslims’ 
negative influence on society has been emphasised drawing on contemporary conceptions of 
the terrorist and extremist “Other within”.  A tendency that justifies the considerable 
circulating accounts about “extremism”, “radicalism” and “Islamic revivalism”. As an 
illustration, the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci (2006) warns against the “Islamization” 
project claiming that “Europe becomes more and more a province of Islam, a colony of Islam. 
In each of our cities lies a second city: a Muslim city, a city run by the Koran. A stage in the 
Islamic expansionism”(p.35). Important to realise in this regard, the European historical 
experience of religion as a source of irrationality and conflict has played a salient role in 
strengthening the view that the presence of Muslims should create anxiety and fear. Based on 
such logic, Islam turns “to be a formless, stateless, borderless enemy motivated solely by an 
extremist (Islamic) desire to destroy western values and modes of life” (Jamal, 2013, p. 35).  
Significantly, a campaign against Islam and its adherents has never been that heavily 
intense as it is now in Europe. Consequently, Muslims have been subject to discrimination, 
stereotyping, and hostility in mainstream Western discourses— not just in the form of 
                                                 
3
 (Globalreligiousfutures.org, 2010) 
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electronic and print media, but also within politics. Equally important, Muslims have become 
the victims of what Stanley Cohen has diagnosed as “moral panic” 4.To demonstrate, some 
European countries have chosen to adopt “politics of fear”5 through for example using the 
issue of terrorism in the policy debate “to justify tougher controls of migration in general” 
(Triandafyllidou and Modood, 2012, p. 13), to exert restrictions on the constructions of 
minarets, the call for prayers, religious education and the public display of religious symbols. 
This adopted approach is used often under the pretext of encouraging the integration of 
Muslims into society.  Another point is that Islam tends to be equated with fundamentalism6 
in general; a claim that is often evoked whenever a terrorist attack takes place: 
This means that instead of presenting these events as the result of the actions of single 
individual human beings acting out of a more or less complex series of motivations, 
both US and European media largely presented them as a clash between civilisations. 
The result is that the idea of a clash between Islam and the West has become one of 
the most powerful political myths of our time (Bottici and Challand, 2012, p.118). 
Similar political debates are raged across Europe presenting Islam as inherently incompatible 
with the liberal secular democracy. This discourse has consequently contributed to the 
shaping of European public opinion about Islam, and thus it turns to be “a relic from the past 
deemed to disappear with progress” (Triandafyllidou and Modood, 2012, p. 20). Based on 
these circulating claims, Muslim actors’ capability to practice agency and be part of 
modernity is simply denied.  
On the other hand, some European countries have sought to compensate for the 
alienation of Muslims through establishing a formal bridge between the state and Islam. For 
instance, Islam was publically recognised as the second largest religion in France, and thus a 
council for the Muslim population (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman) was established in 
2003 as a step toward creating “French Islam” (Göleb, 2006, p.145). As a matter of fact, 
allowing an Islamic representation in the public sphere is connected to the states’ efforts to 
transform the “Muslims in Europe” into “European Muslims”. To clarify, Muslims are 
                                                 
4
 Moral panic obtains when opportunistic political agents manage to stigmatize a targeted group in such a way 
that the group’s purported moral deviance becomes convincingly portrayed as an existential threat to the society 
as a whole. Furthermore, moral panic is all the likelier in the “risk society” of late modernity where persons 
become more preoccupied with potential than with actual dangers. (O’Brien, 2013, p.13) 
5
 I will be using this expression to refer restrictive immigration policies. 
6
 Fundamentalism in this sense refers to those who read the Quran and Sunnah literarily and out of context 
justifying the legitimacy of their practices in the name of Islam.  
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expected to adopt a form of religion compatible with liberal democracy, individual human 
rights, and the demands of a civil society. To put it differently, some European politicians 
officially encourage “a Europeanized Islam, that is, an Islam that has been subjected to similar 
self-scrutiny and self-reform as the Christian denominations are alleged to have undergone in 
the modern age” (O’Brien, 2013, p. 6) This approach to the presence of Muslims in Europe is 
supported by Bassam Tibi (2008) who coined the term “Euro-Islam” advocating the 
development of “a European Islam based on the values of civil society, to be shared by all 
who want to live in Europe as citizens of an open society” (2008, p. xiv). Above all, European 
states adopt such an approach in an effort to reduce the potential for Islamic radicalism or 
extremism.  For the better understanding of the position(s) of Islam within European states the 
next chapter will outline the different implications of secularism, multiculturalism and 
feminism in relation to religion. 
2.3 Norway and Muslim Women: a Debate 
between Theories of Secularism, Multiculturalism 
and Feminism 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Norway has a total population of 5.17 and it is growing more culturally and religiously 
diverse8 (Figure 1) the same way as most of the European countries that has been affected by 
the ongoing asylum and migration flows.  Equally, dealing with such a plurality has 
increasingly become a topic of its own in recent years, especially that “in the current context 
one of the greatest challenges to the general public as well as to academics is the inclusion of 
Islam into the Nordic national identities, as one among several other religions pertaining to 
the Nordic peoples ” (Mårtensson, 2014, p.5) .The aim of this chapter accordingly is to 
                                                 
7
 Ssb.no, (2014). Population and population changes - SSB. [online] Available at: 
http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/folkendrkv/kvartal [Accessed 6 Nov. 2014]. 
8Members of religious and life stance communities outside the church of Norway, by religion/life stance:  
 As of 1 January 2013, 549 400 persons in Norway were members of religious and life stance 
communities; an increase of 39 000 compared with the previous year.  
More than half of the members, 313 000, were members of Christian communities. A total of 86 000 
were members of life stance communities and accounted for approximately 16 per cent of all members 
of communities. Furthermore, various Islamic communities (120 882 inhabitants) accounted for around 
22 per cent of the members, while the members of Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh communities accounted 
for 3 per cent, 1.2 per cent and 0.6 per cent of the members respectively.  
Source: (Religious communities and life stance communities, 2013) 
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provide insights on the particularity of the Norwegian case in relation to its secular nature, 
multicultural environment and the Muslim community, namely women. 
 
2.3.2 Norway and Secularism  
Norway’s approach to secularism remains to some extent different from the other 
European countries. In fact, until recently Norway had Christianity as its “official religion” 
and in particular a State Church connected to the monarchy.  Nevertheless, in an attempt to 
accommodate the increasing plurality and multi-religious reality of Norway, this “state 
religion” system has been in a process of regulation. Through the implementation of a number 
of reforms, Christianity was gradually excluded from decision-making and the privilege to 
determine public morality regarding issues such as divorce, abortion, birth control and same 
sex-unions. A recent example is the May 2012 constitutional amendment that granted the 
Church of Norway autonomy and separation from the state interference (Mårtensson, 2014, 
p.10). As a consequence, The Church of Norway is now perceived to be a faith community on 
an equal basis with other faith communities. In this regard, the Norwegian government though 
no longer appoints bishops and necessitates that half the cabinet ministers are church 
members, continues supporting financially the national church and minority faith-based 
11 
 
institutions with an equal funding according to memberships. Moreover, all registered faith-
communities are entitled to certify marriages, and they are also given exemption rights 
protected by a Norwegian anti-discrimination legislation (Siim and Skjeie, 2008, pp. 328-9). 
Given Norway’s increasing efforts and adjustments to accommodate diversity, it could be 
associated with the category of secularism as statecraft9 with regard to the two principles of 
non-establishment and the freedom of religion. In contrast to the neutrality model of 
secularism10, “Norwegian public authorities have pushed an active policy of accommodation 
of religious dress, and mainly regarded this as a question of non-discrimination between 
religions”(Siim and Skjeie, 2008, p. 331). However, in some domains religion continues to be 
intertwined with the secular providing the Church of Norway with “powers, privileges, and 
advantages which no other religious organization has been granted” (Furseth, 2014, p. 152-4). 
This includes the armed forces and the prisons, where the Church of Norway administers 
religious life (ibid.). On the basis of this model of state-religion separation, the Norwegian 
experience seems different from other secularized European countries such as France and 
Nederland.   
The Norwegian’s relation to religion can be also understood in association with the 
principle of secularization that refers mainly to the decline of religious beliefs and practices 
(Casanova, 1994). To put it differently, the Norwegian population is known of being among 
the most secularized and least religious in the world. This entails that the majority 
Norwegians are increasingly becoming less religious and more supportive of “an idealized 
secular public sphere free of religious influence and intervention” (Bangstad, 2013, p. 359). In 
fact, this emancipation from religion is rapidly emerging as a significant aspect of the 
Norwegian national identity. This argument is exemplified by the decreasing percentage of 
churchgoers in the Scandinavian countries including Norway. They rather belong to religious 
communities (mainly Christianity) without actually practicing a religious faith. In this respect 
Davie (2000) points out that “On a superficial level, the Scandinavians appear to reverse the 
British idea: they belong without believing” (p. 3). Obviously, Norway’s values, norms and 
structures have been influenced first by Christianity and then by secularism both as a 
philosophical ideology and a statecraft.  
Regardless its increasingly secular orientation, the Norwegian State is supposed to 
treat all religions equally without privileging one over another. The controversy of the subject 
                                                 
9
 Casanova’s definition of secularism as “statecraft” will be discussed in the theory chapter, see p. 11.  
10
 Secularism as “neutrality” be discussed later, see p. 23.  
12 
 
of religious education is a relevant example in this regard. As the UN Human Rights 
Commission in 2004 and the European Court of Human Rights in 2007 approved the religious 
minorities and the secular humanists complaint about the indoctrinating nature of the subject 
KRL (Christianity, Religion and Ethics), Norway was compelled to reconsider the name of 
the subject and its content. As a consequence, this subject was replaced with RLE (Religion, 
Philosophies of Life and Ethics) in 2008. Though there is still some dissatisfaction with the 
subject, “there are many indications that it has now become more acceptable to the 
minorities—so that it may function according to the intention of providing an arena for 
interreligious learning and dialogue training” (Leirvik, 2014, p.158). Nevertheless, a point 
worth mentioning here is that this secular principle of equal worth and pluralism conflicts 
with the popular political discourses that point often in a different direction “revealing an 
increasing tendency to reaffirm the so-called Christian cultural heritage as the uniting bond of 
the Norwegian nation” (Leirvik, 2005, p. 1). This is clearly demonstrated in the recent 
Norwegian government’s11 continuous efforts to resist religious diversity within society 
through policy proposals, rhetoric and provocations. For example, they declare openly their 
rejection to the niqab as well as their attempt to go back to the old version of the religious 
subject RLE12 demanding a minimum of 55 % teachings of Christianity. Briefly, it can be said 
that though Norwegian secularity has proven to be plural in its manifestation, this might not 
be always the case when it comes to accommodating religious diversity. Besides, this might 
result at a gradual erosion in the protection of freedom of religion and belief, and thus a more 
conflicting atmosphere; incompatible with the increasing religious plurality in Norway. In 
other words, it seems that there is a tendency towards moving from secularism as “pluralism” 
to secularism as “neutrality”13 and at the same time privileging the Christian heritage.  
2.3.3 Norway and Multiculturalism  
According to Stokke (2012), Norway’s approach towards diversity can be situated 
somewhere in the middle of the “civic nation” model in France and “ethnic nation” model in 
Germany sharing some characteristics of both (Figure 2) (p. 8). In particular, “while official 
Norwegian integration policy and citizenship law today is closer to the civic nation model, 
                                                 
11 The right-wing party was elected in 2013, and the anti-immigration Progress Party (PP) is into government 
for the first time. 
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 The government has decided lately to give the RE the name KRLE, an abbreviation for Christianity, Religion, 
World Views and Ethics.  
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 Both models of secularism are discussed in the theory chapter, see pp. 21-23.  
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popular conceptions of Norwegian national identity tend to emphasize ethnicity” (ibid.). In 
other words, Norway has emphasised traditionally its hegemonic national identity (Furseth, 
2014, p. 154) through various forms of assimilation, and at the same time it has encouraged 
immigrants to preserve their own languages and cultures.   
Figure 2: Integration policy in Norway 
 
Source14: Stokke, C. (2012). A Multicultural Society. How Norwegian Muslims Challenge a 
White Nation. Ph. D. Trondheim: NTNU. 
Norway’s approach to diversity is also described in terms of rights hierarchy with immigrants 
and other minority groups in the bottom “granted some poly-ethnic rights, but are ultimately 
expected to adapt to the majority culture” (Brochmann, 2002, p. 44-46). This entails the 
necessity on each individual to take part in society and comply with the state’s basic norms 
and principles including democracy, gender equality and children rights. To illustrate, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion manages “campaigns and education to 
prevent the early and sometimes forced marriages of young boys and girls; campaigns against 
female genital mutilation; more substantial ‘introductory learning packages’ about Norwegian 
language and society for new immigrants (…)” (Mårtensson, 2014, p.17). Another aspect of 
the Norwegian policies towards minorities is “defined not as a form of ‘multiculturalism’, but 
as in line with a ‘diversity policy’ that has developed in several other European countries” 
(Stokke, 2012, p. 49). Accordingly, the focus is directed more towards balancing between the 
shared values as well as diversity within society as a setting where “complex identities” and 
“multiple ways of being Norwegian” are all acknowledged (ibid.).  In the same way, Norway 
aims at fostering “a ‘tolerant, multicultural society’ through equal rights and duties for 
individuals regardless of ethnic/religious background, and uses ‘dialogue’ with minority 
organizations as an instrument to manage diversity” (Stokke, 2012, p. 252). To put it simply, 
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 This diagram presents my understanding to Stokke’s (2012) description of Norway’s integration policy. 
"Civic Nation": 
assimilation, 
homogenous nation.  
Sharing some feature
of both 
"Ethnic Nation": 
segragation, immigrants 
not expected to integrate. 
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“integration” remains a salient objective associated with the minority-oriented policies in 
Norway.   
In spite of Norway’s efforts to accommodate diversity, its general political approach 
remains problematic due to a number of reasons. As an indirect assimilation and “politics of 
fear”, Norway is “resorting to patriotic testing and scrutiny of applicants for residency and 
citizenship and demanding (often ridiculously contrived) demonstrations of national 
allegiance or cultural appropriateness from immigrants.” (Morgan and Poynting, 2012, p. 9) . 
The proposed “twenty one years of age rule”15 for family reunification is another example in 
this respect. Nevertheless, though such efforts may be perceived as equalizing means, they, 
for others, represent a mere reproduction of the Orientalist model of the “West” verses the 
“uncivilised rest”.  Such a tendency is more manifested in the recent government that has 
already started to suggest tougher visa regulations and faster return of persons without legal 
residence, as well as a number of asylum seekers. In the same direction, radical right-wing 
party reinforces this tendency through warning against the threat of immigrant to the 
Norwegian Christian and secular culture.  In fact, Norway as other Nordic nations is often 
identified “with ‘Christian culture’ in ethno-nationalist ways that exclude all immigrants and 
particularly Muslims” (Mårtensson, 2014, p.18). Furthermore, it can be assumed that the 
failure of multiculturalism(s) in Norway and in most European countries is connected 
relatively to gender concerns and religious demands, especially those associated with Islam 
and Muslim women. In other words, the visibility of minority religious practices in the public 
sphere challenges the state’s approach to citizenship, laws on gender equality and 
international conventions on human rights. This point is more illustrated in the coming 
sections.  
2.3.4 Has Norway failed Minority women?  
Important to realize, gender equality in the Scandinavian context presents a central 
part of social democratic policies and welfare state arrangements. This includes 
predominantly a focus on women’s participation in labour market, access to public childcare 
and political participation and representation. Norway in particular has gained “a strong 
national and international reputation of advocating women-friendly policies as both a legal 
                                                 
15
 Due to huge protest from non-governmental organizations, including ethnic minority and humanitarian 
organizations, and anti-discrimination institutions, the government gave up this proposition (Siim and Skjeie, 
2008, p. 336) 
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requirement and a substantive aim” (Halsaa et al, 2010, p. 7). In fact, Norway is often referred 
to as “a champion of gender equality” (Logna, 2003, p. 156); nevertheless in the case of 
minority women the debate becomes more complex. 
The relationship between feminism and multiculturalism in the Norwegian context is 
thus shaped by ongoing debates on issues related to women in minority cultures within both 
politics and in academia. This includes two dimensions namely “when it comes to recognizing 
cultural diversity in general, and to accepting different models of gender equality and the 
family in particular” (Siim and Skjeie, 2008, p. 338-9). To put it differently, the increasing 
diversity of women’s interests and views is either perceived as challenging to the Norwegian 
gender equality agenda and thus should be restricted, or as a fact that should be 
accommodated. On the one hand, scholars such as Nyhagen Predelli (2010) are sceptical to 
the state’s tolerance and accommodation of practices that discriminate against women through 
financial support; in particular religious organisations whose practices contradict gender 
equality laws (p. 15). Religious schools, mosques and youth organizations are some examples 
in this respect. On the other hand, state feminism is charged of being blind to diversities 
resulting in homogenized conceptions of women’s interests. Notably, although state feminism 
has been a salient feature of Norwegian politics during the last decades, an equal degree of 
cultural recognition has been ignored along the way (Logna, 2003, p. 164).  In this respect, 
the Other’s voices have been silenced when it comes to the framing of the gender equality 
agenda and decision-making, whereas the radical right’s views on minority groups remain the 
most influential (Siim and Skjeie, 2008, p. 338).  To put it differently, “in the Norwegian 
case, a continued political ambition to expand gender balance politics has not been combined 
with similarly eager efforts to include minority based location, voices and points of views in 
core decision making bodies” (ibid. p. 339). Based on this claim, it can be assumed that the 
different models of gender equality emerging in the multicultural Norwegian society are not 
all voiced within politics. As a result, the supposedly women-friendly policies may reflect a 
mere preferential agenda that is not in the favour of all women and all men16. To clarify 
Stokke (2012) criticises the way political hegemony sometimes excludes the “Other within” 
as follows:   
Turning universal values into symbols of political loyalty to Norway, the government 
suggests that immigrants lack knowledge of and need to be educated about human 
                                                 
16
 This may be exemplified by the controversial debates about the parental leave policy and the cash-for-care 
benefit. 
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rights, while Norwegian citizens are constructed as carriers of universal values. Thus, 
while emphasizing that universal values are open to interpretation, there is a tendency 
towards a Norwegian monologue where goals are defined in advance by the majority.  
(p. 253) 
A similar criticism is expressed by Halsaa et al (2010) who indicate that “if gender equality is 
constructed as a particularly ‘Norwegian’ value, as something constitutive of ‘Norwegian-
ness’, it contributes to a problematic ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide” (p. 9).  Such a duality is even 
more challenging in the growing global and diverse Norwegian environment where women’s 
interests and needs are changing. For this reason, it seems that developing appropriate social 
and gender equality policies that would be in women(s) best interests become an area that 
needs more focus if we are to recognize diversity “within”. Another important point stressed 
by Langvasbråten (2008) is that addressing the specific problems facing minority women, 
should not be a source of generalization or stigmatization to certain groups (p. 47). For 
example, dealing with violence, or force marriages should not be associated with specific 
nationalities or religions, but rather addressed separately. Equally important, minority group 
related gender equality agenda is mainly directed towards “forms of violence like force 
marriages and female genital mutilation as the only gendered “multicultural problems” (ibid. 
p. 44).  Indeed, dealing with issues related to minority women should not be limited to a 
certain negative practices, but it should also incorporate the accommodation of their 
particularities.  
2.3.5 Norway, Islam and Muslim women  
Islam and the radicalization discourse 
According to estimates from 2013, Norway has about 120 882 inhabitants of a Muslim 
background, which means that, outside the Norwegian Church, the Muslims make up around 
22.0 % of the population and Islam has one of the highest number of adherents of faith 
communities outside the Lutheran church in Norway (Figure 1). As it is the case in most 
European countries, this population growth has generated public debates and anxieties over 
the presence of Islam and Muslim in Norway. The populist Progress Party Fremskrittspartiet, 
for instance, “has increasingly singled out ‘Islam’ as an enemy to Norwegian society and to 
Christianity” (Leirvik, 2014, p.151; Mårtensson, 2014). Based on Islamophobic discourses, 
the rhetoric of the fear from the “Other within” is articulated in many occasions. To 
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demonstrate, Islam is not only perceived as a threat against the security of the state, but it is 
also considered as a major challenge to the future of Norway as an egalitarian society with an 
advanced welfare state and relative gender equality.  
Among the anti-Islamic agents is the Norwegian far-right blogger, Jens Anfindsen 
(2007) who criticises the state’s tolerance towards Islam and its financial support to religious 
associations and mosques. On the other hand, he advocates openly the implementation of 
restrictive immigration laws as well as the preservation of the Christian cultural heritage and 
the values and norms shaped by the humanist enlightenment project as a means to combat 
against the Islamization of Norway. The following extract demonstrates clearly his 
perspective on “the Muslims within”:   
 
We have the means of tackling the budding islamization of our nation at our 
disposal. First and foremost, we can simply restrict our immigration laws. An 
essential step in that regard would be to follow in the footsteps of Denmark 
and tighten the conditions for family reunifications. This is something my 
organization, Human Rights Service (HRS), actively works to promote. 
Secondly, we can stop government support of organizations that support 
Islamic terror. Thirdly, we can abandon the ridiculous idea that all religions are 
equal, and, consequently, the principle that all religions should be treated 
equal. We can face up to it that we are a country with a specific cultural 
heritage, that our values and the norms we want to uphold in our society are 
shaped by Christianity and by humanist enlightenment, and we can 
acknowledge that this is an heritage we want to preserve. We can, 
democratically, demand that those values and those norms, not those of 
Medina, be preserved as the foundations for our society. It shouldn’t really be 
that hard to do. So it will be my conclusion that, at present, the greatest 
threats concerning the islamization of Norway do stem from the Islamists 
themselves, but from relativism, multiculturalism and political correctness 
within our own ranks. (Anfindsen, 2007, p. 3-4) 
 
Advocating the development of such “politics of fear”, Anfindsen reveals also his scepticism 
to the cultural relativism of multiculturalism for empowering the legitimate argument of 
respect and recognition of diverse identities in Norway (Islam in this case). In detail, he 
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criticises the political implication of cultural relativism with respect to religion, and thus the 
establishment of religious tolerance and the encouragement of multiculturalism. Another 
point worth mentioning here is the immediate association of Muslims with any violence 
incidents as a result of growing anti-Muslim sentiments among the larger population. In fact, 
the controversial media coverage of the terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011 remains a relevant 
example in this regard because “before it became clear that the perpetrator was a white ethnic 
majority Norwegian and a self-declared “cultural Christian”, the general tendency was to 
assume that radical Islamists were behind the violent attacks” (Jacobsen and Leirvik, 2013, p. 
499). Moreover, the increasing concern about “radical Islam” and the “radicalization” of 
Muslim youth is a recurrent issue in public debates especially after the emergence of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)17. To counter radicalism, training programmes for 
imams as well as a programme for higher Islamic studies at UIO have been established 
subsequently (Mårtensson, 2014, p. 23). With the same purpose the Norwegian Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security issued recently an action plan against radicalization and violent 
extremism with the purpose of improving its preventative efforts18. Although these might be 
good measures to some extent; nevertheless, Bangstad´s (2014a) book Anders Breivik and 
The Rise of Islamophobia draws attention to the tendency of the Norwegian politicians as well 
as researchers to treat Islam and terrorism as an exclusively ideological phenomenon, whereas 
right-wing terrorism is primarily perceived as a social psychological phenomenon. To clarify, 
Bangstad claims that the Norwegian public debates on the 22 July terror attacks, literature as 
well as politics have ignored the ideology adopted by Breivik, and rather focused on his 
troubled psychology. Additionally, the Norwegian government continues to support the HRS 
through a budget increase of 80% in the last state budget precisely for their long-standing 
anti-Muslim advocacy19.  
On the other hand, “interreligious dialogue” remains well-established in Norway with 
the aim of achieving mutual respect between different faiths and life stances and 
cooperatively addressing social and ethical issues of common concern; including the position 
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 This refers to young people being radicalised and going to fight in the current war in Iraq and Syria. (2014)  
18
 The Norwegian government wants to improve the preventative efforts against radicalisation and violent 
extremism based on the fact that:  
There is a need for more information, more cooperation and better coordination of the efforts in this 
area within Norway. The efforts must be improved in different professional areas and sectors of society. 
The goal is to reach persons who are at risk as early as possible and encounter them with measures that 
work. This action plan provides a framework for a targeted, strategic effort in this field within Norway. 
(Counterextremism.org, 2014) 
19
 Bangstad, S. (2014b). - Yes, Aftenposten: In an unprecedented... | Facebook. [online] Facebook.com. 
Available at: https://www.facebook.com/sindre.bangstad/posts/269335573257225 [Accessed 8 Nov. 2014]. 
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of women in the religious communities, the issue of homosexuality, and the question of 
conversion (Jacobsen and leirvik, 2013; Mårtensson, 2014; Siim and Skjeie, 2008). As a 
matter of fact, in cultural and political debates, Christian leaders have in general defended 
Muslim minority rights and supported their integrity against populist assaults produced by 
“the influential right wing/populist party Fremskrittspartiet” (Leirvik, 2005, p. 7).  
Islam and women’s oppression 
Perceived as inherently oppressive to women, Muslim cultures and Islam are often 
associated with patriarchal and even harmful practices in Norway as well. In particular, 
discriminatory practices against minority women are considered as a “threat” to the gains of 
Norwegian gender equality system. For this reason granting recognition to a traditional 
culture or religion is seen as having the potential for engendering harm to women within their 
groups. With regard to such an understanding about the status of Muslim women, the co-
founder and information director of HRS and journalist Hege Storhaug advocates 
occasionally an increase surveillance of Muslim communities for the purpose of protecting 
Norway’s most vulnerable females. She draws her arguments most of the time on individual 
experiences; including that of Kadra, Nadia and Saynab20. Nevertheless, for many researchers 
Storhaug’s position remains a mere reproduction of the Orientalist Othering of Muslim 
women’s lives; especially that Islam bears no responsibility for customs such as arranged or 
forced marriages, honour killing and female genital mutilation. In the same fashion, the 
Norwegian media coverage of issues related to Muslims and Islam is also perceived as biased 
and controversial focusing mainly on similar issues (Jacobsen and Leirvik, 2013, p. 498). 
Notably, voicing mainly the negative stories about being “a victim of one’s own group” 
reflects the existence of a hierarchy of preference among some Norwegian media editors. To 
put it differently, whereas certain voices remain effectively ignored, and even rendered silent, 
the voices of individuals of Muslim background involved in critique of Islam are privileged in 
the mediated public spheres in Norway. A report by the Norwegian Directorate for Integration 
and Plurality (IMDi 2009) revealed accordingly that “matters related to Islam and Muslims 
are given disproportionately large media attention” and that “Muslims are overwhelmingly 
negatively represented” framing the overall discourse on Muslim community (Mårtensson, 
2014, p. 22).  
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 These are three Muslim young women, from different backgrounds, who had shared publically their personal 
stories about forced marriage and genital mutilation with the support of Hege Storhaug. 
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Regarding the hijab controversy in Norway, the hijab has been dealt with both as an 
issue of individual gender equality rights and in relation to religious plurality policies. For 
Siim and Skjeie (2008), it is also important that “no divisive public conflict has appeared 
between feminist voices and voices from the mosque” (p. 334). To clarify, though some 
activists view the hijab as a symbol of female oppression, and thus incompatible with 
Norwegian values; attempts to ban its visibility in the public sphere were considered 
ultimately a violation against the freedom of choice as well as religion among minority 
women. To illustrate, few individual cases of prohibition in the work place were rather 
deemed as discriminatory under the Gender Equality Act and the new Act against Ethnic and 
Religious discrimination from 2005 (Skjeie and Siim, 2008, p. 332). Under those 
circumstances, the hijab has been accommodated with uniforms in the army, the health care 
system, and customs, and there is also a hijab version of uniform in a few work places for 
instance in IKEA, and the Ullevål University Hospital in Oslo (Jacobsen and Leirvik, 2013, p. 
494-5). In fact, with reference to human rights principles and matters of individual choice, the 
state is supposed to recognize, respect and make public space for all women. With the 
purpose of understanding the way the Muslim community has been dealt with in Europe 
generally and in Norway particularly, the chapter to come will be mainly about outlining the 
key debates associated with secularism, multiculturalism and feminism.  
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3 Theoretical Background 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, religion has been widely debated in Europe. Indeed, it has 
become a central issue in a variety of policy debates in areas as diverse as citizenship, 
security, employment, education, healthcare, justice and human rights. Basically, this 
unprecedented public presence of religion has compelled European states to revisit their 
approaches not only on secularism and multiculturalism, but also on feminism. As a result, 
heated debates have given rise on the scope of freedom of religion, its bases and justifications, 
and the relationship between the secular nature of the state, democracy and women’s rights. 
Grounded on the fact that Muslim women in the European setting are affected in a way or 
another by these debates, the chapter aims at presenting a frame of reference for 
understanding and interpreting the standpoints of my interviewees. It provides an overview of 
the different theories that help address religion in relation to women’s issues within the 
secular and multicultural state.  
This chapter consists of four main parts. At first, different implications and tensions 
associated with the principle of secularism and multiculturalism will be traced drawing on 
examples from debates and policies developed in a range of European countries. Then, the 
“multiculturalism versus feminism” debate initiated by the liberal feminist Susan Moller Okin 
will be reviewed as a background to the discussions linked with Muslim women in Europe. 
Moreover, feminists’ approaches to Islam and Muslim women will be emphasised including 
secular feminism and Islamic feminism. Finally, I will address the main issues and elements 
of the postcolonial feminist theory and the standpoint feminist theory as an introducing 
section to move to the research design and the methodology chapter.  
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Figure 3: Theoretical background 
 
3.2 Theories of Secularism  
Secularism as a contemporary social and political issue has been given different forms 
and implications. In general, secularism refers to “different normative-ideological state 
projects, as well as to different legal-constitutional frameworks of separation of state and 
religion and to different models of differentiation of religion, ethics, morality, and law” 
(Casanova, 2011, p. 66). This implies that defining a “secular state” varies from one country 
to another depending on the significance a state chooses to appropriate to the principle of 
secularism. As a form of statecraft, separation between religious and political authority is 
adopted “either for the sake of neutrality of the state vis-à-vis all religions, or for the sake of 
protecting the freedom of conscious of each individual, or for the sake of facilitating the equal 
access of all citizens, religious as well as nonreligious, to democratic participation” (ibid.).  
3.2.1 Secularism as “pluralism” 
To begin with, one form of secularism refers uniquely to a separation that aims at 
favouring religious pluralism in a society where everyone is equally respected. For the 
purpose of protecting the free exercise of religion, this tendency regards the external 
manifestation of one’s religious or non-religious conviction as a ‘secular’ practice, which 
means that the state should not interfere in religious matters. This entails also that no 
limitations on one’s freedom of religion and belief are to be imposed. “Indeed, “free exercise” 
stands out as a normative democratic principle in itself.” (Casanova, 2011, p. 72) Grounded 
on this view, many European countries have chosen to invest in the development of a 
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pluralistic and multi-religious space exerting no constraints on the legitimacy to express one’s 
religious affiliation in secular institutions such as school, work and media. This particular 
approach to religious plurality could be related in some degree to the UK and German models. 
Secularism, in this sense, supports freedom of and from religion. Thus, a secular state has the 
responsibility for ensuring, neutrally and impartially, the equal exercise of various religions, 
faiths and beliefs. Obviously under this principle, identifying a state with one privileged 
religion in the increasingly pluralistic environment of Europe is unacceptable. In this case, 
secularism remains advantageous for the believers whose religion plays a salient role in their 
daily lives. At the same time, it is directed towards challenging religious privilege and 
discrimination against persons of a minority faith tradition or of no faith. In fact, “it was not 
meant to deny the public character of religion, but to deny the identification of the state with 
any one religion” (Modood, 1998, p. 394). Secularism in this sense is rather about creating an 
environment of justice and mutual consideration; a state of many faiths and none.   
3.2.2 Secularism as “neutrality” 
Secularism as neutrality, on the other hand, refers namely to every effort made by 
the state to empty its public scene from any reference to God (Taylor, 2007). The focus here 
is on the neutrality of the secular public spheres and their separation from religious 
institutions and norms (Casanova, 1994). To help maintain such neutrality, some politicians 
advocate the privatization of religion. Thus in many occasions the secular nature of a state is 
stressed as an argument to reject any demands or recognition of minority rights. This 
exclusionary version of secularism justifies significantly the exertion of restrictions on 
religious freedom, and, thus, the complete relegation of religion to privatised spheres 
(Casanova, 1994). This perceptive accordingly explains the fierce debates on issues related to 
the visibility of religious symbols in the European public space. As an illustration, the Islamic 
veil, hijab, is regarded as a threat to the core of the French republic since it challenges its 
public order and democracy. Another example is that of Italy and Switzerland. Both states 
have implemented legal actions rejecting the presence of crucifixes in schools, courtrooms 
and other public buildings. Notably, the presence of a sign associated with a given religion is 
perceived as an indoctrinating factor, and therefore it conflicts with the expected secular 
nature of the state. To demonstrate, an educational environment should function in a way that 
would not challenge the parents’ right to have their children educated in accordance with their 
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own philosophical convictions.  This entails accordingly that the presence of the crucifix, for 
example, can breach the pupils’ right to freedom of conscience. The same argument is 
adopted by Switzerland to ban the construction of minarets.  
3.2.3 Secularism as “non-religious”  
Different from the previous models, a radical approach to secularism regards all 
religions as unenlightened, anti-egalitarian and even dangerous for democratic politics. It is a 
belief that has its roots in Karl Marx’s famous statement that “religion is the opium of the 
masses” and Nietzsche’s claim that “God is dead”. In this respect, the principle of neutrality 
is evoked mainly to argue that religion should be ignored and even abolished from ‘the 
public’ given its irrationality and potential to create conflicts. This widespread view has been 
emphasised by the radical right-wing parties, especially after the last terrorist attacks in 
Europe. Consequently, an expanding literature has interpreted political secularism “to mean 
that religious beliefs and discourse should be excluded from the public sphere and/or politics 
and certainly from activities endorsed or funded by the state” (Triandafyllidou and Modood, 
2012, p. 10). Secularism, in this sense, is understood as synonymous to modernity, freedom, 
tolerance and peace as it projects:  
The perception of the progressive achievement of Western secular modernity, offering 
a self-validating justification of the secular separation of religion and politics as the 
condition for modern liberal democratic politics, for global peace, and for the 
protection of individual privatized religious freedom. (Casanova, 2011, p. 70) 
Grounded on this view, radical secular political arrangements seem to “suit and favour the 
private kind of religions, but not those that require public action” (Modood, 1998, p. 393).  
Nevertheless, liberal states adopting such a discourse (for example through rejecting religious 
education being destructive and irrational)21 are challenged by the tensions related to their 
advocacy for freedom, equality and human rights, and secularism.  
3.2.4 The Secularization thesis 
                                                 
21
 Zembeta (2008) 
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In the sociology of religion, the secularization thesis is presented by Steve Bruce in 
God is Dead: Secularization in the West (2002) as “a decline in the extent to which people 
engage in religious practices, display beliefs of a religious kind, and other aspects of their 
lives in manner informed by such beliefs” (p. 3). Secularization in this sense refers to the 
process whereby “the sacred” has no longer its significant neither in society nor among the 
population. In fact, “the decline in the societal power and significance of religious institutions, 
and the decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals” are perceived as 
“structurally related components of general processes of modernization” (Casanova, 2006, 
p.8). Consequently, people give the priority to the material over the spiritual and the profane 
over the sacred in their lives; “based on a rigid dichotomous contraposition of sacred tradition 
and secular modernity, assuming that the more of one, the less of the other” (ibid. p.14). 
Especially with the scientific and technological advancement, the belief in God, as the 
knower, came to be seen as backward and anti-modern. On the other hand, “the secularist 
genealogy of modernity was constructed as a triumphant emancipation of reason, freedom, 
and worldly pursuits from the constraints of religion” (ibid. p.11).  As a result, there has been 
an increasing interest in alternative spiritualties; perceived as more modern, and thus become 
the fastest growing religious forms in Europe. A similar view is held by Taylor (2007) who 
claims that secularization is accompanied “by a new placement of the sacred or spiritual in 
relation to individual and social life. This new placement is now the occasion for re-
compositions of spiritual life in new forms, and for new ways of existing both in and out of 
relation to God” (p. 437). To illustrate, Turner (2014) points out that “the new generations of 
seekers find their inspiration in JRR Tolkien’s22 mythological world, from science fiction and 
Star Wars. They are also drawn to Satanism, witchcraft and neo-paganism.” (p. 781).  
Namely, the emergence of individualised forms and conditions of existence reflects an 
emphasised concern with spirituality as a means for seeking meaning and happiness rather 
than traditional or institutionalized religions. Under those circumstances, the meaning of 
“spirituality” has moved from “the shadowy realms of theology to become a 'fashionable' 
sociological concept” (Flanagan and Jupp, 2007, p.162). In this sense, the concept of 
spirituality focuses the relationship with the sacred “no longer from the point of view of 
obedience to external authority but instead centralising the freedom of the individual” (ibid. p. 
170). 
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 “J. R. R. Tolkien (1892-1973) gained a reputation during the 1960s and 1970s as a cult figure among youths 
disillusioned with war and the technological age; his continuing popularity evidences his ability to evoke the 
oppressive realities of modern life while drawing audiences into a fantasy world” (J. R. R. Tolkien, 2004). 
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Different from the previous point, this changing nature of European religion (or 
spirituality) is explained differently by Grace Davie (2000). To explain, based on historical 
factors, and data collection of church attendance and participation to religious activities, 
Davie suggests that there is rather a tendency of “believing without belonging”. The same 
assumption is supported by Roy (2007) who claims that in the increasingly secularised 
Europe “society has gradually emancipated itself from religion without necessarily denying 
it” (p 15). To put it another way, most European population believe in faith traditions without 
actually belonging to any religious communities. “In this sense, individualization means the 
variation and differentiation of lifestyles and forms of life, opposing the thinking behind the 
traditional categories of large-group societies–which is to say, classes, estates, and social 
stratification” (Beck, 1992, p.88). This accordingly explains the corresponding rise in, for 
example, the “do-it-yourself” or “individualized” religiosity, seen as the result of a reflexive 
process of identity construction. Notably, the idea of self-identity and the reflective 
construction of the self is developed by Giddens (1991) who argues that in the context of the 
post-traditional order of late-modern societies “the altered self has to be explored and 
constructed as part of a reflexive process of connecting personal and social change” (p. 33). 
This continuous re-definition of the self in response to social dynamics is referred to by Beck 
(1992) as a “reflexive biography” that is personally rather than socially constructed (p. 135). 
Nevertheless, while Giddens (1991) takes the stance that religion is incompatible in 
(post)modern social life (p. 109), Beck (2010) asserts recently that religion is an important 
aspect of contemporary world where religiosity “is based increasingly on individualization” 
(p. 29). To recapitulate, while the power of institutional religion has declined, the interest in 
individualized spirituality has increased. 
Different from the previous views on the secularization thesis, many scholars 
including Jürgen Habermas (2006) emphasise that Europe experiences a religious return into 
its secularised societies, or “post-secular society” as he calls it. Accordingly, Habermas draws 
attention to “the fact that religion continues to assert itself in an increasingly secular 
environment and that society, for the time being, reckons with the continued existence of 
religious communities” (ibid. p. 258). A point worth mentioning here is that post-secularism, 
as described by Habermas, and the increasing identification with religion have no connection 
with neo-fundamentalism23 in contrast to Roy (2007) who tends to combine the two 
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 For Roy (2007) neo-fundamentalism is a product of contemporary globalization. It refers also to the global 
aspect of Islam. It is not about identifying with one nation-state, but rather with the global Muslim community.   
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phenomena. This assumption is supported by Turner in his article “Religion and 
Contemporary Sociological Theories” (2014) where he confirms that “there is ample evidence 
of robust religious vitality, especially among youth” (p. 783). A similar view is held by 
Casanova (2006) who focuses the influence of Globalization, presented as the incorporation 
of “inter-civilizational encounters, cultural imitations and borrowings, diasporic diffusions, 
hybridity, creolization, and transcultural hyphenations” on world religions that do not only 
draw upon their own traditions but also increasingly upon one another (p.17). This means that 
people in their attempt to find meaning in various and diverse traditions and beliefs, they 
negotiate the sacred in newly manners with the absence of territorial constraints. In fact, in the 
contemporary context, the understanding of the religious viewpoints in the democratic public 
sphere is important as religion began to compete with what was believed to be a “process of 
secularization” (Habermas, 2006). In other words, the increasing visibility of religion in the 
public sphere challenges the secularization thesis projecting a considerable change not only 
inside secular states, but also in terms of the consciousness of people. Then again, most 
researches and debates have emphasised the rigid conceptual dualities between religious and 
secular groups and practices resulting in the failure to capture the empirical diversity within 
these categories (Turner, 2014, p. 772). In this regard, avoiding the polarization between the 
sacred and the secular remains a salient aspect that has to be taken into consideration. In what 
follows, a key element in the discussion of religion in secular Europe is to be explored; 
namely multiculturalism. 
3.3 Theories of Multiculturalism 
Both within academia and in politics, multiculturalism is a ‘polysemic’ concept that 
reflects different implications, in different contexts and at different times (Triandaffyllidou, 
Modood and Meer, 2012, p.4). At the descriptive level, multiculturalism refers to the presence 
of plurality in a given society, the belief that cultures and communities can coexist equitably 
within a single country, or the various ways in which the state could recognise and support 
this diversity (ibid.) In terms of political and legal rights, the very forms Multiculturalism take 
vary significantly across different European regimes; as they relate to integration in different 
ways (Modood, 2011, p. 3)24. A central discussion underlying this political philosophy is 
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 Modoood (2011) categorises Multiculturalism into various modes of integration including; assimilation, 
individual integration, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism.  
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mainly concerned with the group rights versus individual rights. Basically, the appropriate 
way to act towards cultural and religious diversity within a given state includes on the one 
hand “individuals who are granted exemptions from generally applicable laws in virtue of 
their religious beliefs or individuals who seek language accommodations in schools or in 
voting”. On the other hand, this includes group rights “as in the case of indigenous groups and 
minority nations, who claim the right of self-determination” (Song, 2014, n.p.). Important to 
realize, multiculturalism remains a complex, contextual and situated concept that is 
continuously criticized and much questioned across Europe. In this section, I will outline 
some of the forms and manifestations of multiculturalism, namely as “assimilation” and 
“inclusion”, discussing subsequently the “multiculturalism versus feminism” debate initiated 
by the liberal feminist Susan Moller Okin.    
3.3.1 Multiculturalism as “assimilation” 
Though multiculturalism, as a policy, was initially introduced for the purpose of 
integrating the claim that different groups can make legitimate demands for public 
accommodation of their particularities within a given society, it was however adopted as an 
assimilative strategy by some European countries. In this respect, multiculturalism refers to 
the political discourse that is in support for the unity and shared identity of the nation. This 
includes the common culture, and core values and norms within a society. The focus in this 
sense is more on finding similarities than on allowing for differences. This means that 
minorities should assimilate to the dominant culture if they are to be accepted in the public 
sphere. Thus, individuals and groups distinguished by “difference” can be discriminated 
against, and given the label of outsider or “other within”.  This model of multiculturalism can 
be illustrated by the state’s “official promotion of a national identity, official national values, 
compulsory language courses, clothing prohibitions, test of migrants” (Triandafyllidou and 
Modood, 2012, p.3). Countries such as France, Netherland and Denmark are examples in this 
regard. A point worth mentioning here is that these countries chose to claim democracy and 
equality through invisibility and sameness in opposition to the view that support a politics of 
difference to achieve equality.  To clarify, the politics of integration supposes a predetermined 
frame of social institutions and public values to which the newcomers are expected to 
conform and assimilate. In the same way, the argument of terrorism is frequently evoked by 
political parties to encourage assimilationist approaches to what they perceive as a failure of 
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the former multicultural policies. Avoiding the politically damaged connotation of the term 
“assimilation”, some politicians “have preferred to use terms such as ‘cohesion’, ‘integration’ 
and national identity while giving them an assimilative interpretation” (Meer and Modood, 
2013, p. 5). 
3.3.2 Multiculturalism as “Inclusion” 
Multiculturalism as “inclusion” emphasises mainly “pluralism” and “the politics of 
recognition” (Taylor, 1994). As a policy for promoting integration, Multiculturalism is 
associated with the political efforts to provide space for racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious 
minorities. It aims at fostering a diverse environment through implementing policies that 
respect the diversity and multicultural nature of its population. This inclusive approach is 
described by Modood as “creating a new, ongoing ‘We’ out of all the little, medium-sized and 
large platoons that make up the country” (2012, p. 3). Given that every citizen is owed equal 
respect and concern, the state is supposed to guarantee public and legal recognition of all 
forms of self-assertion. Hence, categories of difference such as ethnicity, or religion are not to 
affect the individual’s rights and opportunities in participating and accessing the various 
sectors of society; “not just in law, but in representation in the offices of the state, public 
committees, consultative exercises and access to public forums” (Triandafyllidou and 
Modood, 2012, p 4). This entails that multiculturalism as a public policy is more about 
inclusion and fluidity than about domination or uniformity.  In fact, “it is a critique of the 
cultural assimilation traditionally demanded by nation states of migrants and minorities, as 
well as liberal individualism that has no space for groups” (Modood, 2013, p.122). In this 
sense, the demand for the accommodation of group differences are the basis for multicultural 
politics that are supposed to take into consideration the “the equal dignity of all citizens” as 
well as “the distinctive identity of every single group” (Taylor, 1994, p 82)25. Equally 
important, the argument for inclusion is aimed at “keeping open the possibility of dialogue 
and mutual influence” (Modood, 1998, p. 396). According to Taylor, equal opportunity 
should be accompanied by negotiation, infusion and interaction; meaning that the majority 
should be open to be influenced by other cultures, and vice versa (Ibid.). Such an intercultural 
dialogue is meant to develop individual identities that are “personal amalgams of bits from 
various groups and heritages and there is no one dominant social identity to which all must 
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 While Charles Taylor (1994), Bhikhu Parekh (2000) and Will Kymlicka (1995) emphasised the inclusion of 
race and ethnicity, Modood (1998) extends the argument to religion, and in particular Muslims.  
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conform” (Modood, 2011, p. 7). In this way, integration would be directed towards bringing 
new communities into relations of equal respect. In addition, Modood (1998) stresses that 
“the goal of democratic multiculturalism cannot and should not be cultural neutrality but, 
rather, the inclusion of marginal and disadvantaged groups, including religious communities 
in public life” (p. 396). It is a type of political separation where the state does not identify 
with or privilege a particular religious tradition, but rather protects the religious freedom of all 
citizens26. In this regard, “equality” is not about “sameness”, but rather about “difference” and 
“social justice”. A key aspect in this debate is the connection between multiculturalism and 
the nuanced and dynamic understandings associated with concepts such as culture, religion 
and secularism. This depends on for example the context of a debate, the particularity of a 
given group/individual’s demand, and the state’s integration policy.   
3.3.3 Has Multiculturalism failed Europe? 
Multiculturalism is one of the conflicting policies that European societies had to 
reconsider after the 9/11 events, the London and Madrid bombings, and their aftermath. As a 
result, an expanding literature, both in academia and in the public media, has focused mainly 
on examining the factors that have contributed to what they would refer to as “the crisis of 
multiculturalism” or “the failure of multiculturalism”. The key points of this criticism are 
identified differently by the defenders of multiculturalism, and those who regard the 
implementation of multiculturalism as the main cause for European states’ failure to deal with 
their increasingly diversified societies. 
According to Gøle (2012), the failure of multiculturalism is primarily linked to the 
absence of a common frame of dialogue and interaction (p.142). She maintains that achieving 
inclusion is not just about cultural pluralism and the politics of difference (ibid.). In like 
manner, Meer and Modood (2013) view dialogue as a centrality that is “missing in liberal 
nationalist or human rights or class-based approaches” (p. 2). Grounded on this claim, most 
tends of multiculturalism and integration policies are accused of entrenching resentment, 
fragmentation and disunity (ibid. p.1). This is illustrated by their overemphasis on the 
minorities’ duty to adapt and be part of the wider community while neglecting the importance 
of “mutual integration” and an “intercultural” approach to plurality (ibid. p. 3). Another 
relevant argument in this respect is associated with the states’ failure to recognize and respect 
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 Compatible with the definition of secularism as “pluralism” mentioned in the previous section, see p. 21.  
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the particular cultural identities of all citizens. As a consequence, a new intolerance towards 
the categories perceived as the “other within” emerges. This intolerance is demonstrated in 
the state’s exertion of resistance against the non-confirming “Other”; especially in religious 
matters including the hijab and niqab controversies. At the same time, the states’ focus on 
citizenship, visibility and identity issues “has displaced attention from socio-economic 
disparities” (ibid., p. 1). A similar criticism is related to the politicians’ “politics of fear” and 
the growing resentment against migrants; especially those perceived as suspiciously as real or 
potential threats to the wellbeing of European societies. This includes groups such as 
fundamentalists, jihadists, or terrorists. Reinforcing such a rhetoric, and thus generating panic 
and tensions among the people made multiculturalism accused even of “international 
terrorism” (ibid., p. 1).  
Whereas some have chosen to emphasise the shortcomings of the various models of 
multiculturalism, others have even declared its inutility as a political policy within the 
European contexts of post-migration diversity. They view the recognition of difference and 
plurality rather as an irresponsible and naive tolerance toward minorities. For instance, the 
state’s accommodation of group rights may allow “members of minority groups vulnerable to 
serve injustice within the group, and may, in effect, work to reinforce some of the most 
hierarchical elements of a culture” (Shachar, 2001, p. 2-3) As a result, the European states’ 
efforts towards more egalitarian environments will be weakened. Another key point in this 
discussion is the tensions between multiculturalism and the feminism project; a debate that 
was initiated by Susan Moller Okin (1999). In particular, women interests’ are seen as 
underrepresented in traditional cultures, and thus any policy of accommodation of group 
rights may cause these women harm and restriction. To put it another way, giving cultural 
groups the legitimacy to decide over their members undermines the differences and plurality 
within these groups, and hence encourages internal inequalities; especially between men and 
women (ibid.). To understand this conflicting relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism, the next section outlines the main aspects of the debate.  
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3.4 Accommodating Diversity: a Debate 
between Multiculturalism and Feminism  
Recent minority groups’ demands for recognition and the accommodation of their 
cultural difference in the public sphere have generated considerable tensions between 
feminism as and multiculturalism. These tensions were initially highlighted by many feminist 
critics who view some group norms and practices as oppressive especially with respect to 
issues of gender and sexuality. To clarify, the problem with multiculturalism, as “inclusion”27, 
lies in the fact that it may conflict with one of the important feminist gains; namely the 
principle of gender equality. To put it differently: 
Extending special protections and accommodations to patriarchal cultural communities 
may help reinforce gender inequality within these communities. Examples include 
conflicts over polygamy, arranged marriage, the ban on headscarves in France, 
“cultural defenses” in criminal law, accommodating religious law or customary law 
within the dominant legal system, and self-government rights for indigenous 
communities that deny equality to women in certain respects (Deveaux 2006, Phillips 
2007, Shachar 2001, Song 2007) (Song, 2014, n.p.). 
 Mainly, as some cultural practices have conflicted with the European states’ commitment to 
gender equality and women’s human rights on the one hand, and the necessity to respect and 
accommodate diversity on the other. Even though both approaches struggle initially for 
equality and the protection of women’s as well as minority rights, “their different particular 
concerns put them at odds” (Kukathas, 2001, p. 86). Especially with the discourse of 
feminism versus multiculturalism, each term is supposed to exclude the values of the other.  
With this in mind, feminism is “presumed not to value the rights of minority cultures” in 
contrast to multiculturalism that is “presumed not to value the rights of women” (Volpp, 
2001, p. 1203). In other words, the conflict is between feminism’s concern to liberate women 
from culture and multiculturalism’s support and protection of cultural pluralism.  
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 It refers to a model of multiculturalism that emphasises the accommodation of group-differentiated rights for 
minority groups.  
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3.4.1 Has Multiculturalism as “inclusion” Failed Minority Women?  
Generally speaking, the feminist objection to most trends of multiculturalism is 
grounded on the assumption that most cultures perpetuate patterns of oppressive treatment 
and control over women. For this reason, the incorporation of minority rights and politics of 
recognition into the public is conceived as likely harmful to vulnerable individuals within 
minority communities, specifically women.  The key aspect of this argument is that: 
In many cultural communities women are denied the same access to education as men, 
are subject to forcible genital mutilation in girlhood, or are given no say in the choice 
of marriage partner or in the question of whether to marry at all. Moreover, in many 
traditions, the recognized power of husband over wife leaves married women without 
relief from abuse within the home 28(Kukathas, 2001, p. 87).  
Such attitudes and practices are regarded as patriarchal and discriminatory to women’s 
equality and freedom. For this reason, minority cultures are not to be tolerated (Okin, 1999). 
In this regard, the focus on the feminists’ commitment to reduce differentials of power 
between men and women are more important than their advocacy for identity politics29; 
namely the individuality of each woman.  A central argument underlying this criticism is that 
though multiculturalism gives minorities an unprecedented opportunity to live as equal 
citizens in liberal democracies, it however serves to legitimize norms and values that are in 
many cases hostile towards women. Another key point is connected to the misuse of the 
principle of religious freedom to perpetuate the subordination of women; a practice that has 
been allowed for by multicultural policies as Jeffreys (2012,) points out:  
In recent decades multiculturalism has morphed into multifaithism. Culture and 
religion are being confused or understood as one and the same, and governments in 
                                                 
28 Other examples include the covering of women, polygamy and honour killing. 
29 Definition of identity politics: 
The laden phrase “identity politics” has come to signify a wide range of political activity and theorizing 
founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups. Rather than 
organizing solely around belief systems, programmatic manifestos, or party affiliation, identity political 
formations typically aim to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within 
its larger context. Members of that constituency assert or reclaim ways of understanding their 
distinctiveness that challenge dominant oppressive characterizations, with the goal of greater self-
determination. 
 
Heyes ,Cressida, 2012, “Identity Politics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, access: 27 July 2014 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/#toc 
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states such as Australia and the UK are increasingly exercising ‘multicultural’ policies 
through religion or ‘faiths’ with particularly harmful consequences for women (p. 77).  
For Jeffreys, accommodating cultural diversity is used as a pretext to introduce religious 
claims that threaten to infringe women’s rights. As an alternative, feminists, sharing the views 
of Okin, suggest that it is unnecessary to implement a policy targeting minority patriarchy. 
Instead, they maintain that such a liberating process can be incorporated under a feminist 
policy conceived from a more liberal and universal perspective. In fact, feminism is regarded 
as more compatible with liberalism than multiculturalism assuming that it advocates liberty, 
autonomy, and equality.  
3.4.2 Multiculturalism and Feminism: An Incompatible Relation 
Correspondingly, the “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women”30 debate highlights these 
tensions between group rights and women’s rights more clearly. As brought forth by the 
political scientist Okin (1999), feminism and multiculturalism are incompatible given the 
potentially harmful influence the state’s support for minority cultures may have on women; 
especially that “many of the cultural minorities that claim group rights are more patriarchal 
than their surrounding cultures” (ibid., p. 17). Moreover, she draws attention to the 
inequalities31 associated with the cultures that multiculturalism tolerates serving to reinforce 
structural gender biases; a project which she views as running counter to that of feminism 
(ibid.). That is to say, the accommodation of traditional racial, cultural or religious practices 
would function as a legitimacy to oppress minority women. An alternative solution to 
demands from minority groups is suggested by Okin (ibid., p. 22) as follows: 
In the case of a more patriarchal culture in the context of a less patriarchal culture, no 
argument can be made on the basis of self-respect or freedom that female members of 
the culture have a clear interest in its preservation. Indeed they might be much better 
off if the culture into which they were born were either to become extinct or 
preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of women. 
This approach suggests openly that liberal states should acculturate members of minority 
groups preferably by education, but by punishment when necessary (Okin, 1998, p. 676). 
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 A debate initiated by Susan Moller Okin’s article “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women”.  
31 She mentions polygamy as an example. 
35 
 
Then again, Okin (2005) clarifies that she should not be misunderstood, and she rather 
advocates the importance of engaging minority women in any negotiations about group rights, 
taking into account the plurality of their interests and concerns. This would consequently 
allow minority women to give up the cultural pressure not to speak out for their rights, and 
hence not to be forced to choose between their culture and their rights.  
3.4.3 Multiculturalism and Feminism: A Common Concern 
Different from the previous insights, multiculturalism and feminism are interpreted as 
having a common concern provided that both struggle for equality and recognition, and are 
against subordination.  Accordingly, Kukathas (2001) suggests that “minority cultures should 
be able to resist the encroachment upon their traditions, including those that confine women, 
by the dominant culture seeking to impose its allegedly universal values upon all groups” (p. 
87).  This is also supported by the view that cultural diversity and difference are to be dealt 
with not through assimilation but rather by toleration and respect. On this regard, women 
would not be required to follow a particular way of life given that “many explicitly reject 
liberalism as incapable of doing justice to their moral concerns” (Kukathas, 2001, p. 85).  To 
clarify, multiculturalism is conceived as compatible with liberalism especially as it focuses on 
toleration and the need to support freedom of choice, individual autonomy and the state’s 
neutrality. A similar view is developed by Parekh (1999) who argues that “far from being the 
enemy of women, it (multiculturalism) gives them unique historical opportunity to pluralize 
and transform radically the universally hegemonic and boringly homogenous patriarchal 
culture that damages both woman and men alike” (p. 75). This contrasts with Okin’s account 
that was criticised heavily (Al-Hibri, 1999; Benhabib, 1999; Honig, 1999; Parekh, 1999). To 
point out some, Okin is accused of being judgmental and one-sided as she focuses only on 
minority cultures ignoring inequalities within Western liberal societies. To illustrate, she 
reinforces the claim that emancipation is a “white Western” model that should be followed if 
we are to achieve women’s well-being. In addition, such reductionist liberal feminist thinking 
depicts minority women as passive victims of their oppressive cultures, and hence in need to 
be rescued by Western women. Besides, Okin is regarded as an Orientalist, imperialist and 
ethnocentric. This criticism is also stressed by the feminist Judith Butler (2000) who declares 
that “feminism works in full complicity with US colonial aims in imposing its norms of 
civility through an effacement and a decimation of local Second and Third world cultures” (p. 
36 
 
35). Similarly, this fierce debate voiced in opposition to Okin is also understood as “a 
common fate met by outsiders who dare to criticize” (Kukathas, 2001, p. 88).  
On the other hand, a commitment to equality in a setting of multiple differences and 
power hierarchies is assumed to be achieved through creating a balance between feminism 
and multiculturalism. The possibility of integrating both discourses is described by 
Mookherjee (2009) as the development of “a multicultural form of feminism and a feminist 
form of multiculturalism” (p. x). Emphasising claims for equal rights, equal respect and equal 
worth for all individuals and social groups, she acknowledges that  “the meaning of feminist 
justice, of multiculturalism and, indeed, of rights can only be articulated by paying attention 
to the interplay between the universality and cultural particularity of human interests” (ibid.). 
This idea is taken further by Kukathas (2001) as he argues that since feminism and 
multiculturalism stem from common concerns about equal freedom of men and women, and 
of people of different cultures or religious traditions, both theories32 should support “the value 
of individual freedom, the importance of human dignity, and the need for toleration rather 
than the suppression of difference or disagreement” (p. 85). A similar view is strengthened by 
post-colonial feminists and defenders of multiculturalism who reject all approaches that 
homogenize women as a universal category. Equally important, they maintain that “the 
assumption that women are by definition oppressed in minority cultures can be traced to 
several theoretical bases: the history of colonialism, depictions of the feminist subject, the 
limits of liberalism, and the use of binary logic” (Volpp, 2001, p. 1195). This tendency is 
more elaborated in the next section about feminism and the different ways Islam and Muslim 
women-related issues have been approached.  
3.4.4 Feminism, Islam and Muslim Women  
Religion has become a potent dimension of a number of women’s lives in 
contemporary Europe generating also concerns within feminist discourse, and as a result 
challenging its conceptualisations and grasp of issues such as agency, freedom and 
emancipation.  Especially with the visibility of Muslim women in its secular public sphere, 
concerns to reconsider feminism’s historical rejection of religion were conceived as 
intrinsically androcentric and oppressive (Stanton, 1885; Okin, 1999). In other words, religion 
has become to an increasing extent an issue of interest within feminist scholarship as many 
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as well as minority rights.  
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Muslim women are rebelliously challenging western liberal notions about social development 
and secular modernity. To emphasize the complexity of this debate, I will present an overview 
about two different feminist perspectives on Islam and Muslim women; namely secular 
feminism and Islamic feminism. 
Secular Feminism 
Some secular feminists33 tend to theorize religion as totally repressive and self-
alienating to women. As Stanton (1885) pointed out earlier “History shows that the moral 
degradation of woman is due more to theological superstitions than to all other influences 
together” (p. 389). Such an approach accordingly indicates a dichotomy between religion as 
being pre-modern, irrational and outdated, and feminism as equated with civilization, 
modernity and liberation. Interpreted simply in negative terms, religion is perceived only as a 
constraint ideologically and institutionally, and even the embrace of religious affiliations or 
allegiances is viewed as a sign of false consciousness (Castelli, 2001, p. 5). More specifically, 
“this negative rendering of ‘religion’ is in many respects an ironic handover from Feminism’s 
own Enlightenment inheritance” (ibid.). To demonstrate, Okin (1999) views Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam as myths that namely attempt to justify the control and subordination 
of women. She also argues that they encompass “a combination of denials of women’s role in 
reproduction; (…) characterizations of women as overly emotional, untrustworthy, evil, or 
sexually dangerous; and refusals to acknowledge mothers’ rights over disposition of their 
children” (p. 13). In the light of such an approach to religion, Islam is also regarded as a key 
factor in the subordination of women, and hence cannot be compatible with the principles of 
equality and human dignity. Moreover, Reilly (2011) draws attention to the assumption that 
“regressive, gendered religious practices are really only a problem for women in societies that 
are ‘not modern’ (i.e. in or from the global South) who, within this logic, are generally 
construed as ‘victims’ of ‘religiousness as difference’ or ‘religion as culture’” (p. 20). In this 
case, Islam is accused of promoting patriarchy, gender inequality, violence, and even 
extremism. Such a depiction remains influential and even intensified as Muslim women 
(those visibly religious) continue to be associated with passivity or vulnerability especially if 
they insist firmly on belonging to their Muslim community.  
                                                 
33
 I refer here to secular feminists who adopt a non-religious approach and not those feminist who view 
secularism as impartiality towards all religions. 
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Regarding some secular feminists, the hijab is a means to control Muslim women’s 
sexuality who are actually socialised to values of female restriction, modesty and seclusion. 
The same view is sustained by Hirsi Ali34 (2010) who indicates that “such is the tragedy of 
girls and women who by the strictures of their upbringing and culture cannot own up to their 
body's desires, even to themselves” (p.77). To put it differently, she argues that though most 
of Muslim women might appear to make choices and decisions autonomously, they are not 
actually autonomous. Besides, Muslim women are often seen as complicit in supporting 
patriarchy (Badran, 2008, p. 26). The same mode of thinking simultaneously associates 
religious visibility with political Islam, turning veiled women from unconscious and 
submissive agents into dangerous agents that threaten the security of democratic societies. 
This point is also stressed by Hirsi Ali (2007) who criticising Islam argues that “wishful 
thinking about the peaceful tolerance of Islam cannot interpret away this reality: hands are 
still cut off, women still stoned and enslaved, just as the Prophet Muhammad decided 
centuries ago” (p. 347). As a matter of fact, this “submission versus threat” frame becomes 
typical of most discourses on Muslim women. To clarify, Reilly (2011) states that  
Undoubtedly, much feminist scholarship at the intersection of religion and politics has 
roots in a liberal Enlightenment tradition epitomized by a commitment to women’s 
equality and human rights. However, despite ‘freedom of religion’ also being a 
cornerstone of this tradition, because religion is frequently implicated in endorsing 
subordinate roles for women relative to men and/or harmful cultural practices, equality 
and rights feminism tends to view religion primarily as a threat. (p. 21) 
Given these points, Western feminism, in general, is accused of its failure to produce 
appropriate frameworks for thinking through Islamic difference, the fact that justifies the 
continuous “Othering” and denial of Muslim women’s demands and concerns.  
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  Ayan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-born writer and former Dutch parliamentarian. She is known for her hostile criticism 
to Islam. For instance, she states that: 
Many well-meaning Dutch people have told me in all earnestness that nothing in Islamic culture incites abuse of 
women, that this is just a terrible misunderstanding. Men all over the world beat their women, I am constantly 
informed. In reality, these Westerners are the ones who misunderstand Islam. The Quran mandates these 
punishments. It gives a legitimate basis for abuse, so that the perpetrators feel no shame and are not hounded by 
their conscience of their community. I wanted my art exhibit to make it difficult for people to look away from 
this problem. I wanted secular, non-Muslim people to stop kidding themselves that “Islam is peace and 
tolerance” (Hirsi Ali, 2007, p. 307).  
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Islam Feminism 
Different from the previous feminist accounts, Islamic feminism emerged in 1990s as 
a new form of feminism that is occupied with Muslim women’s concerns in different parts of 
the world. As stated by Badran (2002) “Islamic feminism has a role to play as it transcends 
and destroys old binaries that have been constructed. These included polarities between 
religious and secular and between ‘East’ and ‘West’ ”(p. 3).  In other words, Islamic feminism 
was concerned at first with deconstructing orientalism and contextualizing Arab women’s 
lived experiences. Besides, Muslim women intellectuals and activists start challenging the 
hegemony of patriarchal interpretations of the Qu’ran and the Hadith assuming that the 
appropriation of religion by men is the reason behind its oppression to women. Grounded in 
re-readings of the Islamic traditions, Islamic feminists were able to distinguish between the 
texts themselves, and the interpretations that have perpetuated patriarchal traditions. To 
illustrate, Barlas (2005) reveals that “the Qur’an repeatedly warns against “following the 
ways of the father,” which can be read literally or metaphorically as cautioning against 
adherence to patriarchal tradition, rule by the father, or both” (p.99). She also stresses the 
importance of reclaiming “the Qur’an’s integrity by detaching God from sexual oppression” if 
we are to challenge “culturally androcentric” and patriarchal traditions in Muslim 
communities (ibid. p. 100). As a criticism to patriarchy within Islamic societies Mernissi 
(1991) argues that “If women’s rights are a problem for some modern Muslim men, it is 
neither because of the Koran nor the Prophet, nor the Islamic tradition, but simply because 
those rights conflict with the interests of a male elite” (p. ix). Equally important, this view 
suggests that the discriminatory practices of some Muslims against women have no inherent 
link to religion, but rather lie in culture and socially constructed constrains. As a result, 
interpretations from a woman’s perspective were carried with the aim of advocating freedom, 
equality and social justice from within Islam (Badran, 2008, p. 29). Specifically, feminists 
“used Islamic modernist arguments in tandem with secular nationalist and humanist 
arguments during the 20th century to successfully promote rights to education and work and a 
variety of other women’s rights” (ibid). By so doing, they aim at introducing an egalitarian 
version of Islam that would empower women.  
Debates concerning religion and its connection to feminism continue to raise 
enormous concerns about the appropriate strategies to address women’s issues from within 
Islamic framework. Other Islamic feminists on the other hand have chosen to evoke secular, 
socio-economic and political arguments in an attempt to reform Islam for the favour of 
40 
 
Muslim women (Moghadam, 2002). In this respect, they believe that the Quran should be 
adapted for the purpose of accommodating a more egalitarian setting where “women would 
have full access to economy, intellectual, and political participation, and men would value and 
therefore participate fully in home and child care for a more balanced and fair society” 
(Wadud, 1999, p. 103). In this respect, Wadud’s leading one-off prayer event that was 
attended by both women and men is an example of feminist’s challenge to patriarchy within 
Islam. Equally, this reformist position was contested by feminists like Moghissi (1999) who 
conceives Islam as incompatible with the struggle for women’s equality given its misogynistic 
orientation. Nawal Al-Saadawi35 holds the same idea emphasizing the inutility of engaging 
religion in the feminist struggle for women's rights. In the same way, the Egyptian American 
journalist Mona Al Tahawi argues that all religions are intrinsically patriarchal and inimical to 
women. She even disapproves Muslim women’s use of feminism believing that the kind of 
“respect the choice regardless” argument would result in the eradication and marginalization 
of women’s agency. Similarly, Ahmed (1992) is even sceptical to the contemporary “re-
veiling movement” as a counter response to modernity. On the whole, advocates for this 
reform-oriented feminist trend maintain that Islam can and must be reformed and stripped of 
its patriarchal elements in order to guarantee equality for women and men.  In what follows I 
will address the main issues and elements of postcolonial feminist theory and standpoint 
feminist theory as an introducing section to move to the research design and the methodology 
chapter. 
3.5 Feminist Theories  
3.5.1 Postcolonial Feminist Theory 
Postmodern scholars in general are concerned with including the views and norms of 
the “Other” into research. Postcolonial feminists in particular aim at “de-colonizing the Other 
from the social and political forces that colonize, subjugate, disempower, and even enslave 
those deemed Other in a global context” (Hesse-Biber, Leavy and Yaiser 2004, p.19). This 
approach to reality and knowledge production in fact stresses Harding’s (2004) emphasis on 
the involvement of the neglected and frequently silenced voices in the development of 
feminist scholarship, reconciling between theory and practice. That is to say, the normative 
                                                 
35She is an Egyptian novelist, doctor, and militant writer of Arab women's struggles. 
41 
 
liberal accounts of human agency and the notion of a singular model of woman informing 
most feminist and political interpretations are to be challenged if we are to make room for 
other forms that have been frequently ignored or miss-understood. Opposed to the notions of 
the universal category of ‘Woman’ and the Western claim of modernity, such approach to 
research challenges also the singular model of the autonomous citizen that silences the Other 
being different. Besides, the fact that the nature of knowledge and truth “is partial, situated, 
subjective, power imbued and relational” urges the reconceptualization of the taken-for-
granted norms in the increasingly diversified, secular and multicultural Europe (Hesse-Biber, 
Leavy and Yaiser 2004, pp. 12-13).  The principle of “difference” in this regard is important 
given that it provides “feminist research with a densely complex view of the world and the 
shifting environments that can be seen from within the research process” (Hesse-Biber and 
Leckenby, 2004, p. 214). Grounded on this claim, the model(s) of female subjectivity among 
Muslim women can be investigated exploring their particular understanding(s) of agency and 
liberation. This involves an attempt to develop an account that integrates the recognition and 
the validity of the Other’s viewpoints regardless of what is dominantly accepted. Indeed, a 
research informed by a post-colonial critique of knowledge production would be “attentive to 
issues of difference, the questioning of social power, resistance to scientific oppression, and a 
commitment to political activism and social justice” (Hesse-Biber, Leavy, and Yaiser, 2004, 
p. 3). Post-colonial feminist theory in this sense remains a means to rethink the hegemonic, 
universal and liberal models informing most feminist and political accounts.  
3.5.2 Standpoint Feminist Theory 
The feminist standpoint theory is an approach that stresses the situated knowledge of 
the marginalised or neglected women, whose experiences have been silenced under the 
hegemonic social, economic and political discourses (Harding, 2004).  It aims at giving voice 
to those women who have been talked about from privileged positions. Simply put, a 
standpoint feminist perspective is meant to produce an objective feminist scholarship that is 
opposed to the “(...) adding ‘Otherness’ to mainstream culture and the resulting desires and 
fantasies about the “Other”” (Hesse-Biber, and Yaiser, 2004, p. 106). This suggests that 
starting research from the lives of those directly connected with a given problematic, will 
maximise the objectivity of the results. Harding (2004) maintains in this respect that the 
marginalised women’s position has given them the skills and the tools necessary to detect 
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social inequality and bias, and therefore they represent ‘fertile grounds’ for knowledge 
production. This entails that the social location of the subject and the social construction of 
knowledge are salient elements for the defining of the individual’s perceptions and 
viewpoints. In other words, the feminist intersectional approach is significant for the 
challenging of the universal models of womanhood that present “Women” as “coherent, 
homogeneous group in which everyone has identical interests and desires” (Hesse-Biber, and 
Yaiser, 2004, pp. 103-4). Intersectionality in this respect refers to the interrelationships 
between gender and the various aspects of our identities including religion. Such a tendency 
facilitates the better understanding of the uniqueness and singularity of the individual. In fact, 
more importantly, the questioning of the taken for granted value-systems prevalent within the 
feminist and political accounts are to be achieved by the use of the standpoint theory 
elucidated by Harding (1987) as follows: 
If one begins inquiry with what appears problematic from the perspective of women’s 
experiences, one is led to design research for women (...) That is, the goal of this 
inquiry is to provide for women explanations of social phenomena that they want and 
need, rather than providing for welfare departments, manufacturers, advertisers, 
psychiatrists, the medical establishment or the judicial system answers to questions 
that they have. The questions about women that men have wanted answered, all too 
often, arisen from desires to pacify, control, exploit or manipulate women. (p.8) 
To put it differently, privileging the situated knowledge of marginalised social agents would 
challenge the presumed normativity of equality, human rights and women’s freedom. Based 
on this theoretical framework, women are given the opportunity to express their version of 
emancipation and negotiate their uniqueness in relation to other women, feminists and 
prevalent political views challenging as a result the “added in” research strategy (Hesse-Biber, 
Leavy, and Yaiser, 2004, p. 11). Moreover, the aim is to use the social “situatedness” of the 
subjects of knowledge as a source for maximizing objectivity and help “to gain value-
neutrality in the results of research” (2004, pp. 54-58). Such a research tendency attempts to 
produce an epistemological informed perspective resulting from struggle by women who have 
been dominated, ignored or misrepresented. 
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3.6 Summary  
In this chapter, I intended to introduce the theoretical background that framed my research 
and approach to the various issues related to the current debates about the presence and 
visibility of Muslim women in European public sphere, and in Norway particularly. This 
includes the different implications and tensions associated with forms of secularism and 
multiculturalism. Additionally, the relationship(s) between multiculturalism and feminism 
were outlined moving to the feminist discourse on Islam and Muslim women; namely secular 
feminism and Islamic feminism. Finally, I reviewed the main issues and elements of 
postcolonial feminist theory and standpoint feminist theory as an introducing section to move 
to the research design and the methodology chapter.  
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4 Research Design and Methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines in detail the research strategies, methods and procedures 
followed in this study. With the purpose of justifying the appropriateness of the particular 
approaches I selected to address my research questions, this chapter attempts to allow the 
reader better understanding of my findings and conclusions. At first, I will present a 
comprehensive overview of my research design including my choice of research topic, the 
appropriateness of the methodology as well as the method used for data collection. In the 
following parts, I will elaborate further on the sampling procedures, how the data have been 
recorded and managed, the strategies adopted for data analysis, as well as issues related to the 
ethical considerations applied in this research. As for the ethical and methodological 
challenges I encountered carrying out my research, I will be reflecting on them throughout the 
chapter; reflexively projecting my perspective(s) and my relationship to the subject of study. 
4.2 Research Design Overview 
Below is a list tracing the progress of my research project (illustrated in Figure 3), and 
followed by an in-depth discussion of the overall process: 
1. Preceding the choice of this particular research project, a review of the literature was 
carried out to gain an overview of the debate on “Muslim women” within the broad 
areas of feminism, secularism, multiculturalism and integration policies in Europe and 
particularly in Norway.   
2. Subsequent to the proposal defence, I acquired approval from the NSD36 to proceed 
with the research. The NSD approval process involved filling in an online application 
to confirm adherence to criteria put forth for the collection of personal information. 
The interview protocol and the informed consent (Appendix B) were uploaded as well. 
                                                 
36
 NSD refers to the Norwegian Social Science Data Services which is “one of the largest archives for research 
data of its kind and provides data to researchers and students in Norway and abroad. Additionally, NSD is a 
resource centre, which assists researchers with regard to data gathering, data analysis, and issues of 
methodology, privacy and research ethics” (Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), n.d.) 
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3. Potential research participants were contacted through Facebook, and those who 
showed interest to participate were sent a copy of the informed consent in a private 
message. Subsequently, participants were contacted by telephone to decide on a date 
and time for the interview. 
4. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten Muslim female students at UIO. 
5. Interview data responses were transcribed and analysed. 
6. The presentation of the findings.  
 
Figure 4: The sequence of research process 
 
 
Choice of the 
research 
project
Project 
proposal and 
NSD approval
Participants 
recruitment
Interviews 
carried out 
and 
transcribed
Data analysis
Presentation 
of the 
findings
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4.2.1 Choice of Research Topic  
As a starting point, I conducted a review of literature in order to narrow down my 
research topic and acquire the theoretical and methodological framework to guide the 
development of my research proposal.  More specifically, the focus of the review was to gain 
a better understanding about a debate that has gained significant attention both within feminist 
scholarship and European politics, namely the various discourses on Muslim women and the 
issues related to their religious visibility in the public space. With this intention, I realised that 
exploring the relationship(s) Muslim women (precisely female students at UIO) have to 
religion in contemporary Norway would result in more accurate perceptions on their concerns 
and particularities. As a result, I decided to develop a reflexive dialogue between Muslim 
women (by themselves) and some of those who have spoken on their behalf within feminism 
and politics. Adopting a pluralistic, eclectic and non-essentialist tendency to research, I 
examined and problematized various positions in the debate about secularism, 
multiculturalism and feminism with the purpose of developing new understandings about 
Muslim women’s relationship(s) to religion as well as suggesting appropriate ways to 
accommodate their concerns and particularities. All in all, this research introduces a discourse 
that is barely represented given the growingly secular orientations of the European societies 
that regard religion as either violent or misogynist, namely the position of the “believer” 
Muslim woman. With the intention of giving voice to those women who have been most of 
the time talked about from privileged positions, this research drew on a feminist qualitative 
methodology. 
4.2.2 Appropriateness of Feminist Qualitative Research  
Driven by the concern to explore the voice(s) of the “Othered” (Spivak, 1994), 
specifically Muslim women, who are most of the time talked about from privileged 
positions, I have embarked on a feminist qualitative research. One reason for this choice is 
related to the multidisciplinary nature of feminist scholarship that makes it a source of a 
variety of methodologies as well as theories, the fact that provided me with the tools 
necessary to conduct a research for and with women. A point worth mentioning here is that I 
do not identify specifically with a particular feminist school; nevertheless, I draw on different 
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interpretations depending on the emerging themes and issues associated with the debate on 
“Muslim women”. More importantly, I view my research as a contribution to the development 
of feminism as it aims to challenge the already existing feminist writings on this particular 
issue. To begin with, feminism informed my research in various ways: including my choice of 
the topic, my focus on women’s experiences and the kind of research questions and 
objectives I set out to explore, my emphasis on reflexivity and concern with power 
relationships throughout all the research phases, and my attempt to produce an account that 
would generate positive social change.  This demonstrates Hesse-Biber and Leckenby’s 
(2004) claim that “the theoretical perspectives, methodological commitments, and method 
process all engage cyclically with one another during feminist research” (p. 210). These 
points are to be explained in detail subsequently. 
Equally important, reflexivity remains a salient feminist concern, and therefore I am 
aware of my position as “an insider” researcher who shares with her respondents the status of 
belonging to a religious minority. In other words, reflecting on my relationship to the subject 
of my research, I admit that my interest in this particular issue is not merely academic; it is 
also emotional. Moreover, the kind of feminist understandings, perspectives and theories with 
which I identify are obviously influenced by the fact that I am a Muslim, a Gender Studies 
student, immigrant, heterosexual and married woman. As a strategy to remain reflexive I take 
into consideration Harding’s claim that the researcher should not appear “as an invisible, 
anonymous voice of authority, but as a real, historical individual with concrete, specific 
desires and interests” (Harding, 1987, p.9). This subjectivity, a distinctive issue in feminist 
research, is illustrated in my choice of the topic, my literature review, the selection of a 
particular sample and my overall approach to the research. Nevertheless, my personal views, 
beliefs and convictions have been under constant scrutiny along the continuum of the research 
process .This reflexivity is considered throughout the paper.  
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990) as 
“any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures 
or other means of quantification” (p.17). Given the kind of objectives, research questions and 
the narrative I sought to introduce within the feminist scholarship, I found this methodology 
an appropriate one. It guided the research process in all its phases; including my selection of 
the subject of research, the method of data collection, and my interpretive practice. This is 
what Hesse-Biber and Leckenby (2004) underline arguing that “Epistemology, methodology 
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and methods are not de-linked from each other but interact in dynamic ways to produce new 
knowledge and this openness itself is also characteristic of how feminist researchers approach 
their work” (p. 210). In this sense, conducting an exploratory research through a qualitative 
methodological lens enabled me to document my participants’ perspectives through 
influencing the type of data I needed to collect, how I went by collecting it and the way I 
performed my analysis. As I will elucidate in what follows, this approach helped me reach an 
in-depth understanding of my participants’ insights through the qualitative interviewing of a 
number of Muslim female students at UIO. 
 To point out another key strength, this method of data-collection and analysis allowed 
me to capture the participants’ singularity, personal experience and thoughts as they were 
given the chance to present their background, and give their own definitions of terms such as 
freedom, emancipation and secularism. More significantly, they had the opportunity to 
express their position(s) regarding the general debate on Islam and Muslim women within the 
European as well as Norwegian setting.  Indeed, the appropriateness of this approach lies in 
the fact that it provided the tools to gain access into data and voices that have been 
traditionally silenced within the feminist as well as the political discourses.  As Silverman 
(2006) put it, “one of the strengths of qualitative research is its ability to access directly what 
happens in the world” (p. 113). In fact, by emphasising the “participants’ perspective”, this 
tendency helped me “make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people 
bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005:3). Moreover, it helps “understand the particular 
context within which the participants act, and the influence that this context has on their 
action” (Maxwell, 1996, p. 17). For these reasons, a qualitative approach to the issue of 
Muslim women provided the ability to raise new questions resulting in new understandings.  
4.2.3 Appropriateness of Semi-structured Interviews 
Qualitative research can be conducted through a variety of data collection techniques. 
In this regard, Marshall and Rossman (1999) suggest that the data collection methods can be 
classified into four types: (a) participation in the setting, (b) direct observation, (c) in-depth 
interviews, and (d) document analysis. Nevertheless, the choice of the appropriate method(s) 
in research is primarily determined by the researcher’s epistemological and methodological 
perspective. As far as my research is concerned, I reviewed theoretical perspectives drawing 
upon relevant literature within the feminist and political discourses on Islam and “Muslim 
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women” in Europe and Norway in particular. On the other hand, empirical data was derived 
from the participants’ perceptions of life, freedom, women’s liberation, the secular state, and 
how they conceive the prevailing political as well as feminist views on Muslim women. To 
put it differently, in addition to the literature review, that played an important role in framing 
my research, I conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews for my data collection.  
Qualitative interviewing as a method of data collection allowed me to explore the 
participants’ awareness of the mainstream political debates and the growingly feminist 
academic literature about Muslim women, and at the same time examine their position(s) vis-
à-vis those who have chosen to talk on their behalf. This particular choice is based on the 
assumption that “Qualitative interviewing has been particularly attractive to researchers who 
want to explore voices and experiences which they believe have been ignored, misrepresented 
or suppressed in the past” (Byrne, 2004, p. 182 cited in Silverman, 2006, p. 114). Using 
interviews as a research instrument offered  a number of Muslim female students at UIO the 
opportunity to voice their standpoints on this ongoing debate; through first presenting 
themselves, the role(s) religion plays in their lives, and the way they choose to define terms 
such as freedom, women’s liberation, feminism and secularism. On the other hand, 
participants were introduced to the different “secular” political as well as feminist views on 
Muslim women, and were at the same time given the chance to express their standpoints 
regarding those who continue representing them and their concerns. I intended at first to use a 
combination of methods of data collection given that this strategy helps to balance the 
limitations of each one. Additionally, I selected the interview as the primary method for data 
collection in this research for its potential to capture a person’s perspective of an event or 
experience, as maintained by Denzin and Lincoln (2003). Furthermore, it offers the researcher 
the possibility to reformulate questions, clarify statements and even ask for additional 
information.    
Basically, for the purpose of answering my research questions, I utilized interviews as 
my primary method for gathering data. Another reason behind this choice lied in the fact that 
it provided the possibility to obtain an in-depth understanding of my respondents’ attitudes 
and perspectives on different matters associated with Muslim women.  Indeed, “qualitative 
interviewing when done well is able to achieve a level of depth and complexity that is not 
available to other, particularly survey- based approaches” (Byrne, 2004, p. 182 cited in 
Silverman, 2006, p. 114). For instance, this particular method provided a direct, face-to-face 
interaction with the interviewee; the fact that gave me the possibility to exchange views and 
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perspectives and ask follow up questions to get a better understanding of complex issues 
emerging under the interview. To illustrate, when one of my interviewees answered one 
question saying “I try to be a good Muslim”, I had the chance to ask her more precisely: 
“What do you mean by a good Muslim?” In the same way, I managed to get her personal 
insight on “being a good Muslim”. In fact, qualitative interviewing reduces the possibility of 
misunderstanding or ambiguity. It is precisely for this reason that conducting interviews 
allowed me to better explore my participants’ own words vis-à-vis the on-going debates on 
Muslim women within feminism and politics. 
Conducting interviews as a primarily method for collecting data in my research was 
also associated with my concern about exploring individual’s self-definition, singularity and 
personal viewpoints. On this point, Kvale (1996) describes the qualitative research interview 
as an “attempt to understand the world from the subject's point of view, to unfold the meaning 
of peoples' experiences, to uncover their lived world (…)” (p. 1). Correspondingly, this 
technique is compatible with my effort to break out the perpetuating muteness of Muslim 
women’s voices given that it facilitated the capturing of their perspectives in their own words. 
Besides, interviews remain “special forms of conversation” that enable both the researcher 
and the researched to engage in an ‘interactional, interpretive activity” where “meaning is not 
merely elicited by apt questioning, nor simply transported through respondents replies” 
(Silverman, 2004, pp. 140-42). On the contrary, both the interviewer and the respondents are 
active participants and contributors to the production of the interview data. The assumption 
behind this view is expressed by Silverman (2004) as follows: 
Treating interviewing as a social encounter in which knowledge is actively 
constructed suggests the possibility that the interview is not so much a neutral 
conduit or source of distortion, but rather a site of, and occasion for, producing 
reportable knowledge (p. 141). 
Moreover, my choice of interviewing allowed me not only to listen to the voices of my 
participants, but also to see what might be hidden and silenced through other means of data 
collection. This entails that “listening empowers the participant and engages the researcher to 
be present” (Hesse-Biber and Leckenby, 2004, p. 216) resulting in a better understanding of 
how the participants make sense of themselves, their patterns, and their actions. In other 
words, listening also involves observing the ways in which the participant’s words are said, 
her hesitations, periods of silence, and even her voice volume.  
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Qualitative interviewing can be time-consuming in general, and therefore needs a 
well-structured plan. Important to realize, there is potential for bias in qualitative interviews 
and so is the data analysis. To clarify, not all people are equally cooperative and articulate, 
and some may falsify their claims either to project the version of the person they wish to be, 
or simply to please the interviewer. Even the researcher may fall into bias through projecting 
his/her personal views on the respondents; for example, I sometimes found myself directing 
my interviewees to identify with the my personal beliefs and claims.  More importantly, it is a 
method that requires a well-qualified, highly trained interviewer.  Besides, I was aware of the 
fact that “collecting information from a diverse range of individuals and settings, using a 
variety of methods” (Maxwell, 1996, p.715) would maximise the chance of developing a 
more complete and accurate account. Nevertheless, neither constrains of time nor space (80-
120 pages) would have permitted such a research procedure. In the following sections, I will 
reflect more on my sampling procedures and data collection method. 
4.3 Sampling Procedures   
4.3.1 The Sampling Strategy  
Carrying on an exploratory qualitative research, I went for a purposive sampling 
strategy that demands the selection of participants according to predetermined criteria. This 
refers to the strategy in which “particular settings, persons, or events are selected deliberately 
in order to provide important information that can’t be gotten as well from other choices” 
(Maxwell, 1996, p.70). In my case, the focus was on exploring standpoints of participants 
belonging to a defined community in a specific context.  In view of that, the criteria for 
inclusion included (a) age range fall between 18 and 25 years, (b) being female student at 
UIO, (c) living in Norway, and (d) identifying with Islam. The logic behind this specific 
selection was associated with the fact that all the participants belong to the Norwegian 
Muslim young generation; a commonality that I regarded as an important feature for the 
development of a narrative about Muslim women in the contemporary Europe. However, the 
aim of this choice is not linked to the belief that their situated position has given them the 
skills and the tools necessary to detect social inequality and biases, and therefore are the 
“fertile grounds” for knowledge production (Harding, 2004). In fact, I was concerned with 
Maxwell’s claim that “selecting those times, settings, and individuals that can provide you 
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with the information that you need in order to answer your research questions is the most 
important consideration in qualitative sampling decisions” (1996, p.70).  In the same way, my 
research questions and objectives were answered through allowing appropriate participants, 
“women from within”, to personally express their version(s) of emancipation and negotiate 
their uniqueness and position(s) in relation to religion, feminists and the prevalent political 
views. This appropriateness lies in their possession of knowledge and experience my research 
required, and had the time and willingness to participate.  
4.3.2 The Recruitment Process 
 A total of 10 Muslim female students, aged 18-23, and from different bachelor and 
master programs at UIO, were recruited mainly through a social media channel. However, my 
two first participants were friends that I knew from my personal involvement at the mosque 
and youth organizations. As for the recruitment through social media, a Facebook page titled 
“Sisters in University of Oslo UIO” has facilitated the task. Immediately after posting a note 
on the page introducing my research and my need for participants, many students showed 
their interest to participate. While some contented with pressing the “like” bottom, or 
commenting the post, others afforded to take part in the research with pleasure and 
commitment. The direct encounter with participants was preceded by private message 
exchanges via Facebook. To demonstrate, I sent individual messages to potential participants 
providing them with more information about the purpose of the research, and thus a meeting 
place, time, and date was established for the convenience of the researcher and participant. 
Under these conditions, the recruitment process went smoothly and I faced no difficulties 
throughout the way. In fact, individual interviews were conducted and all the participants 
were given a gift in an effort to thank them for their help. This gift was in the form of a cup 
valued fifteen to twenty NOK. 
4.3.3 Reflections on Sampling  
Believing that reflexivity should be “deeply involved in the writing of the research text 
and the writing of oneself” (Hesse-Biber and Leckenby, 2004, p. 220), I must admit that I felt 
a sense of belonging and identification with my research sample and therefore it was 
necessary to reflect on my position as a researcher.  Being an insider researcher, a Muslim 
female student myself, can result in the emergence of several biases, including the recruitment 
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of the informants that I think would share my views on life, support and strongly identify with 
what I have already in the mind. To minimize the impact of my insider position, I took into 
consideration other measures for recruitment. This can be illustrated by the fact that though I 
have many friends that can be potential participants in my research; I opted for recruiting 
people I met for the first time. Moreover, I formulated a semi-structured interview that 
incorporated open questions (….); a strategy that allowed me to examine and understand the 
informants’ viewpoints and the distinctiveness of their choices, as well as to reflect on my 
insights and personal experience. Provided that “being an “insider”_ whatever it actually 
means_ is not a straightforward route to knowing” (Doucet and Mauthner, 2006, p. 40), I 
continuously negotiated and shifted my positionality throughout the research process. To put 
it differently, I conducted my research as an ongoing and dynamic conversation between my 
position as a researcher, my theoretical perspectives and the data collected. Indeed, what 
made my relationship with participants less problematic was their awareness of the different 
positions of the debate on Muslim women and their ability to speak for themselves 
assertively. Nevertheless, important to realize the possibility of emerging blind spots remains 
inevitable, and can influence their insights in a way or in another.  
A further point is that most of the participants expressed their appreciation to the 
objectives of the project, which they found novel and needed, and they saw in their 
participation an opportunity to express their standpoints regarding the way(s) Islam and its 
conception on women are represented. Important to question here is the participants’ great 
interest in my research. This can be explained by the fact that I made use of a web page that is 
assigned just for Muslim female students at UIO which means it is a group that puts its 
affiliation to a given religion in the centre, and therefore it is logical that its members would 
identify with the objectives of my research dealing with issues related to the presence of 
“Muslim women” in Norway. However, the interesting part is that almost all the interviewees 
had different ethnic backgrounds, and enrolled in different fields of study; most of them were 
born in Norway, while some came at an early age. Having provided a description of the 
sampling procedures utilized in the research, I will provide a detailed description of the data 
collection and analysis process that facilitated the qualitative exploration of this research 
topic. 
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4.4 Data Collection Method(s) 
4.4.1 The Interviews Process  
The interview questions were developed based on previous literature on the issue of 
Muslim women within feminism and politics. With guidance from my advisor, the questions 
were discussed, revised and modified until an interview guide was developed (Appendix A). 
This included a specific set of questions in a particular order to explore the participants’ self-
definition, version(s) of emancipation and their distinctiveness in relation to other women, 
feminists and the prevalent political views held on Muslim women. As a first attempt, I 
interviewed a friend of mine (a test interview) to examine my interviewing skills and the 
coherence of my questions. Prior to all the interviews, each interviewee was asked to review 
and sign the informed consent required for participation in this research (Appendix B). 
Accordingly, all the interviewees were promised anonymity37 and thus accepted to be tape-
recorded.  At this instant, I conducted semi-structured person to person conversations in 
English; the fact that allowed me to take notes, guide the sequence of events and stress the 
themes that appeared significant to my research questions. Most of the interviews took place 
at UIO lasting from half to two hours. This depended on the participant’s time and willingness 
to cooperate. Immediately after the first interview, the audio tape was transcribed word for 
word and reviewed to consider what main themes emerged and what needed to be improved 
for the next interview.  In fact, this was an on-going practice throughout the data gathering 
process. Hence, this strategy allowed the flexibility needed to pursue new topics for 
exploration as they appeared in the course of the interview. To ensure confidentiality, I gave 
each participant a pseudo-name on the transcript as well as in my written account. Once data 
was collected through individual interviews, audiotapes were transcribed, methodological 
notes were written and then I conducted a detailed content analysis in order to develop a 
coding technique of the pre-set as well as emerging themes and categories.  
4.4.2 Reflections on the Data Collection Process  
                                                 
37
 All of the interviewees were given pseudo-names. 
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As I mentioned earlier, reflexivity in the research process remains a salient practice 
that should inform continuously the constitutive stages of the research process including data 
collection and analysis. Namely, DeVault and Gross (2006) maintain that:  
In the conduct of any interview research, feminists must maintain a reflexive 
awareness that research relations are never simple encounters, innocent of 
identities and lines of power, but, rather, are always embedded in and shaped 
by cultural constructions of similarity, difference, and significance (p. 181). 
Grounded on this assumption, it had to be aware of the power dynamics in research, and 
therefore adopted a reflexive interviewing strategy establishing a non-hierarchical relationship 
with my informants. This was achieved through conducting active interviews where “the 
respondent’s (…), in collaboration with the interviewer, activates communicative resources as 
an integral part of exchanging questions and answers” (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004, p. 154).  
For instance, my interview guide was organized in a way that would generate collaborative 
back-and-forth discussions. In other words, I intended to start with general and then more 
specific questions as a means to encourage the participants to reflect and negotiate their ideas 
and understandings about different issues. To demonstrate, we discussed first the meaning(s) 
of ‘the secular state’ before moving to talk about the secular Norway and the position of 
women in such a state. The same strategy was applied dealing with the different feminist 
approaches to Muslim women; I referred first to western feminism and then Islamic feminism, 
and finally participants were asked to reconsider their understanding of feminism and which 
version they would support.  
A further point is that I was positioned “in-between” with respect to the specific points 
discussed, a fact that influenced every aspect of my interview practice.  Accordingly, my 
personal background and feminist knowledge were obviously embedded in the type of 
questions addressed under the interviews. Besides, my insider status sharing some identity 
components, beliefs, and commitments with my informants affected my capacity to engage 
and communicate easily with them. This stand served as a means by which I managed to 
establish a certain degree of closeness to participants and thus gained access to their 
viewpoints. The most important is that ease and comfort was observed among interviewees as 
they actively communicated their personal opinions and experiences. Nevertheless, my dual 
role of interviewer and friend with two of my participants whom I have known through my 
involvement with Muslim youth activities in Oslo, required some distance and control over 
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my thoughts, feelings and involvement in the discussion. My initial intention behind this 
selection had nothing to do with emphasizing the lives of those women who I believe would 
support my personal insights. Basically, I went for this choice believing that the interview 
would not interrogate intimate details about the interviewees’ lives, and that this unique 
experience would allow us to be self-reflexive challenging our taken-for-granted thoughts as 
friends who share various things in common.  
Being aware of the risk of reproducing the dominant perspectives on Muslim women, I 
was shifting positions dealing with a research sample that has been raised and socialized in 
Norway, unlike myself. This specificity made me aware of the importance of being more 
attentive to their unfamiliar experiences and perspectives regardless of what I wanted or 
expected to hear. For this reason, active listening remains a salient element of interview 
research to obtain the information needed. Interested in an inclusivity that recognizes and 
values difference, I sought to provide participants with “pertinent ways of conceptualizing 
issues and making connections” (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997, p. 125). I felt sometimes that I 
was exerting a kind of control over my interviewees either by directing the discussion in a 
specific pattern or by emphasizing the details important to me. Nevertheless, to minimize 
power differentials in this regard participants were actively implicated in producing 
knowledge based on the claim that “all interviews are unavoidably active meaning-making 
ventures” (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004, p. 157).  In the next section, the focus will be on 
introducing the procedures followed in the data analysis process as well as a reflection on the 
whole process.  
4.5 Data Analysis  
Conducting a feminist qualitative research, I undertook a thematised analysis of my 
data involving examining, comparing, conceptualizing and organizing the participants’ 
interview transcripts into interpretive categories. I used coding to identify recurring themes, 
key concepts, connections and contradictions in the data gathered. To illustrate, after looking 
at the similarities and differences between participants’ perspectives, I first grouped text 
segments with similar content into separate categories, and then managed to classify them into 
major domains through a process of interpretation and continuous reflexivity capturing the 
distinctive features of each domain. Important to realize, though I was guided by my research 
questions and implicit thoughts, I remained open to new ideas emerging from the data with 
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the purpose of gaining a deep and nuanced understanding of the groups’ standpoints and 
insights. As a result and grounded on my reviewed literature on the various issues linked to 
“Muslim women” within feminist scholarship, in debates about multiculturalism and 
secularism in Europe, and within the Norwegian context, I decided to divide my analysis 
patterns into three dimensions: including the personal, the feminist and the political. This 
framework allowed me subsequently to first account for (5.2) the relationship(s) the 
participants’ have with religion and how their perceptions on life are influenced by such a 
relation. Secondly (5.3), I was able to capture the different positions these young women have 
regarding “feminism” in general, and the ways “Muslim women” have been depicted within 
feminist scholarship in particular. In the political part (5.4), the interviewees were given the 
opportunity to express openly their views on the ways their concerns have been represented 
within politics, their perspectives on the secular state, and more precisely their insights with 
respect to the accommodation of religious diversity in Norway38. Indeed, my engagement 
with the literature as well as the new emergent ideas has shaped my interpretations resulting 
in a continual interplay between the data gathered, my existing theoretical knowledge and the 
analysis. I accordingly hope that the logic of my analysis will become more intelligible in the 
following chapters. 
Figure 5: The sequence of my data analysis 
 
                                                 
38
 The diagram above illustrates the pattern followed in Data Analysis.  
The personal
The feminists
The political
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Reflecting on the data analysis process, I was aware that carrying out a feminist 
research should be “driven by, and aimed toward, a desire to challenge multiple hierarchies of 
inequalities within social life” (Doucet and Mauthner 2006, p.42). With this in mind, I 
managed not just in the data analysis phase but also throughout the whole research process to 
challenge power imbalances basically through doing justice to my participants’ insights and 
concerns. In fact, conducting a feminist research is mainly about treating other women, 
though in the “researched” position, as equal and not as subordinated.  In this respect, I 
attempted to introduce an account that would “carry messages of empowerment that challenge 
the encircling of knowledge claims by those who occupy privileged positions” (Hesse-Biber, 
2012, p.3); particularly politicians and feminists. The point I am putting forward here is in 
agreement with what Harding (1984) regards as “a more complete and less distorting kind of 
social experience” (p. 184) given that I am concerned with the standpoints of individual 
female voices speaking about themselves. However, my research neither stresses the validity 
of the “marginalised” and “oppressed” women’s accounts as Harding claims, nor does it 
privilege the viewpoints of a specific category of women. The emphasis is rather on capturing 
the personal perspectives of these young women through giving them the opportunity to 
comment on what have been written or thought about them. In other words, the purpose is “to 
see what is there, not what we’ve been taught is there” (Du Bois, 1983, p. 109). This tendency 
will be clearly illustrated in the data analysis chapter.  
4.6 Summary  
 In this chapter, I endeavoured to provide a reflexive account of the research process 
with the purpose of justifying my choice of design and research method to address my 
research question(s). Describing the rationale behind my choice of the topic, my 
methodological approach, sampling procedures, the method used for data collection and my 
analysis strategy provides aims at providing a ground for the better understanding of my 
findings. I have also discussed some of the ethical considerations and issues encountered 
during the research process. In the next three chapters, I will introduce my findings in three 
parts; including the interviewees’ relationship(s) and viewpoints on religion (5.2), and various 
issues within feminism (5.3) and in politics (5.4). 
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5 Data Analysis and Discussion 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses in the first place the relationship(s) Muslim women have to 
religion in addition to the various factors behind their identification with Islam in 
contemporary Norway. The second part introduces accordingly a dialogue between the 
Muslim women, feminists39 and Islam. This includes their perceptions on “liberation” and 
“feminism” as well as their viewpoints regarding the ways their concerns and interests have 
been represented within both secular and Islamic feminism. The final section explores 
subsequently the ways Muslim women’s issues are talked about within politics as well as their 
insights on the position of religion within secular Europe.  
5.2 The Personal: Situating Religion in the Life 
of the Muslimah  
5.2.1 A journey towards truth and Inner Peace 
Various factors behind the increasing identification of Muslim youth with Islam were 
determined, exploring my interviewees’ relationship(s) to religion in secular40 Norway. One 
of these factors was mainly their quest for meaning and inner peace in today’s world of 
individuality, consumerism and materialism; or what may be referred to as “late modernity”. 
Simply put, my interviewees suggested that the profound understanding of the purpose of 
human existence, through faith, allows a person to position him/herself within a variety of 
different realities, and as a result find a state of balance and inner peace. Grounded on such a 
claim religious belief or faith can be understood as source of strength and at the same time 
gives meaning and purpose to the life of these young women. This faith referred to in this 
                                                 
39
 This includes secular and Islamic feminists as well as the perceptions my interviewees appropriated to 
“feminism”.  
40
 I refer here to the meaning of the term “secularization” as religious decline, see p. 24. 
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context relates to what Ramadan (2010) identifies as the state of confidence, peace and 
balance and being at ease with oneself.  
To begin with, Sarah41, questioning her position in relation to the prevailing “global 
models of social behaviour and consumption”42, expressed her scepticism to the mainstream 
beauty standards that continue to define and validate a singular version of being “a woman” 
as follows: 
When you have a society with so much focus on things like appearance and how 
women have to look good all the time: women’s beauty is almost abused. It is almost 
vulgarized. It is used for commercials. (…) and over the years western society has 
become more liberal in that sense. Today, it is normal to see women wearing bikinis. 
So that has been a development of liberation of women even if that is not my 
definition of liberation, but that is the way it has been. And I think with that 
development it would make sense if at the same time you also have the development 
of a resistance towards that (Sarah). 
This statement can be accordingly interpreted as a postmodern critique towards the grand 
narratives attributed to the liberating project exemplified in this case by the beauty standards. 
To clarify, Sarah’s position reflects a kind of rejection to the commercialized model of how a 
woman should be like, or what liberation stands for.  In particular, she manifests a counter-
reaction to a lifestyle where the focus on women’s body and beauty standards are 
exaggerated. Another point worth mentioning, in this regard, is Sarah’s critical thinking 
towards the taken-for-granted preoccupation with blindly following the fashion trend; 
especially as she distances herself from those who may associate “liberation” with being a 
“sex object”. This position may be also in agreement with what Giddens (1991) refers to as 
“reflexivity” being a defining characteristic of all human action in late modern society; 
Sarah’s selective attitude towards the various models of being a woman around her. To reflect 
more on this journey towards building one’s self in today’s world, Giddens stresses also the 
                                                 
41
 All my interviewees are given anonymous names.  
42
 For Zembeta (2008), Globalization is seen by those calling for cultural diversity as a homogenising force that 
leads to “the formation of global models of social behaviour and consumption”, and therefore it presents an 
obstacle to plurality and it marginalises the nonconforming Other (p. 301). Different from this definition 
Casanova (2006) presents Globalization as the incorporation of “inter-civilizational encounters, cultural 
imitations and borrowings, diasporic diffusions, hybridity, creolization, and transcultural hyphenations” (p.17). 
See p.  
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fact that people no longer rely on local knowledge, traditions, religious guidelines, conducts 
or observation of others’ practices to manage their everyday lives. However, he adds that this 
process is neither straightforward nor certain, and this is because choices must be made 
between a range of options and possibilities (ibid. p. 3).  Moving to a similar claim, Linda 
argued that “Muslim women are definitely fed up with fashion, and they are trying to be more 
Islamic appropriate, and they know that the material world is not really something that can 
give them happiness, freedom, or anything in that way”.  
On the negative side, such an emphasis on faith as an alternative to achieving 
happiness over other material pursuits may be interpreted as a mere reproduction of what was 
transmitted to these young women by their parents, or limited to the range of options available 
to them. Nevertheless, the scepticism expressed by Sarah and Linda towards the worldly and 
material elements within society, and their selective approach to the realities around them 
illustrate rather a reflexive as well as rationalized perspective on life (Giddens, 1991). 
Likewise, these young women demonstrate a liberating position resisting sexism within 
society. Linda clarified additionally that “we live in a consumerist society, so you just buy 
things to make yourself happy, or just make you satisfied internally with products and 
materials. (…) you get tired of this routine because it doesn't give a purpose”. Under such 
circumstances, these young women choose to return to religion for self-identification and in a 
quest for developing new adapted versions of “being women” in contemporary Norway. 
Underlining the importance of internal satisfaction, self-confidence and pride, Sarah stated 
that “I think I need an internal liberation; that I learn to acknowledge my self’s worth and 
understand and have self-esteem”. Important to realize is that this emphasis on “internal 
liberation” is thus a kind of struggle that young women are enduring throughout their journey 
to reconcile between their desires, belief in Allah “the Creator”, and their internalized values 
and norms within Norwegian society.  Giddens (1991) maintains in the same way that the self 
is “a reflexive project” that has to “be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive 
activities of the individual” (pp. 32, 52); and mainly in response to the social dynamics, and 
the transformation of the structures and meanings of life is a continuous process.  
Equally important, the aspect of context seems to play also a significant role in young 
women’s identification with Islam. Likewise, one interviewee indicated the influence of 
moving from a majority Muslim country to the multi-religious Norway on her growing 
interest in exploring Islam. She narrated accordingly that:  
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Well, I think before when I lived in (B.)43 We were never raised very strictly Muslims 
because in B., you know, like 90% down there are Muslims and they are not very 
strict. You know they fast in Ramadan, they celebrate the Aid and staff like that ... 
they don't necessary pray every day. So, it is like I learnt about Islam little bit in 
school. But other than that, it wasn't, you know, such a present part of my life as it has 
become later when I moved to Norway. So, I think after I moved to Norway, I was 10. 
I think I became more aware (…) You know, because when you come to a new 
culture, a new place and your original identity is maybe threatened because you come 
to a new society where people think very differently .I think that when it became more 
and more important, and, like, I start becoming more religious, like, my brother and 
my mother as well. And since then it has increased and played a part in my life 
(Sarah). 
This comment illustrates exactly how the setting aspect influences the person’s identity 
formation.  It entails that moving to a host country engenders the need for reaffirming and 
preserving the most vulnerable and endangered elements of one’s identity; which is religion 
in this case. Another important point in this regard is the fact that in Oslo (a European setting) 
religion has moved from being just about the performance of worship to a more 
individualized reflection upon the self in its relation to God and its creation. As pointed out 
earlier, spirituality in this context is more about the relationship one has with the sacred “no 
longer from the point of view of obedience to external authority but instead centralising the 
freedom of the individual” (Flanagan and Jupp, 2007, p. 170). In other words, young women 
are more concerned about “the believing” than about “the belonging” if we are to use Davie’s 
(2000)44 terms describing religiosity among the youth in Europe. Nevertheless, concepts such 
as “do-it-yourself religiosity” or “individualized” religiosity are incompatible in this context 
given that these young women are not creating alternative or individualistic forms of religion, 
but they are rather engaging in learning about Islam in an attempt to assess what have been 
transmitted to them by their parents, and better understand what they have chosen to believe 
in. The same view is sustained by a research on Muslim women where the findings reveal that 
“In fact, the quest to display ‘authentic’ or ‘real’ Islam encourages them out of the private 
family to practice their religion through study groups, academic reading and internet forums 
in the more public arena” (Vincett et al, 2008, p. 9).  
                                                 
43
 The country’s name is anonymous for privacy reasons.  
44
 Davie’s claim of “belonging without believing” was discussed under “the secularization” section, see p. 26.  
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Much more interesting, reversing the position of faith from a majority religious 
environment to secular Europe exemplifies what Göle, (2012) describes in her article 
“Decentering Europe, Recentering Islam” as new dynamics of encounter between Europe and 
Islam. This contiguous contact and confrontation between Europe and Islam is interpreted as 
follows: 
The location of this encounter, namely old Europe, is becoming a site of novel 
experiences, where we can no longer speak of two distinct civilizations separated by 
time and space. The discourse of civilizational difference does not, in spite of its 
popularity, capture social realities and social imaginaries that are shaped by 
transgressions of geographic frontiers, by cultural borrowings and hybridity (p. 668). 
When Göle’s argument is looked at closely, it is important to point out that she advocates a 
new understanding of the presence of Muslims and the visibility of Islam in Europe, one that 
transcends the reductionist dichotomy of the “West versus the Rest”. This may be understood 
accordingly as a reference to the fact that Islam has moved from being a mere “immigrant” or 
a “cultural diversity” related issue, to rather a new relationship that young women (including 
the born Muslims, the new converts, and those who were not observant Muslims before) are 
developing to religion.  
5.2.2 Forming the Self through Religion  
As demonstrated previously, the greater number of interviewees asserted their resort to 
Islam in an attempt to understand and reform the self; an empowering experience that 
provides meaning to one’s positionality in relation to the different elements present in their 
lives; involving for example the parental expectations and the lifestyle structures. In this case, 
developing the self in late modernity is created through choice, individuality and reflexive 
thinking (Beck, 1992). With regard to my interviewees, several examples were narrated 
reflecting different motives behind their conscious return to Islam; as they prefer to call it. 
Notably, these young women have chosen to embark personally into a journey towards the 
self, setting aside assertiveness for reflection and investigation as human beings not as Arabs, 
Westerners, or Sudanese. On that account, one interviewee articulated her self-discovery of 
Islam as follows: 
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I came from a home that has a high level of education; like my father is also a doctor; 
my mother has been educated in economy and such things. So, we have always been 
like: “you need to find things on your own” (…) so, for me, it has always been: “Read 
about it. Find out why. Be sure about it” So, when someone asks you about it, 
especially here in Norway. You have to be able to answer and not only say because 
my Dad's Mum said so and my grandfather said so (Aisha). 
With regard to this comment, one can interpret that investigating the correctness of some 
practises linked to religion, culture or tradition serves as a source through which these young 
women shape continuously their self. One may associate Aisha’s independent thought with 
the fact of belonging to a middle class family. To clarify, raised up by a well-educated parents 
may be the reason behind Aisha’s rational approach to life. Nevertheless, this assumption is 
limited since the same view is stressed by all my interviewees who maintained that learning 
about Islam have been part of their quest for identity and personality formation. Undoubtedly, 
living within a society with a plurality of beliefs and multiple realities, engenders a set of 
questions related to the different influential elements in one’s life; including agents of 
socialization namely media, school, friends, the parents’ background, and the virtual world as 
well. In an effort to balance and reflect upon all these conflicting elements, these young 
women found in their consciously chosen religion a perfectly flexible as well as adaptable 
way of life. In fact, “Against local customs, ancestral traditions, despotic patriarchy and daily 
alienation, they are convinced that more Islam means more rights and more freedom” 
(Ramadan, 2001, p. 58). To illustrate, this independent quest for knowledge about Islam was 
expressed by an interviewee who mentioned that:  
So, you need to know where the red line goes about like boys and girls interaction.  
So, that is why we have to go back and read the Quran, read the hadith and all that. 
That is why I think this generation that has been raised up in the West, is different 
from other generations (Aisha).  
Maturity plays also a significant role in this respect given the fact that the more 
grown-up one becomes the more responsible and serious he/she is about the future and life in 
general. “A lot of people ask questions about: “what is life?  What is the purpose of life?” 
(…) and this results in that you go back to religion because you feel more confident in that 
religion” (Nora). One outcome of Nora’s claim is the interconnection between understanding 
the purpose of life, feeling confident and religion. A point evoked earlier, this accentuated 
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approach to life, among most interviewees, may be understood as their internalization to those 
virtues associated with feminine passivity, obedience and submissiveness, which, from a 
secular feminist45 point of view relate to gender-based restrictions within religion. With this in 
mind, Muslim women are perceived as complicit in supporting patriarchy. Another feminist 
insight my interpret women’s religious compliance as their false understanding of their own 
interests, and therefore consciousness-raising46 is a key element in this regard. Nevertheless, 
one of the main arguments against this assumption is the interviewees’ emphasis on their 
conscious choice and autonomy as indicated by Yasmin who stated that “the more mature one 
gets, the more he/she learns and studies about Islam. So, one understands much more by 
himself.  We are in a way born into Islam but, we cannot that much about it until we can 
actually understand it by ourselves” The same point was also identified by Jacobsen (2011) 
grounded on her research on young Muslims in Norway. She maintains that: 
The young Muslims repeatedly stated that they followed Islam as the result of a 
personal choice, this ideally having been made on rational grounds, because Islam had 
proven, after close scrutiny, to be the one true religion. (…) the ideal way of being 
Muslim was thus one that realized individual freedom; Islam should be followed not 
out of tradition but because of an individual and free choice based iman47. That 
individuality and free choice were guaranteed by Islam was something frequently 
expressed by young Muslims who, to make their point, would invoke the Koranic 
saying: ‘There is no compulsion in the religion’ (p. 373). 
 Indeed, these are students that have received their education within the Norwegian public-
school system the same way as the majority population. In that case, liberalism and individual 
autonomy are key aspects behind their own conception of the “good life”, and the decision 
they declared is based on their selective revision to the different options in their lives 
(Kymlicka, 1995). Besides, Most of the interviewees stressed accordingly how acquiring 
knowledge about religion helped them understand the purpose of life. “They are seeking 
knowledge about their religion and finding the truth and the purpose in their lives and then 
identifying with the Islamic view of freedom” (Linda). The development toward freedom in 
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 I refer here to some “secular feminists” who regard religion as incompatible with feminism being 
discriminatory against women, see p. 37.   
46
 “A tactic usually associated with the U.S. Women's Liberation Movement (WLM) and other feminist-activist 
groupings born in the late 1960s. (…) Grounded in practical action rather than theory, consciousness raising 
aimed to promote awareness of the repressed and marginal status of women”  (Consciousness Raising Groups, 
2000) 
47
 Iman is an Arabic word meaning belief or faith.  
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this respect is associated with one’s relationship with Allah, the creator, as well as finding 
one’s assigned place in the world (Abouleish, 2014). This explains somehow why most of the 
interviewees have chosen to define themselves in exclusively religious terms with a little 
emphasis on their Pakistani or Algerian backgrounds; a point that was already highlighted by 
a number of scholars. Ramadan (2004) for example clarifies that: 
Above and beyond the diversity of their national cultures, the essence of their faith, 
their identity, their being in the world, is the same; they define themselves on the basis 
of points of reference that explain their sense of belonging to the same community of 
faith and at the same time, more profoundly, root them in the universe of Islam (p.9). 
Equally important, globalization as well as technology has made it easier for the youth 
to access information and learn about everything; including Islam. The same research evoked 
earlier affirms that “their religiosity is constructed, even enhanced, through technology, 
especially the internet, and the educational opportunities available to them in an 
individualistic liberal democracy” (Vincett et al, 2008, p. 8). To illustrate, one interviewee 
claimed the following: “I feel that the old generation for example, that of my father and my 
mother had the religion but they haven’t been given that knowledge to ask more, find out 
sources. So, I think that we are learning much more” (Yasmin). To put it differently, Islamic 
scholarship is much more accessible to this younger generation owing to advancements in 
technology and communication. This includes the use of the internet as a source of 
information about Islam and as a global network where contact with other Muslims is much 
easier. Moreover, the presence of Islamic Scholars in Europe who are consulted for opinions 
on the most diverse subjects as well as the arrangement of workshops, social activities and 
conferences related to Muslims in Europe plays a salient role in this regard.  As one 
interviewee claimed “access to information is very easy, and there are many people with 
knowledge that come here and live here, and they speak English. You know, it is easier to get 
the knowledge” (Laila). “Yes, here in Europe, I feel that young people are more gathered, 
they have conferences and events about Islam. It is more about knowledge” (Yasmin). Based 
on the statements of both Laila and Yasmin, one can identify a “new form of belonging” 
among the youth; a belonging that provides a source of community and support in a secular 
context. Contrary to the idea of an increasing “individualized” religiosity and knowledge 
acquisition, and the progressive detachment from religious authorities (Imams and scholars), 
these young women seek collectively to become knowledgeable and educated believers. 
69 
 
Through their involvement in activities and gatherings, they learn, share and negotiate 
insights about what is “Islamically” appropriate behaviour in the environment they belong to. 
To recapitulate, through a journey towards the self and truth, these young women found 
empowerment and freedom in Islam, and thus gained more confidence and control over their 
future. In opposition to the Occident conceptualisation of freedom that went hand in hand 
with secularization and liberation from religion, freedom within Islam is only realized when 
human beings are neither “imprisoned in themselves”, nor “are a slave of nature”. In other 
words, the believer’s freedom is attained through experiencing “oneself as a spiritual being 
and knows oneself in harmony with the divine spirit in the world” (Abouleish, 2014, part 4). 
Furthermore, these young students perceived the acquisition of religious knowledge as a 
prerequisite for adopting a lifestyle that goes hand in hand with their deliberately chosen 
belief and at the same time with their aspirations in today’s world. 
5.2.3 An “intellectual jihad” towards authenticity  
Acquiring a proper Islamic knowledge was regarded as necessity to obtain freedom 
not only from the materialistic aspects of life, but also from the crisis Muslims are 
experiencing worldwide. Under these circumstances, Muslim youth have chosen to embark in 
an “intellectual jihad”48 for the purpose of reconceptualising the true meaning of Islam, 
detached from what is presented in mainstream media. Linda, for instance, explained that 
“because, I feel that many Muslim women in Norway do not have a lot of knowledge about 
Islam and it is very important to know what you believe is the right thing. Islam is the purpose 
of your life, so it is very important to have knowledge about it, and act upon it”. In this sense, 
knowledge is also understood to be in a sine qua non relationship with faith, spirituality and 
the well-being of these young women. In fact, knowledge is a fundamental principle within 
Islam as exemplified in the Prophet’s saying: “seek knowledge from the cradle to the 
grave”49.  This focused importance of acquiring knowledge is maintained by one interviewee 
as follows:  “But, I feel that this generation is like more curious about learning about Islam 
and knowing the rules, and why are the rules like this? They want to know everything in 
Islam” (Rima). Grounded on this belief, these young women have committed themselves to 
                                                 
48
 The true meaning of jihad in the Islamic tradition is “managing our natural, individual and/or collective 
contradictions, and seeking peace”(Ramadan, 2010, n.p.) 
49
 Hadith (a saying) from the Prophet Muhammad; translated from Arabic: (Nahj al-Fasahah, Tradition 327)  
Payande, Abulqasim (1337), Nahj al-Fasahah. Tehran: al-Islamiyya Publication.  
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the study of their religion as a basic means of rationalizing their conviction as well as 
effectively transforming their lives.  
Another point worth mentioning, for most of my interviewees, knowledge acquisition 
goes often side by side with their assessment of their parents’ presumed religious practices. 
Simply put, they are seeking an authentic Islam purged from ethnic and cultural practices 
emphasizing a commitment to find their own answers to religious questions.   
I think because a lot of parents follow culture. For example, one from Pakistan 
cannot marry a girl from Iraq because of the parents. But, in Islam it is correct 
(permissible). You can marry as long as he is Muslim, and also I think the 
younger generation explores these things to show their parents: “see you are 
not following Islam! You are following culture and it is wrong” (Rima).   
This quote accordingly indicates that the youth adopts a religiosity that is more moderate and 
universal, in the sense of being detached from biased traditional practices such as same-
ethnicity marriage, or exaggerated dowry. As revealed by Jacobsen (2011) “they orient their 
religious practices in terms of what is perceived as halal and haram50, rather than in terms of 
their parents’ religious practice” (p. 371). To clarify, Laila underlined that:   
It is like our parents have much more culture than we have, I think, because we have 
more the culture from here (Norway), because we are raised here. So, our parents have 
much more culture that is like mixed with religion. While we have culture and we 
have religion as two different things (Laila).  
In fact, Laila draws a clear distinction between culture and religion; a distinction that is often 
difficult to grasp especially for an “outsider”. A clear example in this respect would be the 
distinction between the Moroccan cultural tradition of eating couscous every Friday and the 
obligatory “Friday prayer” that men are supposed to do in the mosque. With this in mind, 
preparing the couscous on Fridays can be dropped, or even replaced by the Norwegian typical 
Saturday lunch risgrøt. However, the “Friday prayer” remains a central practice in Islam that 
is not to be negotiated under the umbrella of “cultural diversity”, but rather in relation to the 
principle of “religious freedom”51. Important to realize is that these young women manifest a 
selective and critical attitude towards the prevailing views about the notion of the good 
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Muslim within their (cultural) communities. Again, this standpoint can be understood in the 
light of Beck’s (1992) theory on individualization where he states that: 
Each person ́s biography is removed from given determinations and placed in his or 
her own hands, open and dependent on decisions. The proportion of life opportunities 
which are fundamentally closed to decision-making is decreasing and the proportion 
of the biography which is open and must be constructed personally is increasing 
(p.135).  
Self-reflexivity in this respect becomes a continuous practice through which these young 
women individually investigate the various norms and ways towards emancipation forming at 
the same time their own singularity, distinctiveness and originality. On that account, Aisha 
mentioned that “we are always adopting something that is good in western countries: which is 
finding out things and, like, taking scientific and historical perspectives to see things, learn 
how to know what is the right source and not the right one”. Moreover, these young women 
are perceived as “modern” because they use all type of modern techniques of communication 
and they are exposed to certain models of the self and technologies of individualization 
(Jacobsen, 2011, p. 368). Under those circumstances, spirituality and the quest for freedom 
are searched for through religion, namely “authentic” Islam.  
Equally important, this association between (late) modernity52, globalization, 
emancipation and the resort to Islam was also related to the situation in the Middle East53: 
“Education has of course a big role. So, I think in the Middle East, for example, and what we 
see today is because they know what is acceptable and not acceptable. That is why we see 
these revolutions54 now” (Aisha). This liberating aspect of Islam is similar to Ramadan’s 
(2012) argument when he pointed out that “In this sense, Islam as a religion was called upon 
to play a key role in the liberation and the political, cultural, and economic future of the 
Muslim majority countries” (p. 70). Additionally, this tendency among the youth may be 
understood as a new-born postcolonial reaction towards the discourse of the West, as the best 
exemplar of modern civilization, especially in a time where “social realities and social 
imaginaries are shaped by transgressions of geographic frontiers, by cultural borrowings and 
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hybridity” (Göle, 2012, p. 668)55. To recapitulate, these young women negotiate the diversity 
within their lives reflexively and from an in-between positon constructing who they are and 
what they stand for.  
5.3 The Feminist: An Ongoing Debate  
5.3.1 Liberation “within and by Islam” 
As mentioned earlier, the importance attributed to religion is also stressed in the 
interviewees’ perceptions about freedom, autonomy and women’s liberation. The key aspect 
of this argument is the association made between Allah, the creator, and his knowledge about 
what is best for humanity and women in particular.  One interviewee made the following 
comment: “when Islam plays an important role in your life, many of your opinions obviously 
cohere with your religion. Also, I think Islam has given me an increased understanding of 
women's position and women's role” (Sarah). This accordingly suggests that for these young 
students living as women in secular Norway is defined predominantly by religion. The same 
view is articulated by Kenza when she stated that “women have, I would say, a very specific 
role in Islam and it does affect me and what I do as a Muslim, I guess”. Similarly, Laila 
claimed that “you know when you become more religious, you see that, as a woman, you 
have a special role you should play, but it is not like everyone should be the same”. Again 
these statements reveal the importance of acquiring religious knowledge as a means for 
seeking liberation from the worldly shackles that may confine or restrict their freedom.  
Equally important, some of the interviewees pointed out that living Islam is an internal 
and a personal matter, and thus it cannot be judged by how one looks or dresses. As one 
prophetic saying indicates “God does not look at your appearance or your possessions, but He 
looks at your heart and your deeds” (Nahj al-Fasahah, Tradition 719). This entails to some 
extent that wearing the hijab for instance does not mean essentially being more pious, or more 
religious than others. Farah formulated this point comprehensibly when she expressed her 
viewpoint about the non-Muslims, or the non-observant Muslims:  
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So, I do it for myself and if somebody maybe is a Muslim, but don’t follow this I don’t 
want to judge them because I don’t know their struggle. Or, maybe if they are not 
Muslims, and they go against these things, I cannot think badly about them. I am 
liberated, but I don’t look down on women who are Western liberated. I become 
irritated when people judge based on the appearance (Farah).  
An interesting point in Farah’s comment is her emphasis on respecting difference and 
diversity within her Muslim community as well as within the whole Norwegian society. Her 
concerned with living life in compliance with Islam does not make her better than other 
women who live differently. Another assumption of this view is that neither “Muslim 
women” should be treated as a monolithic category, nor should feminists remain “blind” of 
the importance religion plays in their lives. To clarify, while the donning of the hijab may be 
for some non-Muslim women, or some feminists56 equated with oppression, control and 
restriction, for these young women it presents a tool to communicate their femininity, to take 
control of their lives independently and to reject a world where women have to endure 
categorization as sex objects. In this case, the hijab becomes rather synonymous with 
empowerment and emancipation from the oppressive forces of consumerism and 
materialism57. On that account, Yasmin Mogahed (2012), an international lecturer and writer, 
argues in her book Reclaim Your Heart that:  
As Muslim women, we have been liberated from this silent bondage. We don't need 
society's standard of beauty or fashion, to define our worth. We don't need to become 
just like men to be honored, and we don't need to wait for a prince to save or complete 
us. Our worth, our honor, our salvation, and our completion lie not in the slave, but in 
the Lord of the slave (p. 123).  
This tendency can be viewed correspondingly in connection with the core feminist 
values since it compasses models of female subjectivity and freedom of choice. In particular, 
postcolonial feminism stresses the recognition and the legitimacy of the different models of 
“being a woman” regardless of what is dominantly prevalent, and thus becomes a means to 
“de-colonizing the Other from the social and political forces that colonize, subjugate, 
disempower, and enslave those deemed Other in a global context” (Hesse-Biber, Leavy and 
Yaiser 2004, p.19).  Linda for example explained that “I would say that I found freedom in 
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my religion. (…) I see freedom as what the Creator says my freedom is .That is my freedom, 
and that is how I felt my freedom was”. With this emphasis on the Creator, these young 
women support the role and status the Quran and Islamic teachings prescribe for them. 
Different from the majority women within the Norwegian society, their quest for liberation is 
rather “within and by Islam” living up to its ethics and values as they are understood to 
embody freedom and equality between women and men. As put forward by Sarah:  
Liberation, in my context, is having the opportunity to be the person you want to be, 
the way you want to be, not feeling disrespected because of the person you are, or the 
person you want to be, or what you want to express. In my context, yes, it definitely 
means being able to be who you want to be and be respected for that (Sarah).   
Based on a postcolonial feminist theorising of freedom, autonomy and the human subject, 
deviating from the Western hegemonic notions of being a woman does not make it any less 
valid or less recognizable. Nevertheless, some countries such as France adopt certain 
regulations that “denies veiled women’s agency by seeking to impose a hegemonic 
Universalist model appropriated by secular feminist” (Gole and Billaud, 2011, p. 125). This 
reflects accordingly a reductionist focus on one model of autonomous citizen, while other 
differences are silenced or even supressed. Conversely, a common aspect in all feminism(s) 
emphasises singularity as well as the importance of equality as a universal value and a crucial 
argument for advocating women’s rights. This means that a female emancipation that is 
opposed to the prevailing right to not be covered and rather be differently liberated is to be 
respected equally. Farah argued accordingly that “Liberation means that a woman can do 
what she wants and not be judged”. Resorting to religion in this sense can be interpreted as an 
act of feminist resistance and a liberating struggle that aims at eradicating domination in all its 
forms. Basically, this liberating process encompasses a deep knowledge about one’s worth as 
a woman within Islam, and at the same time one’s position among the non-religious majority. 
5.3.2 Islam and the wisdom of restrictions 
Regarding my interviewees’ insights on the restrictive aspect of religion, and its 
influence on their daily lives, most of them maintained that it is just normal to live in 
accordance with what Allah assigned for them as women. To illustrate, Linda argued that: 
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The restrictions are actually good for you because they are set by the divine, by the 
Creator. So, they are actually good for you. Maybe you do not know why the 
restrictions are good for you, or the wisdom behind it. So, I would not even call it a 
restriction. I just will call it the right way of living (Linda). 
The same view is stressed in Esposito and Mogahed (2007) book Who Speaks for Islam? 
What a Billion Muslims Really Think58 arguing that “Muslim women do not regard Islam as 
an obstacle to their progress; indeed, many may see it as a crucial component of that 
progress” (p. 114). This is elaborated by Nora who claimed that “I actually feel that what is 
not good for me is always prohibited in Islam. It is actually a good thing for me because it 
allows me to think about myself and to have limits for myself”. Again, this submission and 
trust in Allah’s will is voiced with confidence and pride which demonstrates a strong belief on 
one’s choice and conviction. In fact, believing that there is always wisdom behind all the 
restrictions within Islam, these young women have chosen to comply with Allah’s 
“commands and to seek knowledge and wisdom that He has revealed and bestowed unto His 
prophet” (Anfindsen, 2008, p. 442). The interviewees narrated accordingly several examples, 
where their claims stressed human being’s need for control over one’s self and desires. For 
Aisha: 
There are a lot of things that you need to control. Yes, of course sometimes Islam 
restricts some of these desires, and I don't think that it is a bad thing. It is a good thing 
because sometimes it is not always a good thing to follow your desires. It can be 
everything from like eating chocolate to different things. Like, sometimes I have this 
idea of health and Islam. For me, your body is like a gift from God and you have to 
take care of it. You will be asked about it. “Why did you hurt yourself by eating a lot 
of chocolate?” (…) In Islam, it is not that you can't do it. But, you have a different 
way to do it. Of course you can have a party, but it is a different way with your 
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friends, with girls, or maybe only with your family. There is a different way. It doesn't 
mean that the other way is wrong, or something” (Aisha). 
In this sense, living in compliance with Islamic teachings becomes a “disciplinary practice” 
that influences all the aspects of life; ranging from health care, nutrition and manners to 
sexuality.  
Such an emphasis on self-improvement and refashioning is often interpreted as 
submission, obedience and passivity within feminist scholarship. As a result, Muslim women 
are accused of subverting the achievements of the feminist movement by submitting to “the 
demands of religious institutions and religious authorities” (Souaiaia, 2008, p. 91). 
Additionally, “by accepting the framing of women’s struggle within the Islamic discourse, 
Muslim women are legalizing the limitations and restrictions imposed on them in the name of 
religion” (ibid.). The point presented here demonstrates the complexity of theorizing 
“difference” within feminist scholarship. Indeed, academic feminists’ frequent failure to 
incorporate “Muslim” women’s difference is explained by Lazreg (1990) as the result of 
reducing “Islam to one or two sura59, or injunctions, such as those related to gender hierarchy 
and the punishment meted out to adulterous women (which is also applied to men)” (p. 330).  
To put it differently, Lazreg points out to the literary approach some feminists adopt in their 
understanding of issues related to Islam, resulting consequently in misquotations and 
misinterpretations of both the Qur'an and Prophet Mohammad's Hadith. This significantly 
illustrates the clash between a support for a commitment to autonomy and a resistance to 
woman’s insistence on adhering to a particular religion grounded on the belief that this may 
cause her a substantial harm60. In other words, equating cultural discriminatory practices such 
as the extreme cases of female circumcision, honour killing and forced marriages with Islam 
presents a major obstacle to the understanding of the factual experiences of Muslim women.  
As a matter of fact, the liberal definitions of terms such as freedom and autonomy are not 
always able to encompass the experience of the believer whose final authority of truth is 
Allah. In other words, this aspired self-reform through obedience and submission to “God’s 
will” should be interpreted with more understanding if we are to speak in the name of Muslim 
women. 
                                                 
59
 Sura is the Arabic word for the verse from the Qur’an  
60
 Okin (1999), see p. 33.  
77 
 
Another point in Aisha’s statement is the fact that Islam provides Halal61 alternatives 
for enjoying life without being compelled to follow the mainstream, which according to her is 
not necessarily wrong, but just different, and thus should be respected. Another important 
point here is the individual’s responsibility to care and balance between the needs of his or her 
own body, mind and soul, and this is actually through moderation.  Some examples from the 
Qur’an are as follows:  
{. . . Eat and drink: but waste not by excess, for Allah loves not the wasters.} (Qur'an 
7:31) 
{. . . But say, 'O my Rabb62 Advance me in knowledge.'} (Qur'an 20:114) 
{And keep your soul content with those who call on their Rabb morning and evening, 
seeking His Face; and let not your eyes pass beyond them, seeking the pomp and 
glitter of this Life; nor obey any whose heart We have permitted to neglect the 
remembrance of Us, one who follows his own desires, whose case has gone beyond all 
bounds.} (Qur'an 18:28) 
The three verses demonstrate subsequently the individual’s duty to be moderate in one’s 
intake of food and drink, to enlighten one’s mind through seeking knowledge, and finally to 
take care for one’s soul through various kind of worship and through striving to live in 
accordance with Allah’s commands. Nevertheless, these remain ultimate goals for Muslim 
women who also mentioned those moments of weakness and struggle. In fact one of the 
interviewees commented that  
But then again, I can say that I have had those thoughts before and maybe I have them 
again, you know. Where I feel like:  “Ah, I would like to do this, but I can't because I 
have to do this and this instead, because I am a Muslim, or I want to do something but 
because I am constricted…” I have thought that way before, but when I look back on 
it, it is more that my way of thinking that was wrong, and that my perspective was 
limited.  I was actually limited” (Sarah). 
In addition to this continuous struggle for self-discipline, there is an emphatic focus on the 
cognitive limitations human beings have. To put it differently, it is sometimes difficult to 
comprehend the wisdom behind some restrictions such as the Islamic approach to the law of 
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inheritance63 that seems challenging to the values of democratic societies when perceived 
from a non-Islamic perspectives; whereas, for Muslims it presents a reasonable system.  
Even though conforming oneself to the Islamic norms and ethics in the Norwegian 
secular context remain an everyday challenge, most of my interviewees interpreted these 
constraints as logical since they are set by God, the Knower. Again, Jannah argued that “No, I 
don't feel that Islam is an obstacle for me. I feel that it rather helps me. I believe that what I 
have learned about being a women and the respect I have for myself as woman, I actually 
learn it from Islam”. Based on a postcolonial feminist approach to knowledge production, this 
personal choice, though taken on religious grounds, remains legitimate, and therefore should 
be respected. Such an approach stresses the equal recognition of diversity of paths, and rejects 
“the one size fits all” notion of womanhood64. Another important point is that while almost all 
my interviewees were aware of the fact that other women do suffer from all kinds of social 
and cultural restrictions that have no religious justification, they indicated that they had never 
experienced any form of discrimination. Bearing in mind the previous arguments, one can 
assume that postcolonial feminism provides the possibility for any effort to deal with the 
claims of Muslim women. It accordingly challenges the normative narratives about the 
“Other” as well as it rejects the single story about the subject “woman” providing room for 
alternative definitions and ways of being.  
5.3.3 Transcending Boundaries:  A believer’s perception on 
“feminism” 
When asked about their understanding of the word “feminism”, most of my 
interviewees argued that it refers to “advocating for women's rights and women's equal worth 
in society” (Sarah). At the same way, feminism was associated with every woman that “fights 
for her rights, and who doesn't accept being oppressed by a man” (Nora). In other words, 
“feminism means that women have the equal rights and the opportunities in comparison with 
men” (Linda). These arguments accordingly reveal that these young students possess an 
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awareness of the main concerns of feminism; including women's subordinate position and 
gender as a problematic category within society. Even though most of the interviewees 
demonstrated a well-informed interest in feminism, two of them avoided the label while the 
others were critical to the fact that feminism has been concerned with an advocacy for an 
essential sameness between men and women. To clarify, Linda commented: “For me, it 
means that women are trying to be equal to a man. Not equal in the sense that they have the 
same worth, but they are trying to be equal in a way that they are trying to be as men and not 
embracing the feminism”. Similarly, all my interviewees rejected assertively the idea of 
“being like or stronger than man” articulating other ways of thinking about difference and 
sameness and its relation to equality. As an illustration, Aisha equated feminism with the 
“woman who does everything not to be a woman; to do everything to be like the strongest 
thing ever, sometimes even stronger than a man, and not equal”. Being sceptical to such an 
approach, most of my interviewees acknowledged that women and men are equal before God 
but different, and thus reject to view man as “the standard”. Such a position can be 
accordingly connected to Okin’s (1999) view on feminism being “the belief that women 
should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they should be recognized as having human 
dignity equal to that of men , and that they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling 
and as freely chosen lives as men can” (p.10). Likewise, Linda was rather supportive of 
human dignity, equal opportunity and freedom claiming that “I don’t need to be like a man, to 
behave like a man. I am different and I am happy with that”. In this sense, the viewpoints of 
these young Muslim women reflect a deep awareness of the feminist tendency that aims at 
deconstructing the social dualities that tend to privilege one particular sex over the other65. At 
the same time, they believe, from an Islamic perspective, that the principle of 
complementarity is at the centre of the conception of gender roles; a common principle within 
the different feminist trends.  
Another controversial point was maintained by two interviewees who viewed 
feminism as synonymous with the Western lifestyle; the fact of undressing women and 
encouraging dating and drinking. This attributed bad reputation to feminism was articulated 
as follows:  
“(…) I think that the West is like “we need to free the woman and like undress her” 
(Laila). 
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“Often when you hear about feminism and all that, it is more about being free, and 
they often mean that you are free if you dress in a certain why. You are, I would say, a 
kind of light-clothed” (Kenza). 
In the light of these viewpoints, it seems that there is often a link between feminism and 
liberation in sexual behaviours on the one hand, and between religion and piety on the other.  
In the European context, such a perceived binary division between the sacred and the secular 
within feminism may be understood in relation with the secularization process. To explain:  
 When representations of personal identity shifted away from Christianity from 1960s, 
secularization advanced. The liberalization in sexual attitudes and behaviour and the 
advent of feminism issues major blows to Christian religiosity. In the industrial period 
women had been identified as the main carriers and supporters of religiosity, so when 
women accepted feminism and sexual liberalism as alternative resources for identity 
construction, this was a significant setback for the church. Church attendance declined 
sharply, and femininity ceased to be associated with piety (Vincett et al, 2008, p. 4). 
In contrast, these young students manifest a different relationship to religion blurring the 
boundaries between what have been assumed as fixed categories (public/private and 
religious/secular). As highlighted through the analysis, they are living out their religiosity not 
just in private, but also in public, and thus emphasizing their agency in that choice. Indeed, 
“the non-separation of the body, the spatial, the social and the religious is a major theme in 
women’s spirituality” (ibid. p. 12). Correspondently, some interviewees indicated that within 
feminism women’s interests and concerns have always been defined from a mere Western and 
singular perspective that does not take into consideration diversity and difference among 
women. In other words, feminism is seen as a mere projection of the lives and the experiences 
of white middle class Western women. To illustrate, “what is typical with Western feminism 
is that you are just like each other and nothing is different. Yes, just like that” (Aisha). 
Notwithstanding, nearly all the interviewees expressed a relativist postcolonial perspective to 
feminism arguing for the accommodation of the needs and concerns of all women regardless 
of their ethnic, racial or religious differences. With this intention, they called for mutual 
respect and recognition of plurality within the category “Woman”. In fact, they believe that 
the voice of Muslim women is to be heard in all its diversity.  Then again replacing equality 
with recognition of difference as a central concern of feminism is often criticised. For 
instance, Jeffreys (2012) explains that “the difference approach had made it very difficult for 
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feminist theorists to question culture or religion without implications of racism being directed 
to them” (p.86). This claim reflects accordingly an implicit scepticism to cultural as well as 
religious diversity within feminism.   
Most important, other interviewees were in favour of a commitment to social justice in 
the hope to eliminate the social structures that continue perpetuating injustices against not 
only women, but also men, children and the non-confirming Other within.  Rima argued 
accordingly that:  
(…) If I see a man being oppressed, I would do the same for him as I would do for a 
woman or a child. It is more about justice; that you have to do the right thing and try to 
help people without thinking “Is it a woman?  Is it a Muslim? Is it a man? Is it a 
Christian?” So, I don’t have a definition on feminism, seriously (Rima).  
This standpoint is defined by Barlas (2005) as “an egalitarian sexual praxis that will also 
allow Muslim women (and men) to experience the divine as a liberatory force in their lives” 
(p. 101) ensuring that no one is to endure injustice or discrimination because of his or her 
difference. To put it another way, the inability to fit comfortably into the majority category 
because of one’s race, culture, religion or class should not be an excuse to exclude or 
marginalise certain women or men. Furthermore, the common issue of the continuous struggle 
against women’s oppression and inequality was also raised by most of the interviewees. They 
maintained consequently that though living in a democratic country, there is still much to be 
done in term of equalising women’s position within society.  As stated by Smith (2008) 
“women still face occupational segregation in the workplace, a gendered wage, ‘glass 
ceilings’, overrepresentation among part-time and low wage workers, the double burden of 
unpaid care work and wage earning” (p. 131). A similar view was held by one interviewee 
who stressed the significance of feminism in contemporary world:    
 Feminism is very important for me because although we call ourselves modern and 
we have got our rights as women, yet there many oppressive practices that we should 
fight against such as sexual harassment and the fact that women are helpless and they 
cannot defend themselves (…) It is important for me to work on equality because 
though women have similar education and work, they are still paid less than men. 
Society has accepted that it is just like that, but not me.  I am with equality both in 
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work places, schools and in public.  The world is not as it should be when it comes to 
women” (Jannah). 
Another key point in this discussion in this respect is the emphasised compatibility of Islam 
with modernity, democracy, social justice and human rights expressed by a number of 
interviewees. Barlas (2005) declares openly that “in my own case, for instance, I came to the 
realization that women and men are equal as a result not of reading feminist texts, but of 
reading the Qur’an. In fact, it wasn’t until much later in my life that I even encountered 
feminist texts”(p.11). Similarly, these young women underline the role Islam plays in 
empowerment and social change. With this in mind, they are more concerned about 
reformulating concepts such as liberation and equality based on Islam, and not the opposite. 
In fact, they identify growingly with Islam rejecting the mainstream standards that expect 
women’s agency to take a certain shape in the public. One can accordingly interpret the 
failure of some feminists as well as politics to understand and interpret Muslim women’s  
“journey” given either their marginalization of the centrality religion plays in their lives, or 
their inability to distinguish between faith and cultural traditions when dealing with Islam.  
5.3.4 Muslim and feminist: a compatible combination  
Realizing66 that advocating feminism encompasses a variety of ideas and perspectives, 
the great majority of my interviewees chose to appropriate the term to their commitment to 
religion. Being a feminist and Muslim in this regard was described as an advantageous 
combination that would allow one to work for the cause of Muslim women’s rights. Grounded 
on an Islamic perspective to feminism, they suggested various ways of adopting feminism. In 
other words, the statements of most of my interviewees suggest that they are for feminism on 
the condition that they define its content and goals. For Sarah, challenging the cultural 
practices that discriminate against women is important in this respect. She additionally 
mentioned the possibility of reinterpreting some Islamic texts if needed depending on the 
correctness of such an approach to religion. In particular, she maintained that: 
As a Muslim feminist, I would work to free society from the cultural norms that 
oppress women and that have nothing to do with Islam. That should be one of the 
goals at least. And then secondly if it is so that we believe that some interpretations 
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might be oppressive to women, I would want to change that. Now, I don't know if that 
is right because I don't know a lot about that (Sarah). 
This includes the patriarchal traditions that are often legitimated in the family milieu with 
reference to Islam. For example, in some Arab cultures husband and wife are not supposed to 
have prior contact before the wedding ceremony; however, in Islam sexual intercourse is 
immediately justified through the marriage contract. An even more extreme example would 
be that of the bride’s virginity67proof on the weeding day. This Moroccan tradition is 
described by Crapanzano (1985) as follows: “The bride’s mother or mother-in-law rushes in 
as soon as possible to inspect the wedding cloth for blood and then dances out to the guests, 
bearing it on a tea tray on her head” (p. 31). Such unjustified practices have no support from 
religion, but are rather condemned within Islam. For this reason, Nora argued that: 
They have to separate culture and religion. Many Muslim women need a voice (…) I 
am not oppressed, but there are many women in the Arab worlds or Pakistan that are 
also oppressed. It is a problem and they are Muslims. It is not because of Islam, but 
they are Muslim woman that are oppressed, and men who are misusing the word of 
Islam.  That is why we need women who fight for their rights (Nora). 
 In like manner, Farah suggested that as, an active Muslim feminist, she would work with 
Muslim women, especially in Muslim countries, with the aim of making them aware of their 
honoured position and the rights they have within Islam. This claim is in agreement with 
Robert’s (2005) explanation: “It is not Islam that oppresses Muslim women; it is the lack of 
knowledge or the lack of application of that knowledge that oppresses” (p. 248). To clarify, 
Rima pointed out that “In Islam a woman is really put up because it is said that paradise is 
beneath your mother’s feet and not your father. So, I see a lady without thinking that she is 
wearing a miniskirt or a hijab. I have a lot of respect for woman, and that is because of 
Islam”. Similarly, several examples of this kind were narrated by other interviewees, where 
the claim reaffirms a collective struggle for empowering Muslim women as well as 
demystifying the prevailing fallacies about Islam. Yasmin for example argued that “I could 
speak for Muslim women. I don’t call myself a feminist, but maybe I am”. By the same token, 
Nora conveyed the fact that “It is actually possible for a Muslim woman to be a feminist 
because you know your rights” Similarly, Rima stressed that “I don’t think that it is a problem 
to be a Muslim feminist. I would think that it is an advantage”.  
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Grounded on these comments, one can deduce that the main concern of these young 
women is to communicate that knowledge acquisition about “the true Islam” is the means 
with which to liberate women even in Western contexts. “You can definitely be a feminist and 
a Muslim because it is like you can just show how many rights we have in Islam and how a 
woman is so much appreciated and honoured. It is like we had the rights a long before the 
West. We just have to show how beautiful a Muslim woman is in the religion” (Laila). In fact, 
they affirmed that Islam itself pioneered women’s rights, an advocacy to freedom and justice. 
A similar view is expressed by Mernissi (1991) who argues that “we Muslim women can 
walk into the modern world with pride, knowing that the quest for dignity, democracy, and 
human rights, for full participation in the political and social affairs of our country, stems 
from no imported Western values, but is a true part of the Muslim tradition” (p. viii). 
According to Yasmin, “when one speaks within the European and academic sphere I think 
that Muslim women should stand forth because the notions of democracy and equality are not 
synonymous for justice. Democracy does not give a high status to a woman”. In view of such 
a criticism to the current position of women within democratic societies, one can identify two 
points. This may include the double burden68 that some women are subject to as a 
consequence of the modernization project that expects the individual to be independent and 
self-sufficient no matter his or her capacities. Another point may be the fact that some 
democratic countries, as France for example, still discriminate against the non-confirming 
Other. Under those circumstances, Islam is presented as the best model to follow especially 
with respect to women as Nora put it: “I think that if you learn about Islam, you will find that 
women have so many rights that have not been shown in media (…). Since I learnt a lot about 
my religion and women in my religion, I have learnt that women have many rights than it 
seems to be” (Nora). Notably, some even went into justifying Islam as a feminist religion 
citing teachings from the Qur’an, and thus did not see any problem with being both religious 
and hold feminist attitudes. To illustrate, Jannah maintained that “I feel that Muslim women 
can actually define themselves as feminists more than other women who are not so religious 
because they have a deeper understanding of what it is to be a women and what it is to be a 
Muslim”. In this case, one can claim these young Muslim women are “modern” without being 
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 Refers to “the dual oppression experienced by women who are both paid workers and unpaid homemakers, 
wives and mothers in the household” (Prentice, 2000, p. 145).  
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“Western” (Ramadan and Amghar, 2001, p. 57). Modern in the sense of being critical to both 
the popular Western mainstream tends as well as their parental cultural practices. 
 
Exploring the interviewees’ standpoints on the Islamic feminists’ advocacy for the re-
reading of the Quran and the Sunnah from a woman’s perspective believing that the 
patriarchal interpretation of religion is the reason behind the oppressive practices against 
Muslim women, nuanced views were encounters. While some of the interviewees were 
sceptical to the idea, other appreciated it, and thought that reinterpreting some issues in Islam 
by women can be an interesting project. A central feature underlying this argument is that 
though embracing Islam as a belief and a lifestyle means living up to its foundations; 
however, many issues remain open to reconsideration and Ijtihad69. This is exemplified in 
Aisha’s scepticism to the limitation or prohibition against women's travelling alone70. 
Describing her attempt to persuade her mother,   she stated:  
 (…)But, for me when I want to travel, it is always for a seminar, or for a work, or 
something like that. She doesn't like it at all. In Islam, I know, there are examples. 
I know, I am like reinterpreting... like if a woman travels alone, a lot of Muslims 
say: No, it is haram and it is not allowed and all that. It is not really that because if 
you go back in Islam there is a woman who came to the prophet PBH and said to 
him: “I don't have any family and I want to go to Haj” for example. And then he 
told her that: “every Muslim is a brother and sister” So, that is an example.  .. In 
that time, it is understood that a woman couldn't travel alone because just traveling 
from one city to another was one of the hardest things, and even here in Norway, 
like 200 years ago, it is not really the safest thing.  I think it is more about safety 
that woman shouldn't travel alone. But I can't find something that is concrete about 
that woman can't travel alone or live alone if she is safe. I think this part is 
something that needs to be worked on. I don't think that it is bad that woman can 
travel if it is safe, of course, especially if it has something to do with work, 
education and such things.  So, this is something I would like that someone that is 
well-respected to re-interpret it (Aisha).  
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This statement accordingly reflects Aisha’s reflexive capacity to question her mother’s 
restrictive ideas based on her personal knowledge and research about the subject within 
Islamic scholarship. It also reflects the openness of Islam to new interpretations suitable to the 
demands and needs of individuals with respect to their particular context and circumstances. 
In fact, “the issue of reform and renewal and the debate about what constitutes reform are 
nothing new and date to Islam’s early history” (Hunter, 2009, p. 4).  This means that though 
the Qur’an cannot be modified, re-interpretation within Islam has always been possible in 
response to the changing of priorities and understandings of fatwa(s)71 within context. Equally 
important, some interviewees argued that it does not matter if it is a man or a woman 
understanding of the Quran and the Sunnah, because having the appropriate knowledge and 
qualification for interpretation is more salient in this regard. They maintained furthermore that 
this area of specialization is the work of the Muslim Ulama and the experts in the field, and 
not feminists. Linda for instance argued that:  
They can be female Muslim scholars who can reinterpret the Quran. I do not believe 
that they should make it a woman's perspective or a man's perspective. Either way, it 
should be what the Quran says and what the Sunnah says. So it doesn't matter if you 
are a woman or a man as long as you are giving the correct information and the correct 
interpretation. Islam is not about man or woman, it is about what is right (Linda). 
This means that being a woman would not affect the meaning, and thus it should not be a 
problem that the transmitters of Islam have been mainly men. A point often overlooked in this 
regard, is the role Muslim female scholars have played in the transmission of religion: “Yes, I 
think there have been Muslim women, I guess, from when Islam began until now” (Kenza). 
All in all, when referring to feminism and Islam one should be aware of the difference 
between some Muslim feminists (secularists) who have appropriated western values and other 
Muslim women who have rather produced a literature demonstrating the fact that Islam itself 
pioneered freedom, equality and social justice.  
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 Fatwa refers to a clarification of an ambiguous judicial point or an opinion by a jurist trained in Islamic law, in 
response to a query posed by a judge or a private inquirer (Shehabuddin, p. 171). 
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5.4 The Political: A Religious Perspective on 
Secularism 
5.4.1 A discourse of denial: “the personal is not always the 
political”72  
Discussing the various ways issues related to Muslim women have been approached 
within politics, feminist scholarship, and in media, all my interviewees disapproved the 
simple misrepresentations of women as “the passive victims” of Islam and its patriarchal 
oppressive norms; a discourse they considered inaccurate and misleading. They demonstrated 
accordingly a detachment from those who have situated themselves as the voices struggling 
on their behalf; namely some public figures73. In other words, they indicated that Muslim 
women’s issues are mainly voiced, or confined to the outsiders’ distorted discourse on Islam. 
As an illumination, they pointed out some reasons behind the circulation of such a narrowly 
construed image of Muslim women as secluded and silenced victims of a misogynist Islamic 
culture. On the other hand, the interviewees narrated several examples where the claim 
reaffirms the opposite emphasizing freedom and agency in various ways.  
The tendency to exaggerate the negative aspects of gender relations within Islam, and 
to present Muslim women mainly as victims was perceived as a result of ignorance and even 
misrepresentation of their concerns in academic, policy, and media discussions. Based on a 
set of prejudices and Orientalist understandings, media tends to depict Muslim women as 
oppressed or mute victims, but hardly as agents with diverse realities. The same assumption is 
highlighted by Jacobsen (2011) who clarifies that “gendered ethnic and religious stereotypes 
are central to making off Us from Them and assumptions about the traditional and oppressive 
gender systems of the Others have contributed to making gender questions the most contested 
area of Muslim Otherness in Contemporary Norway” (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 172). In particular, 
the descriptions most interviewees provided to express their viewpoints about the mainstream 
media and its depiction of Muslims suggests that there is a lack of correct knowledge about 
Islam. Jannah for instance put it as follows: “I feel that people have just prejudices and they 
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88 
 
speak just out of what they have seen in TV. But, they haven't gone directly to a person and 
asked: “why do you have it like that?  How are you doing?  Are you abused home? Were you 
forced to marriage?” So that one can get rid of the prejudices” Farah similarly stressed that “I 
don’t think the politicians actually know who Muslim women are. They just paint the picture 
and then say: “Yes, they are oppressed”, and they just stick to it.  Yes, maybe some are 
oppressed, but we are different like any other group in the world”. Apparently, ignorance, 
prejudices and misunderstanding appeared as explanations for the reason behind 
misrepresenting Islam that, for them, needs to be approached as a whole. To illustrate, Aisha 
maintained that “in Islam, it is like a puzzle. If you remove something, it just doesn't make 
sense. But if you look at every part of it together, it makes sense”. For the purpose of giving a 
concrete example, she explained that “Yes, I think the moment you start to look at only what 
the women have to do according to Islam, of course you will look at them as passive victims. 
But, the moment you also look at what men have to do, you will think they are also passive 
victims actually” (Aisha).  
A further point is that when the interviewees were asked to express their viewpoints 
about the representations Ayan Hisi Ali74 and others Norwegian public figures, all of them 
rejected the picture they managed to draw about Muslim women and their oppression under 
Islam. The need and aspiration to occupy the public scene and gain popularity was mentioned 
as explanations for such a position. In particular Aisha conveyed that “If you understand how 
they get famous, you will clearly understand what they are talking about. (…) I can say that 
all the famous women here in Norway75 talk negatively about Islam and that are Muslims 
also. Often, they talk about the cultural part, but they are very bad at saying that it is culture 
not Islam”. For Farah, voices such as Ayan Hirsi are the most heard in media; however, one 
should take into account her personal background “because we must not forget that some 
Muslims are maybe following cultural things, or maybe taking Islam too extreme. So, they 
have like given her a bad view of Islam, and this is the only Islam she knows”. Seemingly, 
this entails that Hirsi Ali resorts to her experience instead of a well-established knowledge 
about Islam, and thus ends up mixing the way she was raised up, her childhood, family and 
Somali cultural practices with religion. Ramadan and Amghar (2001) point out that “the worst 
enemy of the rights of women is not Islam but ignorance and illiteracy, to which we may add 
the determining role of traditional prejudices.” (p. 54). As an outcome, such women either 
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continue to endure injustice, or embrace blindly the first alternative they come across. 
According to Linda “the arguments that they are using are not Islamic correct. They are 
Muslims that practice honor killings or forced marriage, but that is not part of Islam” (Linda). 
Moreover, suggesting that liberation is only possible through apostasy, Hirsi Ali alienated 
herself from many of the Muslim women for whom she claimed to speak on their behalf.  
Speaking about them without accountability, Hirsi Ali (2007) portrayed Muslim women as 
passive followers of a static religion. She maintains correspondingly that “By declaring our 
Prophet infallible and not permitting ourselves to question him, we Muslims had set up a 
static tyranny. The Prophet Muhammad attempted to legislate every aspect of life” (ibid. p. 
272). As a reaction to Hirsi Ali’s fierce attack on Islam, the following series of quotes 
highlight the interviewees’ sense of dissatisfaction with the media emphasis on propagating 
generalizations about Muslims and encouraging Islamophobia through such a reductionist 
discourse:  
“I think this is a way to be famous in media. Because they speak about the negative 
issues that people like to hear and know about” (Yasmin). 
“They are given an opportunity to speak to the masses about how they think Islam is 
wrong, but they never give the opportunity to Muslims to tell how they think Islam is 
the right. They get this power and fame since they are ex-Muslim” (Linda). 
“You know, you have Muslim women that are making the complete opposite 
argument. Why aren't we paying them more attention? And, that people get a balanced 
view” (Sarah). 
Like if I go out to media and say that I have been beaten by my father or my husband, 
and this is life as a Muslim, I will get much more attention than if I go and say I am 
fine as a Muslim, I have a father or a husband who loves me. There are millions of 
Muslims in the world and two people can't talk for such a large group. I got to have a 
problem to gain attention in media (Jannah).  
Giving voice to one specific opinion at the expense of others tends to legitimate state 
intervention, reinforce the stereotypical views about Islam as inherently intolerant, and thus 
gain prominence in public just for adhering to the discourse of power (Gole and Billaud, 
2011, p. 133). Furthermore, challenging Islam publically, being the source of her oppression, 
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Hirsi Ali (2007) clarifies that “Islam was like a mental cage. At first, when you open the door, 
the caged bird stays inside: it is frightened. It has internalized its imprisonment. It takes time 
for bird to escape, even after someone has opened the doors to its cage”(pp. 285-6). She 
maintains additionally that “It takes a long time to dissolve the bars of a mental cage” (ibid. p. 
309). But again this cage remains a mere representation of Hirsi Ali’s family, culture and the 
way she views life, and therefore it has no room for the free and already liberated “other 
within76”women. One interviewee explained that “they have experienced something in a 
Muslim community and that is their opinion. I don’t say that they are wrong in their opinion 
or their experiences but I can’t relate to that at all. I can’t say that I am oppressed, or I live in 
a patriarchal society. In my home, my mother and my father decide everything together (...)” 
(Rima). However, for Jacobsen (2011) in contemporary political discourse Muslim women 
are categorised along the duality of “acceptable” and “unacceptable” forms of Islam in order 
to “police the border between religion and politics, the religious and the secular” (p. 385). In 
the whole, the majority of the interviewees argued that women who get their voices out 
loudest are the ones who speak for the larger Muslim community presenting a mere 
prejudiced and a partial depiction, and therefore should be considered as legitimate sources of 
knowledge.  
Equally important, the issue of some politicians and feminists’ failure to recognise 
difference among women was emphasised often grounded on the long-lasting “tradition 
versus modernity” dichotomy as an argument to justify the West’s duty to liberate and civilize 
the “Other”. In the Norwegian context, practices such as forced marriages and female genital 
mutilation77, thought to secure the oppression of Muslim women, have been in the agenda of 
state policies. With this in mind, all the interviewees highlighted the fact that Muslim 
women’s concerns are often oversimplified being mainly equated with some customs that 
most of the time remain irrelevant. Farah for example put it this way:  “I have to disagree with 
them because I feel like if they are so feminists, wouldn’t they know that every woman is 
different. I know that there are Muslim women who are oppressed, but we can’t say that 
everybody is oppressed”. This mean accordingly that using the label “Muslim women” to 
initiate debates about issues that are most of the time purely cultural, and are thus not 
practiced in all Muslim countries misrepresent women who choose to be differentiated by 
their religious affiliation, namely Islam. Important to mention is that “in line with the (neo-) 
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liberal paradigm that constructs individual rights and the free choice of individuals as in 
opposition to, and threatened by, group identities and cultures, Muslim women are thus often 
constructed as passive victims in need of ‘help’ in order to proceed toward greater autonomy” 
(Jacobsen, 2011, p. 172). This claim consequently explains their scepticism towards Islam and 
the cultural traditions that have been practiced in its name. Notably, Okin (1999) claims 
further that “discrimination against and control of the freedom of females are practiced, to a 
greater or lesser extent, by virtually all cultures, past and present, but especially by religious 
ones and those that look to the past—to ancient texts or revered traditions—for guidelines or 
rules about how to live in the contemporary world” (p. 21). Among the issues that receive 
coverage or generate concern are those used to demonstrate the alien and bizarre oppression 
of women; including sati78, dowry death, female genital surgeries, female infanticide, 
marriage by capture, purdah79, foot binding and arranged marriages (Volpp, 2001, p. 1208). 
On the other hand, all my interviewees considered such practices as discriminatory and 
unjustifiable. Equally important to realize is “The idea that 'other' women are subjected to 
extreme patriarchy is developed in relation to the vision of Western women as secular, 
liberated, and in total control of their lives” (Volpp, 2001, p. 1198). With this in mind, these 
young students urged whoever wants to struggle for women in general to be aware of the 
danger of theorizing universal claims and conclusions just based on personal experiences or 
viewpoints. For instance, Yasmin argued that “women who struggle for other women should 
know what we, as Muslims women, stand for actually. They talk about us, but they don’t 
know about us” Moreover, these young women stress the centrality Islam plays in their life, 
and therefore they are against the idea of challenging, or abandoning religion to become free. 
As a matter of fact, “the Otherness of Muslims and Islam is constructed both as representing a 
spatial and temporal difference to Us, Islam and Muslims are seen as ‘foreign’ to Norwegian 
society, as belonging somewhere else” (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 173). Different for such a duality, 
historical and social contexts remain salient for women’s self-definition, their feelings and 
their choices especially if we are to respect the diversity of women's concerns and 
interpretations of worth, agency and freedom.  
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5.4.2 Religion between “centrality” and decline in “secular” Norway 
The presumed progressive decline of religious beliefs and practices, as a European 
aspect of secular modernity, is actually challenged with reference to the standpoints of my 
interviewees; Muslim female students at the UIO. As mentioned earlier in the literature 
review, the traditional explanations of European secularization80 refer either to “increasing 
institutional differentiation, increasing rationality, or increasing individualism” failing to 
capture the fact that “the religious and the secular are inextricably bound together and 
mutually condition each other” (Casanova, 2006, pp.10-4). Exploring how young women 
relate and negotiate their relationship to religion in an “assumed” increasingly secular setting 
(Oslo), I realised that faith and spirituality present a powerful and a motivating force in their 
lives. This means that the assumption that religion is rapidly declining, as a related element of 
the modernization project, is evidently irrelevant in this context. In the same way, the theories 
that have equated religion with irrationality and backwardness81remain a mere myth that has 
been perpetuated without serious scrutiny or investigation. The limitations associated with the 
secularization thesis are indicated by Casanova (ibid.) as follows:  
Indeed, the most interesting issue sociologically is not the fact of progressive religious 
decline among the European population since the 1950s, but the fact that this decline 
is interpreted through the lenses of the secularization paradigm and is therefore 
accompanied by a “secularist” self-understanding that interprets the decline as 
“normal” and “progressive”—that is, as a quasi-normative consequence of being a 
“modern” and “enlightened” European (p.15). 
Exploring my interviewees’ insights regarding the assumption that “there is an 
observed increasing identification with Islam within the secular environment of Europe”, 
eight out of ten confirmed assertively the claim, while one was not sure and the other 
maintained that this is not a new phenomenon. Some of the apparent manifestations of this 
growing religiosity can be exemplified in the great number of women donning the hijab 82in 
the public sphere as well as the increasing interest in debating the presence of Muslims and 
Islam in media, in politics and within academia. As a confirmation to the reliability of this 
claim, all my interviewees stressed the central role religion plays in their daily lives, not just 
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in terms of spirituality, or rituals but also as a way of life. A point worth mentioning here is 
that although not all my interviewees were hijabi women83, they manifested relatively the 
same centrality of religion in their lives. This reveals accordingly that “living Islam” is not 
necessary just about appearances or belonging to a specific community, but mainly about 
believing in the teachings of Allah. Notably, Islam was identified as a salient component of 
their identity. To illustrate, this significance was described by expressions such as “a huge 
role”, “important part”, “the main focus” and “the first priority”. One of the interviewees even 
maintained that her life is “dedicated to religion”, and that religion continues to shape the 
person she is: “everything I do is about Islam. Yes, I do it for Islam: the way I talk, the way I 
dress, the way I think. Everything is shaped by Islam” (Jannah) For these young students 
living as “good” and “righteous” Muslims, striving to behave in accordance with Islam and its 
teachings remains a lifelong struggle. This struggle is known by the term jihad or mujahid 
within the Islamic scholarship and it refers in this context to “a lifelong struggle to realize or 
actualize God’s will in personal life and in society” (Esposito and Voll, 2001, p. 29) In 
addition to the worship practices of praying and fasting, religion influences their lifestyle, 
manners and behaviours, and even the decisions they make. One interviewee made the 
following comment: “Every time I face a decision or something, not only big decisions, but 
also small decisions, I always have in my mind the question like:  what Islam says about it ? , 
what God would like me to do? What satisfies Him? ...such things” (Aisha) This accentuated 
increasing centrality of Islam in these young women’s daily lives is described by Ramadan 
(2009) as follows: 
Women are establishing a new relationship to religion: the issue matters to them; they 
feel they have the right to study it and ask questions, and they offer new proposals 
while striving to remain faithful to Islamic teachings, to the higher objectives of the 
message, without agreeing to remain confined to traditional, literalist, or cultural 
masculine readings (p. 231). 
This quote accordingly outlines some of the aspects of Muslim women’s relationship to 
Islam; including self-exploration, Ijtihad and the challenge of literalist and traditional 
interpretations of Islamic teachings.  
                                                 
83
 Wearing the hijab does not mean that one is more pious, or observant than the other. 
Though the hijab remains a religious obligation ordained by Allah (a principle confirmed by all Islamic scholars, 
but not by all feminists) for some women it represents a fashion statement, or a mere transmitted tradition.  
94 
 
A conclusion of all these insights is that there is a revitalized religiosity among young 
women; a religiosity that is pursued through the acquisition of Islamic knowledge in quest of 
meaning, inner peace, and the forming the self. The same finding is exemplified in the Women 
and Religion in the West: Challenging Secularization, where a number of in-depth qualitative 
studies illustrate the different meanings and (re)formations of women’s individual and 
collective spirituality as well as religiosity. This contribution accordingly indicates that 
women’s responses to secularization vary; including those who abandon the traditional 
church; others who join alternative spiritual communities and those women who choose to 
reclaim and/or renegotiate the traditional religions (Vincett, et al. 2008, p. 7). Regarding 
Muslim women in particular:  
Bracke’s research indicates that in western countries where religion was forcibly 
separated from the state, high levels of religiosity amongst young Muslim women 
signify an assertion of an identity distinct from the dominant order, and a 
contemporary and progressive version of the religion of their grandmothers (ibid., p. 
8). 
Accordingly, this indicates a different truth about secularization in contemporary Europe. 
Indeed, associating secularization with the modernization theory is simplistic and 
unconvincing as religion (Islam in this case) continues to play a major role in people’s lives. 
This contradicts, in like manner, with the scholars who equated secularity and modernity with 
the death of God (Bruce, 2002), or with the emergence of non-religious spiritual alternatives 
(Taylor, 2007). Although this may be true, but in the case of these young students they are 
actually manifesting; what may be described as a post-secular or re-sacralised phenomena. 
For Habermas (2006), Europe is experiencing a religious return into its secularised societies, 
or “post-secular society”. In the next section, the focus will be more on exploring the 
interviewees’ understandings and views on “secularism” and the way a “secular state” would 
operate in relation to religious diversity. 
5.4.3   A believer’s perception on “Secularism” 
Exploring the interviewees understanding(s) of “secularism”, the overwhelming 
majority associated the principle mainly with the state’s non-interference in systems of belief 
and worship, and thus the right of citizens to religious freedom. For example Rima’s 
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statement reflected a deep awareness about secularism as “pluralism” indicating the 
following:  
It is like if your state is a secular state that means that you don’t have religion in the state. 
Like Norway has just removed the Christianity as a state religion. But, of course the 
individuals have their own religions, like different religions, and you have freedom of 
religion despite the fact that the state is secular. So, I think that wearing a cross or wearing 
a hijab or a turban is a sign of a secular state, because then you can see the diversity of 
religions and not one religion; because if the state has the one religion, you have one main 
religion (Rima). 
Taking the case of Norway as an illustration, Rima managed to mention the main 
characteristics appropriated to such a tendency; including Norway’s first step towards 
disestablishment, the respect of religious diversity and its manifestation in the public sphere. 
To emphasise, one interviewee articulated her view specifying that “For me, freedom is to 
believe on what I want and to practice my religion with no social constrains. To have the 
freedom to work, study and do what I wish; within a certain limits of course” (Yasmin). In 
other words, she stresses everyone’s right to frame their lives in compliance with their 
(religious and non-religious) belief systems, on the condition that it does not trespass the basic 
rights and freedom of others. Accordingly, the interviewees’ position regarding secularism 
can be interpreted in the light of the compatibility of Islam with a secular legal framework 
where no particular religion is to be taken as the normative basis of its political order 
involving the implications of concepts such as citizenship, human rights and freedom of 
religion. Significantly, Mårtensson (2014) mentions that according to the FIOE84, put forward 
as mediator and ‘translator’ between Muslim communities and the general public, the 
European Enlightenment itself has Islamic roots, and therefore “Islam is the source of modern 
secular European polities” (p.40). In other words, while freedom of religion remains a secular 
principle, religion itself encompasses secular meanings as well. 
The neutrality of the state vis-à-vis all religions was also interpreted as a means to 
protect the freedom of conscious of all citizens regardless of the belief systems they hold 
(either religious or non-religious). In fact, for these young students a secular public sphere is 
one that favours religious plurality, allows the visibility of difference, and respects people 
                                                 
84
 The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) is “a cultural organization, with hundreds of 
member organizations spread across 28 European States, all subscribing to a common belief in a methodology 
based on moderation and balance, which represents the tolerance of Islam” (Fioe.org, 2014) 
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equally. “For example, even if I am asked to be neutral and not show any political or religious 
symbol, I think that it won't work because I can't live without showing Islam; my religion and 
my ethnicity that are big parts of me” (Jannah) This means that confining secularism with the 
neutrality of the public space is discriminatory against the majority population for whom 
religion plays a vital role in their daily lives. To illustrate, Sarah expressed her relationship to 
religion as follows:  
I think that the neutrality that the others supports is a kind of against human nature in 
some ways. Because I think faith and religious belief is part of human nature. So, I 
think promoting that kind of secularism that doesn't go with my views because for me 
it is going against human nature basically. (Sarah) 
In particular, the focus here is on the individual’s right to live his or her belief openly, and 
with no constraints that may go against her freedom, or self-identification. Although all the 
interviewees supported the separation of the state and religion, they found the state efforts to 
empty the public arena from any reference to God as illogical and even against human nature. 
This is also Jannah’ viewpoint:  
 “I don't think that the state being neutral means that it will try to limit the population 
to become neutral. (…)  No, I don't think that it is right because they are restricting our 
identity and our religion. In this way, they are making up new rules within the 
religion. And religion is as it is and one cannot make any changes in it. (…) And here 
I feel like they are taking away some of this identity” (Jannah). 
 Based on such an argument, these young women viewed any limitation on the manifestation 
of religious affiliation as wrong; especially that any many case this may restrict women from 
accessing education, or the work market. Besides, such restriction is rather discriminatory to 
the individual as it violates his or her right to choose and live in compliance with one’s beliefs 
and convictions. The view stressed here is largely in agreement with that of Ramadan (2009) 
arguing that  
(…) secularism has never meant removing the moral reference from the public sphere, 
but instead distinguishing between different spheres of authority. It means opposing 
the dogmatic imposition, from above and for everyone, of moral and behavioral (and, 
more broadly, religious) norms, but it does not imply the disappearance of the 
collective ethics elaborated and negotiated by society’s members (p. 34-5). 
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Indeed, secularism in this sense refers also to the state’s non-interference in the individual’s 
freedom of belief. Moreover, as equal citizens with acknowledged political rights these young 
women emphasised their right to decide for themselves and be respected for who they are. 
This point accordingly refers to an understanding of inclusion that it is not only confined with 
enjoying equal opportunities, but it also includes measures of adaptation and adjustment. In 
view of the youth’s increasing identification with Islam, Norway’s move towards secularism 
and the privatization of religion is somehow challenged. This entails that even with the 
process of secularization religion still has an important position in European public space 
(Schlesinger and Foret, 2006). 
The understanding of secularism supported by most of the interviewees is not always 
taken into consideration in practice as indicated by Casanova (2001) who argues that 
“European states are far from being secular or neutral” (p.70). To clarify, it is believed that 
there is rather an emergence of a new, sometimes politically assertive, identification with 
Christianity (Triandafyllidou & Modood, 2012, p. 9). In that case, “The suggestion is that 
secularists and Christians in Europe have more in common with each other than they do with 
Muslims” for example (ibid.).  Such a one-sided interpretation of secularism and state 
neutrality, exemplified in the emphasis of “the Christian heritage” of Europe, is therefore 
understood as a pretext that is often used to create boundaries between those who belong, and 
those who do not. In the Nordic context, secularism is simultaneously “either associated with 
Lutheran Christianity as the foundation of national identities, or replacing it, depending on the 
proponent” (Mårtensson, 2014, p.41). The point being assumed here refers to a democratic 
paradox exemplified in the state failure to integrate all religious groups and encourage their 
participation in public discourse. To clarify, Mårtensson (2014) pointes out to the fact that  
As soon as Muslims publicly make claims related to Islam they are liable to be 
accused of ‘Islamism’ which is depicted as a mixing of religion and politics that is 
incompatible with Nordic secularism. The charge ‘Islamist’ has been directed against 
Muslim party politicians by their own party fellows as well as by rival parties and is 
highly discrediting. Muslim politicians who wish to deliberate ‘Muslim issues’ 
publicly thus put their careers at risk, which is a serious democratic problem (p.26-7). 
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In Norway, the case of the former Muslim minister Hadia Tajik85exemplified Mårtensson’s 
view. Namely, whenever Hadia engages in issues related to the Muslim community 
promoting the protection of minority rights and opportunities, though based on liberal 
democracy and human rights, she is automatically equated with an attempt to support the 
“Islamization” project in Norway.  Nevertheless such a reductionist approach to religious 
diversity within secular Norway remains voiced by few politicians.  A more nuanced 
interpretation of secularism is introduced by O’Brien (2013) who emphasises the fact that “in 
reality, most European governments do not practice secularism, rather secularisms – a 
complex, dynamic intermingling and over-layering of policies whose intent and consequences 
often run deeply at odds with one another” (p. 24). Having presented the centrality religion 
plays in the lives of these young women as well as their perceptions on secularism, the next 
chapter will be more about suggesting appropriate ways to represent and accommodate such 
emphasised identification with Islam both within feminist and political debates in secular 
Europe; including Norway.  
 
                                                 
85
 Hadia Tajik is for the moment a Member of Parliament for the Norwegian Labour Party and Chair of the 
Standing Committee on Justice.  
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6 Conclusion  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the present research was to explore the relationship(s) Muslim female 
students at UIO have to religion, and as a result engage these young women in suggesting 
appropriate strategies and approaches to represent/accommodate such religiosity within 
feminist and political debates. This research confirms previous findings about Muslim youth 
and contributes to the understanding of Muslim women’s interests and concerns. In general, 
therefore, it provides a guide for any further attempt to rethink issues as diverse as secularism, 
multiculturalism, religious diversity and women’s liberation; especially in contexts of 
renewed interest in religion.  
To demonstrate, the results are significant in three respects: first, they indicate a growing 
identification with Islam among young Muslim women in (secular) Norway. Second, they 
suggest that for feminists to represent Muslim women they need to be more attentive to their 
“difference” considering the importance Islam plays in their lives. Third, the findings 
emphasise the fact that “the political” should be more attentive to difference within the 
category “Muslim women” to be able to capture the variety and nuances in their experiences, 
beliefs and interests. 
6.2 Understanding the “Personal” in Secular 
Europe 
The new relationship young women are developing to religion requires a new 
understanding to the presence of Islam and Muslims within Europe in general and Norway in 
particular. Indeed, for these young Norwegian students Islam becomes increasingly a 
significant frame of reference in their daily lives. Among the reasons evoked behind such a 
spiritual awakening is their quest for meaning, balance and inner peace in a world loaded with 
global models of social behaviour and consumption. In this sense, the choice to resort to 
religion for self-identification is associated with a desire to understand the purpose of life, 
gain confidence and consequently achieve inner satisfaction. Another factor lies in their 
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attempt to position the self in relation to the plurality of beliefs and multiplicity of realities 
present within Norwegian society. To clarify, living in a setting with a variety of alternatives 
and options of what “the good life” might be, provides these young women with the 
opportunity to reflect on their interests, beliefs and desires; all of which are open to 
reconsideration and change (Kymlicka, 1995, p.81). Hence, Islam perceived as an essential 
guiding force that encompasses all aspects of human life, was chosen deliberately to shape 
their conception(s) of the good life. Then again if we are to problematize this choice: what are 
the grounds for this shared perception about the “good life”? And why did all my participants 
associate themselves with religion and not with other spiritual or secular alternatives? One 
possible answer would be linked to my selective recruitment of Muslim female students at the 
UIO as a sample. This explains their identification with Islam, their shared interests in voicing 
their viewpoints regarding the way Islam and Muslims have been represented, and the 
centrality religion plays in their lives. Although this may be true, but similar findings are also 
supported by previously conducted studies on Muslim youth in Europe (Jacobsen, 2011, Göle, 
2012; Ramadan, 2004; Roy, 2004; Vincett et al, 2008).  Though all young women face almost 
similar challenges and share common experiences of late modernity Norway, they may take 
different directions when it comes to belief and lifestyle. As a result, young women apprehend 
their environment differently. In the case of my interviewees, religion was emphasised as a 
means to negotiate their belonging to a “third space”86; a position that encompasses the 
amalgamation of living in compliance with one’s belief and, at the same time, reconciling 
between the different components of one’s personality. Another reason behind their 
increasing interest in Islam is associated with their critical stance towards their parent’s 
cultural practices and a commitment to find their own answers to religious questions. Such a 
position therefore reflects their critical thinking, selectivity, reflexivity and freedom of choice; 
all of which are characteristics of all human practice in late modernity (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 
1991). To elaborate, these young Muslim women are concerned mainly about “the believing” 
than “the belonging” when it comes to their reflected and conscious choice to believe in 
Islam. But then again, they also develop a new form of “belonging” either through social 
media, or through their participation in study groups, social activities and conferences 
seeking; a source of community and support in secular Norway. Therefore, the idea of an 
increasing “individualized” religiosity and the progressive detachment from religious 
                                                 
86
 A concept developed by Homi Bhabha (1994) to describe an “in-between” place beyond duality where other 
positions can emerge deconstructing and reconstructing the dominant definitions of belonging and power 
relations.  
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authorities is not the case here. As a matter of fact, “instead of simply believing and practising 
Islam as everyone else does, modern individuals have made Islam an object of reflection, 
asking what Islam means for them” (Mårtensson, 2014, p.35). Moreover, the secularization 
myth that associates religion with irrationality and backwardness is also challenged in this 
respect provided that these young women are also presented as modern, knowledgeable and 
free. Grounded on these findings, I agree with Göle’s (2012) claim when she maintained that 
the presence of Islam and Muslims within Europe requires a new understanding that 
transcends Orientalist dichotomies; such as “the irreconcilable relationship between Islam and 
Europe based on the opposition between a Universe of submission and another holding the 
promise of freedom and modernity” (Ramadan, 2008, p. 208). To clarify, I suggest that given 
this increasing interest in religion and spirituality among Muslim youth (not just an issue 
related to immigration), the state as well as its Muslim community should work together to 
deal with such a revival properly. Especially if we take into consideration how beneficial a 
believer can be to his/her society. In other words, Modood (1998) maintains that religion can 
be “a source of renewal of community to overcome social divisions and can provide an 
underpinning of compassion, fairness, justice and public morality” (p. 397). However, the 
challenge posed in this regard is the risk that these young women (with minimum knowledge 
about Islam) may deviate from the right path in their attempt to seek “authentic” knowledge 
about Islam. For this reason, I propose that this return to religion should be accommodated 
property in order to help them develop a more balanced and informed understanding of Islam. 
To emphasise the important role of religion in late modern society, one can argue that these 
young Muslim women are not just different, but their presence can also make a difference. For 
this reason, they “need a new, more coherent balance, as well as new, more stimulating 
energy, to enable them to contribute and propose their answers in today’s and tomorrow’s 
world”(Ramadan, 2008, p. 38).  
6.3 Accommodating the  “Personal” within 
Feminism 
Grounded on my interviewees standpoints on feminism in general and the various 
ways the issue of “Muslim women” have been presented within secular feminism and Islamic 
feminism in particular, I came to the conclusion that for an outsider to understand or talk on 
behalf of Muslim women, he or she needs to take into consideration the fact that the “issue of 
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women” is part of a bigger picture that should be explored from within and by Islam as a 
whole. In fact, Esposito and Mogahed (2007) maintain the same conclusion arguing that “the 
first step in helping Muslim women improve their situation is to question the assumption that 
religious teachings are the root cause of women's societal struggles. We do so by 
understanding the tradition of gender justice in Islam and gaining an appreciation for the 
nuances of Islamic law and the diversity of internal debates within Islam” (p. 131). Again, 
understanding the preference(s) of Muslim women in this context is grounded on the fact that, 
as they enter modernity, these women “are no longer, or only to a limited extent, restrained by 
tradition as they now ‘choose,’ for example, to be Muslims, follow Islam and wear the hijab” 
(Jacobsen, 2011, p. 385). A point often overlooked in this regard is that while the female 
emancipation has taken the direction of the right to uncover in response to the expectations 
imposed on women historically regarding dress and societal roles, other women have adopted 
different models of liberation and resistance to oppression. 
 A point repetitively underlined by the interviewees is the fact that while culture 
remains fluid and changing, the basics of Islam are stable, and therefore are not subject to 
reinterpretation. This explains accordingly the salience of some religious practices to Muslim 
men and women that are often restrained in view of the neutrality of the public sphere. A 
more relevant example is that of the hijab: when approached from a feminist as Okin it is 
regarded as a discriminatory cultural practice that should be rejected, whereas for those 
Muslim women who wear the hijab deliberately, it is a religious commitment that cannot be 
negotiated. To put it differently, the young women’s rejection of the isolation or complete 
assimilation that their parents often desired, in favour of a more balanced position, is often 
misunderstood; especially when viewed from an outsider’s position. For instance, Roy 
presents “Islamic radicalisation” as “an endeavour to reconstruct a “pure” religion outside 
traditional or Western cultures, outside the very concept of culture itself” (Roy, 2005, p.6). 
Again, this statement remains simplistic and perplexing at the same time. To clarify, it entails 
that a person’s life can be devoid of culture (which culture he talks about?), it also justifies the 
potential threat of Muslims to the stability of Europe, and thus presenting them as “the other 
within”. Indeed, it is certain that some youth may fall into the trap of radicalisation as 
suggested by Roy; however, in the case of my interviewees this assumption is somewhat 
inappropriate. On the other hand, Jacobsen (2011) in her book Islamic traditions and Muslim 
youth in Norway, maintains a different view: “Through appropriating Islamic traditions in 
their everyday practice, I argue, young Muslims also develop new modes for engaging with 
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and participating in Norwegian society, as well as new modes of transnational belonging to 
the global Islamic umma (community)” (p. 11). Belonging to a global umma is developed in 
parallel of an identity that is adaptable to the society they live in. To put it differently, they are 
articulating their Islamic identity with pride and confidence, and at the same time they 
participate in all kinds of secular activities. This statement is highlighted also by Jacobsen 
(2011) who based on her research concluded that young Muslims’ perspectives on life and 
religion are “‘modern’ in the sense of being conditioned by the modern national state”, 
including secularism, respect of citizenship and nationhood (p. 368). In fact, seeking inner 
balance through spirituality, or even living in compliance with norms of Islamic devoutness 
does not make a person less autonomous or a second-class citizen. 
6.4 Accommodating the “Personal” within “the 
Political” 
All in all, one may argue that the same patterns of cultural devaluation of “Others” are 
still present in the current political discussions about minority religions and integration both 
in Norway and in Europe generally. For the purpose of developing an approach that would 
incorporate inclusion and the recognition of difference, I suggest that “the political” should be 
more attentive to difference within the category “Muslim women” if they are to capture the 
variety and nuances in their experiences, beliefs and interests. In fact, even though these 
young women emphasis a shared relationship to religion, they cannot be perceived as a 
“coherent, homogeneous, group in which everyone has identical interests and desires” (Hesse-
Biber, and Yaiser, 2004, pp. 103-4). That is to say generalizations and conclusions about 
Muslim women cannot be drawn based on personal experiences or viewpoints when 
suggesting different framings of integration policies and gender equality agendas. To 
illustrate, most of my interviewees maintained that state’s efforts to combat forced marriages 
or female genital mutilation, represent the Othering misconceptions of the past and as a result 
pave the way to a conflictual future. As an illustration, O’Brien (2013) points out: “the 
preoccupation with Muslims may have contributed to the free reign exploited by “Christian” 
terrorists such as Norway’s Anders Behring Breivik or Germany’s National Socialist 
Underground Zwickau Cell (p.9). The same assumption is emphasised by Bangstad´s (2014a) 
who criticises the Norwegian politicians as well as researchers’ tendency to represent Islam 
and terrorism as an exclusively ideological phenomenon, whereas right-wing terrorism is 
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primarily perceived as a social psychological phenomenon. This entails also that the 
conflicting cultural, social and political circumstances of some European states are often 
blamed on religion and its adherents, namely Islam and Muslims. A more general example is 
that of Roy’s (2007) account on the revival of Islam among Muslim youth in Europe 
identifying the need to recover a more correct Islamic practice as “neo-fundamentalism” 
arguing that young European Muslims are distancing themselves from “any cultural, social, or 
anthropological reference and hence, of course, from any national reference”, which 
consequently results in their isolation from their social surroundings, and eventually their 
radicalization (p. 73-4). Different from such a reductionist view on the “religion of the born-
again”, as Roy defines it, most of my interviewees claimed that their rejection to some of the 
cultural norms, both parental as well as Norwegian, is limited to the inappropriate or 
discriminatory practices that has no connection with Islam. Similarly , Jacobsen (2011) 
indicates that “the need to recover a more authentic and correct Islamic practice was often put 
forward as a criticism of ‘cultural practices’ of the parental generation that the young 
associated with ‘oppression’ and ‘backwardness’” ( p. 366). Additionally, Modood (2012) 
argues that such exaggerated fear of Muslims is promoting intolerant as well as exclusionary 
politics across Europe. He adds that adopting “an ideology to oppose Islam and its public 
recognition is a challenge both to pluralism and equality, and thus to some of the bases of 
contemporary democracy” (p. 54). This is more compelling as the challenging traditional 
categories of race and ethnicity have extended to religion and some of its cultural 
manifestations pressing Europe to reconsider its liberal principles including state neutrality, 
gender equality, religious freedom and multicultural accommodation. Under those 
circumstances, the alleged normative liberal discourses, the ideal one-model of autonomous 
citizen, as well as the historical marginalization of minority values are to be challenged. 
Especially in a world with such an increasing “diversity and instability, the accommodation of 
difference requires not only a toleration of disagreement but also a structure which does not 
privilege particular groups or traditions” (Kukathas, 2001, p. 92). Furthermore, to transcend 
the addictive inclusion and narrow interpretations of Muslim women’s concerns, politicians 
have to be more attentive to the believer’s perspectives; a consciously and a willingly chosen 
empowerment through religion and not culture. Moreover, debates about the neutrality of 
public space on terms of religion remain “oversimplified and misleading, because such 
mythical neutrality simply does not exist, and in fact obfuscates another real issue that is thus 
avoided, which in equal rights” (Ramadan Tariq, 2009, p. 268). Taken into consideration the 
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fact that these young students are presented as actors in their own lives, and therefore they 
cannot be equated with most secular feminist assumptions87 (external relations of power) 
about freedom and individual autonomy that have been “naturalized and imposed in 
understanding Muslim women” (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 384). For this reason, the better 
understanding of the choices, experiences and perspectives of these emerging voices 
necessitates the transgression of the frequently evoked dichotomy between Islam and 
secularism; especially if we are to take into consideration the fact that religion is increasingly 
moving from the private towards the public sphere. In fact, protecting minority women’s 
rights ought to be constructed based on the multiplicity of voices. Moreover, accommodating 
Muslim women’s interests and concerns should be based upon an inclusive dialogue that 
bridges the gap between these women and those who representing them (e.g. organizations as 
Mira…). An in all, religion requires greater attention than it has received; including its 
relation to the individual as well as its role in society.   
6.5 Limitations and further research  
This research however was limited in several ways. For instance, adhering to the same 
religious belief as my interviewees, we shared almost the same understandings of matters 
such as agency, autonomy and emancipation. As a result, I was compelled to adopt a “strong 
reflexivity” during the whole research process; reflecting constantly on my social background, 
positionality, and assumptions that might affect the practice of research (Hesse-Biber, and 
Yaiser, 2004, p. 115). Another limitation was the fact that I could not go “beyond the veil” as 
the focus on the hijab was unavoidable under most of the conversations. it remains 
challenging not to fall in the same dichotomous tendency of the ‘Self’ versus the ‘Other’ 
given that the project is directed towards a category of women that are ‘resorting’ to Islam as 
a means to articulate their definitions of liberation and freedom in an increasingly secular 
European context. This may result in the exclusion of other Muslim women that have chosen 
another position negotiating the growingly secular environment they live in.   
 
                                                 
87
 Secular feminism is discussed in the theoretical chapter, see p. 37.  
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Appendix A: Interview Guide  
Interview Guide 
The Interviewee Background 
1. What is your age and ethnic background?  
2. What is your level of education and field of study? 
3. What is your dream job? 
4. If I ask you about the elements that have shaped you personality and the woman you are 
now? What would you say? 
5. If we talk about Islam, what role it plays in your daily life?  
6. Does your Muslim identity affect your understanding (perception) about women’s 
‘liberation’? If so, in which way? 
 Transitional questions  
• In your opinion, who speaks for Muslim women in the contemporary Europe? 
• Can you name some Muslim women’s related issues that have been debated by the 
feminists or the politicians?  
On the political level  
1. How do you identify with the international events associated with Muslims nowadays?   
2. What would you say about the new wave of regulations/ legislations in a number of 
European countries preventing Muslim women from covering their head?  
3. The principle of secularism has been interpreted in different ways. If you were asked to 
choose between the two following claims, which one would you support? 
a. Secularism as the state’s neutrality; which means that the suppression of God from 
the public sphere, and thus a reason to exert restrictions on religious freedom. 
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b. Secularism as the state’s non-interference in systems of belief and worship, and 
thus the right of citizens to religious freedom with no restrains. 
4. How would you explain the connection between the secular nature of a given state and its 
prohibition against the external manifestation/visibility of the individual’s religious 
conviction in public?  
5. What would you say about the political argument that associates extremism with the veil 
regarding hijabi women as active threats to the security of democratic liberal west?  
 
6. What is your opinion about the way Norway is dealing with its multi-religious society? 
(Legally) does your difference is publically recognised? At school, media, work..? 
 
7. Do you think that your difference as, a female Muslim citizen, is recognised socially 
within the Norwegian society?  
a. Do you feel with pride or shame when you are confronted with issues related 
to your religion? 
8. Have you ever felt a sense of marginalization or deprivation related to employment 
opportunities just because of being Muslim?  
9. Do you have any doubt that Norway may adopt the same political approach to freedom of 
religion as that of France, for example? Or, in other words, does the European debate 
influence Norway? 
10. If you were to be given the chance to do something for Muslim women in Norway, What 
would you do? How would you participate to the universal dialogue of human rights? 
11. In your opinion, what is the best way, for politicians and those concerned with Human 
Rights, to engage in the issues of Muslim women?  
On the feminist level   
1. What does feminism mean to you? 
2. How would you define terms liberation, freedom, autonomy and emancipation in the 
increasingly body-oriented European space? 
3. I will give you some concepts and you tell me in few words how do you relate yourself to 
them, (consumerism, capitalism, individualism and materialism)? 
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4. What do you think about the claim that Muslim women in the last decades are ‘resorting’ 
to (learn more about) Islam as a means to claim their definitions of liberation and freedom 
in the European context? 
5. What do you think about the feminists that view Muslim women as ‘passive’ victims of 
Islam and its patriarchal oppressive norms? 
a. How do you feel when you hear such claims and how do you react? (Under 
conversations with friends, from a teacher, a TV program…)  
 
6. What would you say about public figures as Nawal Saadawi and Ayaan Hirsi Ali who 
view Islam as a patriarchal and misogynist religion? 
7. What do you think about the feminists who advocate for the re-reading and the re-
interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah from a woman’s perspective believing that the 
patriarchal interpretation of religion is the reason behind the oppressive practices against 
Muslim women? 
 
8. Does Islam contradict with what you desire as a woman? 
 
9. Do you feel the need to be liberated? If so, for what and to what?  
 
10. In your opinion, what is the best way for feminists to engage in the issues of Muslim 
women?  
11. Is it possible to be a Muslim and a feminist? 
 
12. Do you consider yourself a feminist? If yes, how? If not, Why? 
 
13. What do you really want as a Muslim Norwegian female citizen? 
 
14. Can you mention any role model? 
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Appendix B: Consent Form 
Informed Consent Form 
Muslim Women in UIO: A Faith-Based Agency 
A Debate between the Political, the Feminist and the Personal 
 
I am a Gender Studies master student at UIO conducting a research on the issue of Muslim 
Women. The purpose of this project is to develop an account that integrates the standpoints of 
Muslim female students at UIO regarding both the European political views that advocate, 
most of the time, for the privatization of religion as well as the feminist discourses that either 
reject religion or call for its reinterpretation. 
 
You were selected as a possible participant in this project because, as a female Muslim 
student, I believe that your views and position in relation to the claims of those, who have 
engaged in the issue of Muslim women, is important for the development of a reliable 
narrative about Muslim women in the contemporary Europe.  
 
You should read the information below, and ask questions about anything you do not 
understand, before deciding whether or not to participate.  
 
Your participation in this study will consist of an interview with an estimated length of one 
hour. You will be asked a series of questions about your standpoints regarding political as 
well as feminist views on Muslim women. Our discussion will be audio taped to help me 
accurately document your insights in your own words.   
 
The tapes will only be heard by me and my supervisor for the purpose of this study. Your 
responses will remain confidential and will be used for reference while proceeding with this 
project. Though direct quotes from you may be used in the paper, your name and other 
identifying information will be kept anonymous. All interview recordings will be stored in a 
secure work space until July 2014. The tapes will then be destroyed. 
 
This interview is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw your consent as long as the 
project is in progress, and to stop the interview at any time or for any reason.   
 
If you have any questions or concern, please contact me at any time at the e-mail address 
ilham_skah18@hotmail.com or telephone number +47-99851153.   
 
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may contact the 
Student Adviser Granum Helle Pedersen at telephone number +47-22858937or my supervisor 
Dr. Cecilie Thun at telephone number +47-22858973. 
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The project has been reported to the Data Protection Official for Research at the Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services. 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW 
 
By signing below I acknowledge that I have read and understand the above information. 
My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this 
study. I have been given a copy of this form.  
 
Signature____________________________________________ Date_______________   
 
 
 
